The fighters invoke God's support in all their efforts with prayers, supplications, church attendance, participation in the Immaculate Mysteries and oaths on the Gospel and the cross. Many cases of ritual proclamation of the Revolution are mentioned by I. Philemon in his "Essay on the Greek Revolution" while collections of such references are also found in the works of contemporary authors who deal with religiosity in the Revolution
The rebels identified themselves as "Romans", "Greeks" or "Christians", but within the first months of the Revolution it became common even among the illiterate to use the name "Greeks" exclusively for the rebels. This name indicated prowess and greatness and animated the warriors, as it identified them with the Greeks of the popular imagination, legendary beings of the distant past with gigantic dimensions and supernatural strength.
Political Organization
In May, at the initiative of the Messinian senate, a Pampeloponnesian assembly was convened in the Kaltezo Monastery, under the presidency of Petrobeis Mavromichalis. Powerful dignitaries or their representatives, hierarchs and a few military and Friends participated. Invitations were sent to all three naval islands but they did not participate. By its announcement on May 26, the Peloponnesian Senate was established, in which all the powers and responsibility of directing revolutionary affairs for the entire Peloponnese were vested.
Members of this senate were representatives from all the great ancient fireplaces of the Peloponnese, Palaion Patron Germanos, Petrobeis Mavromichalis and secretary Rigas Palamidis. It was a hasty but coordinated action by the powerful to oppose the power of Demetrius Ypsilantis, who was expected to reach the Peloponnese. Until his arrival this Senate held elections for provincial and community representatives and declared general conscription.
In January 1822, the first National Synod, in Epidaurus, proclaimed the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire. This declaration was sealed after the remarkable victories of the fighting Greeks, on land and sea.
Greek War of Independence 1821-32 - Greek & Ottoman History DOCUMENTARY
The first anniversary episode is dedicated to the beginning and the end of the Struggle: to the leader of the Revolution Alexander Ypsilantis who started the revolution in February 1821 and to his brother Dimitrios who fought the last battle of the Struggle in September 1829 in Petra Boeotia.
The Great Powers in 1821
The Greek Revolution exploded under the most unfavorable omens: seven years after Waterloo, from the Iberian Peninsula to Italy, Europe is shaking with revolts that threaten its monarchical regimes. In fact, exactly in the same period (January - March 1821) the news of the Greek Revolution found the representatives of the Great Powers meeting in Laibach about how the Holy Alliance would suppress the liberation movements in Naples and Piedmont.
And while the suppression of these movements did not seem a difficult task for the powerful European autocracies, the Greek case filled them with concerns because it threatened the long-desired balance for the European continent after the collapse of Napoleon and required a new strategy and diplomacy to maintain order.
The cariophili was a forward-facing weapon, a lance and operated with a flint mechanism. Its length was between 1.20 and 1.70 with a peculiar stock. The long barrel allowed enough range, but for accuracy the gun had to be supported. The caryophili was a heavy and difficult weapon, and the mechanism of the flint often did not fire mainly due to the weather conditions. The oldest cariophiles date to around 1750 and their firing mechanisms came mainly from Italy.
In addition to the cariophili, the thieves and charioteers were additionally armed with 1 or 2 pistols and an additional knife, jatagani (hanjara) and pala (sword). The pistols were also brachycane, leiocan weapons with a flintlock mechanism and depending on their origin, they can be distinguished into European, Oriental or Albanian. Carried on the warrior's belt, "selahi," in shaped pouches. The yatagani was a slightly curved sword with a simple hilt.
The pala was a very curved sword with a cross hilt, the main offensive weapon in hand-to-hand combat (yurusia) and carried by the fighters at their waists or on their shoulder straps. Many times the yataganias and pales as well as their cases were elaborately decorated with silver or gold. The weapons were complemented by palaskas, pouches that had the ammunition (volleys) as well as various other accessories.
The above weapons, which were similar to each other but did not have a uniform type, were used by the regular corps, until they began to be gradually replaced during the struggle by European rifles. It should be noted that both in the pre-revolutionary period and during the revolution, workshops and weapons production workshops were developed in mainland Greece with mechanisms imported from Italy and other European countries.
The gunpowder mills of the Spiliotopou Brothers in Dimitsana, which were essentially the seat of the first Greek war industry, were the main suppliers of the weapons of the revolution with ammunition. To recap, the armament of the irregulars, semi-regulars and regular troops throughout the revolution, initially consisted of cariophiles and pistols that came from Turkish and Balkan gunsmiths and crafts, while some fighters also carried European weapons.
Gradually, however, this scene changed when cargoes of European weapons began to arrive from the Philhellenic committees (committees) that had been established in the countries of Europe and were working to strengthen the revolution, as well as from the spoils that the rebel Greeks seized from the Turkish army, who had the same arms as we have already mentioned. Finally, the first regular army of the revolution used the CHARLEVILLE type lance rifle, of French origin, model 1777, forelocks, with a flintlock mechanism and a caliber of 17.53 millimeters.
Also, a factory for the repair of rifles and cannons and the manufacture of ammunition and projectiles began operating in Nafplion in September 1825 under the command of the French colonel Arnaud, who brought the necessary machinery and a staff of pyrotechnicians from France.
Detailed Description and Significance of Weapons
Fighters of those times considered "their chariots", as they called their weapons, to be an integral part of their attire. It was their honor and their manhood, their jewels and their pride. When indeed they were booty acquired in battle from the hand of the dead enemy, then their owner had a more prominent position. Their weapons were considered sacred as well as holy images. They had them as their children and their love was so great that they baptized them like their children. Karaiskakis called his caryophile "Vasiliki", Thanasis Diakos "Papadia", Dimitris Makris "Liaro", Grivas "Maurikio", Odysseas Androutsos "Matzari".
Revolution carnations also had various names derived from their style or place of manufacture. Some of them were: "Lazarina", "Milioni", "Trikon", "Armuti", "Gizair", "Daliani" (from the Italians), "Sisanes", "Sharmas", "Hare Sharmas", "Moutsonigos" , "Venetianos", "Psalidias", "Sade", "Dansika", "Filyntra" (it was the weapon that had been repaired) etc. The above types of their rifles have been preserved in their songs: "My daliani in the war and armuti in the sign and cariophile in the voice like a worthy lad".
In their Selachi (belt), in cases they had the pistols, usually with embroidery and silver, both in the "lamni" (barrel) and in the "pafilia" (connecting links) and upright handle. In the outer case of the selachi they had the "harbi" used for cleaning and loading the pistol. The "harbi", when it came out of its sheath, became a formidable dagger (disc or single-edged). Also in a separate place in the selahi was their yatagani in its case, usually also embroidered with silver.
Its blade was made of strong steel and carried in an elaborate sheath. On the left part of their waist from a silken girdle or with cords from the left scapula hung the turned pala (sword), the hilt of which resembled a dragon's head made of a separate bone. Her case, also beautifully decorated with figures and embroidery, was of silver or gilt or of bronze. Its light steel blade was the terror of battle.
The swords of the fighters deserve a longer description since, if they considered their chariots sacred, their swords were the holiest of holies. It was the weapon of the lad that qualified the manly in hand-to-hand combat. The cariophili and the pistol kept the enemy at bay. But victory was given by the sword and that is why it was the honored weapon of his armoury. Warriors took their holy oath on their swords. The heaviest oath among the Souliotes was "Let the sword of Botsaris or Xavela cut me".
Women and children were also "burdened" with the carnation, if it happened, but the sword required a manly hand, strong and fearless. This is what the poem of the Kolokotronians says: "They all ride in the church, they worship on horseback/ they throw flowers to the Virgin Mary, they throw flowers to the saints/ and to the master Christ the silver swords./ Our Christ, burn our swords, burn our hands" . The pala was the dominant offensive weapon in the fights and that is why in the images of the fighters we have it is always raised, ready for a terrible blow.
Its shape (very curved), gave it the ability to cut deep into the human body, cutting off hands and heads with a single blow. In their "yurusias" (attacks), the fighters left their other weapons in their "drums" and rushed at the Turks, bare-chested. The descriptions of the "yurusia" are shocking and the sight of the wild attacking men shook even the most emaciated enemy.
A famous such raid was the exit of Messolongius, the "Great Jurusi" as they called it, which shocked the whole world, since, although the besieged Greeks had betrayed and the Turks were waiting for them fully prepared, they managed to open a way with their swords and pass , "harvesting" them like farmers their fields, who enter with the sickle from one end and exit at the other.
Also famous for their dexterity with the sword were the chieftains Nikitaras, the so-called Turkophagus who in Dervenakia exchanged three fights that broke from the incessant blows until his hand "wooden" on the handle and he could not open it, and Gouras who he suffered the same in the battle at the basilicas.
The yatagani was also a famous sword but mainly a defensive weapon in the yurusia, which came out of the selahi, when the blade broke or fell down. Finally, among the warriors, whoever killed the enemy rightfully took his sword as loot. The captains, when handing over the leadership to the protopalikaro of their "daifa", also gave him their sword. Thus many swords passed from the hands of old illustrious captains into the hands of younger ones who honored them as relics sacred to the struggle of "21".
The following verse by our national poet K. Palamas gives us the meaning that the equipment and weapons of the revolutionaries of 1821 must have for the younger Greeks: chariots, the solid or the golden./ Sanctify them with blood and fire, bring censers/ put them in the powder and light the candles".
The Navy of the Insurrection
We are at the beginning of the 18th century, a time when the once mighty Ottoman Empire, whose slow decline had long since shown its first symptoms, being unable to exploit the "dominion of the sea" and its benefits, either because of the indifferent, without special abilities of its sultans, either due to the ignorance of naval matters but also an innate fear of the Turks towards the sea element, essentially left to its subjects - consequently also to the Greek sailors, a completely free field of development and almost complete supremacy of the of their merchant fleets not only in the Aegean region but also in the entire eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
The existing question of the dismemberment of the great Ottoman empire had already been raised more acutely at that time, by the Great European Powers of the time. The Ottomans, on the other hand, also had to deal with the ever-increasing power of local semi-independent Rulers of their empire, who, being aware of their abilities and power, were beginning to raise sovereign claims on territories of the empire that they possessed.
Also a serious threat to the Ottoman status quo was the National Awakening of the peoples enslaved in the Empire, and particularly the Greeks and Serbs, expressed through various local uprisings and claims. The negative consequences of all these issues contributed to the fact that in the 18th century the Divanian empire, although the owner of most of the coastal areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, had already lost control over shipping and trade in these areas.
On the other hand, the living conditions in Western Europe at the beginning of the 18th century and the war conflicts between the major European states, as well as the fierce commercial and colonial competition between these states, particularly favored the birth of the first Greek shipping companies.
In this context, the seaports of the Ionian Islands and Western Greece were initially developed, while the maritime power of Eastern Greece, although one would not expect it, developed several years later, starting from the large islands of the Asia Minor coast and a little later, mainly from the middle of From the 18th century onwards, we have naval development in Hydra, Spetses, Kasos, Mykonos and the other Cycladic islands.
In the meantime, in the European foreground we now have the war for the succession to the Austrian throne, the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and mainly the great bourgeois French Revolution (1789), in the naval skirmishes in which many Greek ships and crews took part in cruisers, a fact which had as a direct consequence, the acquisition of combat experience of these crews.
The outbreak of the Revolution therefore found the islanders fully prepared. Spetses was the first to rebel when on April 2 to 3 they rose up and occupied the Chancellery, the command post of the island at the instigation of the candidate G. Panos and the Botasaians. At the same time or immediately after the Spetses Revolution, the neighboring islands of Poros, Aegina and Salamina (known at the time as Koulouri) also raised a revolutionary flag. A few days later, on Easter, on April 10, Psara also rebelled at the instigation of the envoy Gikas Tsoupas from Spetses and with a decision that entailed great risks since the Psarians knew that as a naval advanced base in the NE Aegean they would be one of the first targets of Ottoman fleet.
Filikos, Papaflessas sent to Hydra already in December 1820 with a letter from Alexandros Ypsilantis, ignited with his rhetorical skill the souls of the Hydraians who, despite the hesitations and reservations of their superiors who waited first to weigh the seriousness of his movement, considering the proclamation of the Revolution untimely, obeying the historical situation and with the initiative and encouragement of the ardent patriot Antonis Economos "captain of the second class", on March 27 (according to others April 16) of 1821 they raised the revolutionary flag and gave their fleet by the pioneers in the naval Race and their money as a determining factor in its conduct.
Finally, the candidates of all three islands, whose person was a combination of commercial wealth, naval power and defensive security, also joined the war game, soul and body. Their ships with mostly ancient Greek names - a favorite habit of the ship owners of the time, indicative of their respect for antiquity and their pride for their ancient ancestors - plowed the seas at the head of the "Trinisian Fleet" in most of the naval conflicts with the Ottoman fleet.
Ares of Tsamados, Themistocles of the Tombazis, Miltiades of Sahini, Agamemnon of Bouboulina, Epaminondas of Hatzigianni Mexis, Achilles of the Botasians, Herakles of the Koutsis.
The Administrative Organization of the Naval Battle
The structure of the Greek fleet was similar to that of the land ships: that is, there was no supreme commander, fleet commander. Each island elected an admiral and a vice-admiral for a particular operation. In March 1822, the Ministry of Marines was established and its management was entrusted to a three-member Commission from representatives of all three large islands. Although the Greek fleet lagged materially and organizationally behind the Ottoman one, without an essentially permanent naval command.
However, with the general leadership of the unique in martial mastery Andreas Miaoulis, who had been tacitly recognized "as first among equals", and with the unattainable regular and effective use of the terrible weapon of the pyrotechnics (which in essence turned the enemy's power into weight and which the Hydraeospetsians and Psarians almost perfected by sacrificing many of their previously commercially profitable ships) repeatedly defeated the Turkish armada.
At the same time, the admirals of the three islands, Andreas Miaoulis for Hydra, Georgios Androutsos for Spetses and Nikolis Apostolis for Psara, are constantly organizing naval battles, testifying their knowledge and strategic mind and continue to recognize, as we mentioned above, in the person of Miaoulis the primum inter pairs.
The Hydrian sailors Tombazides, the Sachinides, the Kriezides, the Tsamados, the Speciotes Mexides, the Orlofs, the Botasaios, the Hatzianargyri, the Androutsos, the Psarians, the Kanarides, the Apostolides, the Giannitsides, the Nikodimos, the Diakogiannis, and so many others , they parade spectacularly in the chorus of naval protagonists suddenly transformed from merchant family heads to managers of a peculiar Race... And they lead this Race by creating incredible feats, full of heroism and glory.
They give themselves wholeheartedly to the Struggle with whatever means they have and the Greek sea warriors manage, despite whatever difficulties they encountered, mainly due to the lack of funding for their naval campaigns, to overturn to a large extent the plans (especially of supplying fortresses and strategic positions) and the actions of the Ottoman fleet and to make it difficult, if not to cut off completely, the communication of the Turks and later also of their Egyptian allies, with the Morea or with other critical, strategic points of the country, as well as to incite neutral islands in the Revolution or to defend the already revolted. The prevalence and stabilization of the Revolution was for them a one-way and final goal.
The Course of the Struggle and its Tragic Economic Consequences
The naval Race continues victoriously to the end. Naval battles and burnings follow one another: Naval battle of Patras, burning of Turkish flagship in Chios from Kanari, Naval battle of Dar, Bogaz, burning of Turkish corvette in Tenedos, naval battle of Samos, Naval battle of Kos-Halicarnassus, naval battle of Gerontas, naval battle of Methoni. However, such a match, and indeed with unequal, most often, conditions, certainly entailed inevitable losses. However, any catastrophic losses were created to highlight the holocaust, the glory of the Hellenic Naval Race. The properties that were actually saved were minimal.
After the end of the Battle, Hydra had fatally lost approximately 78% of its ships, i.e. it had a total of only 100 ships with a total capacity of 10,240 tons. For the neighboring Spetses, things were much worse: at the end of the Battle, they had only 50 ships, while around 1830 the remaining Spetsian ships were only 16!!
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When the Struggle was over, his enormous financial losses were assessed, the amount of which can only be roughly estimated. A general idea is given by the compensations requested by the shipowners of the islands after the end of the war. As an example, I mention that the Hydra demanded 10,000,000 gold francs of the time, the Speciotes 5,570,000, the Psarians 4,430,000 and the Cassians 1,110,000 gold francs. Given the current value of the golden pound, which reaches 200 euros, I think we can all reflect on the correspondence of the allocated amounts.
The Beginning of the Revolution in the Peloponnese
According to the plans of the Friendly Society, the Peloponnese would be the center of the revolution. The reasons that led to this choice were many. Its peculiar geography (peninsula) made it difficult to reinforce it militarily, as it was far from the strong military centers and recruiting areas of the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire.
The mountainous morphology of the terrain prevented the generalized use of cavalry, while the narrow passes made the movement of large military units difficult and facilitated their obstruction by numerically inferior armed groups (stealth warfare). The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the region favored the rapid spread of the revolution.
The Muslim-Christian ratio that exceeded the ratio of 1 to 10 and the strengthened, compared to other regions (e.g. Pumeli) administrative and financial presence of the former who had their own armed forces (the so-called kakus) constituted favorable conditions for the places where the revolution prevailed in the Peloponnese.
To these factors we will add the privileged status of Mani, a region that did not belong to Mora valesi (commander of the Peloponnese) but was administered by Christiano bey who was directly subordinate to Kapudan-Pasha (the head of the Ottoman fleet). For these reasons, Morias was from the beginning an area in which the interest of the Friends was directed, and on the eve of the revolution, the majority of the local leading actors had been introduced to the Society.
The action of the Friends in the Peloponnese and the information about an impending rebellion had worried the High Gate, which reacted by appointing the famous Hursit-Pasha, a former grand vizier and experienced in dealing with rebellions, as Mora valesi in the fall of 1820. The fact worried the initiated but hesitant about the manifestation of the revolution. But soon, at the beginning of January 1821, Xursit with the bulk of his military forces left for Epirus with the aim of suppressing Ali Pasha's rebellion.
At the same time, Papaflessas arrived in the area with the aim of speeding up the revolution. Thus, a series of meetings were held in Bostitsa (Agios) at the end of January, but despite the efforts of Papaflessas and the decision taken to start the revolution at the end of March, the prominent ones remained hesitant. In the meantime, Kolokotronis was secretly returning to the Peloponnese and specifically to the area of Mani, while intense mobility was observed in the ranks of the thieves.
In addition, rudimentary war preparations began, such as the activation of the gunpowder mills in Dimitsana. These movements and the rumors circulating throughout the Peloponnese about an imminent Christian uprising alarmed the Ottomans who gradually began to gather in the fortified Tripolitsa and the castles of the other important cities.
Tension in Christian-Muslim relations continued to escalate until mid-March. Since that time, sporadic attacks by thieves against Muslims began to occur in many provinces, while the tension was fueled by the looting of homes that Muslim families were abandoning.
The dynamic of the ever-escalating tension, the fear of reprisals and the pressure of thieves and Friends led even the most reluctant of the Peloponnesian leadership groups to declare revolution in their regions and put themselves in charge. Thus, in the last ten days of March most provinces declared the revolution, following and leading each other.
On the 1st of March, a ship loaded with proclamations of rebellion set off from Constantinople bound for the Peloponnese, following the actions of Philikos Xanthos. With this ship, the news of the rebellion in Moldova reached Mani at the end of March. Some disturbances of the Christians in the City related to the rebellion, when the revolution broke out in Morea, gave rise to massacres. Fotakos mentions that the Greeks who arrived in Greece from Russia and Constantinople propagated March 25 as the starting day of the revolution.
The Porte considered dealing with Ali Pasha's rebellion a priority, but was seriously worried by the rumors and complaints of the English about a rebellion in the Morea. Shortly after the rebellion in the Rumanian dominions, but not because of it, the Turks of Tripolitsa summoned the provosts of the Morea under pretense of the usual joint annual meeting, but with the aim of holding them hostage. Most of the provosts were hesitant and did not go. Those who went were executed later, some with the outbreak of the revolution, others a few days before the Fall of Tripolitsa and others died from the hardships in the prisons.
In mid-March 1821, Papaflessas had completed his cycle of tours in the Peloponnese and was together with Anagnostaras in Messinia, an area for which he had been made responsible by the Filiki Etairia. Kolokotronis was also in his area of responsibility, Mani. Odysseas Androutsos was hiding in Patras, ready to take action. Other Friends were each in various areas of responsibility. Despite the doubts of the provosts, the climate in the Peloponnese was strongly revolutionary and a spark was missing for the great explosion.
In 1821, March 25 was set as the starting day of the revolution by Alexander Ypsilantis. It was even chosen precisely because it is the day of the Annunciation. Although for various reasons the revolution had already begun in Moldowallachia and broke out earlier in various regions of the Peloponnese, in some regions it began exactly on the predetermined date with the sieges of castles, with rebellion or rituals.
In areas where the prokrites were initially hesitant to revolt, such as the Peloponnese, thieves and Friends carried out armed attacks against the Ottoman authorities, blackmailing the start of the revolution. The trigger of the revolution was given in the ten days between March 14-25 in different places in Moria. In the area of Kalavryta, important revolutionary events took place during this period, which were the spark for the start of the Revolution.
The first was Nikolaos Christodoulou or Soliotis, ignoring the endless meetings of the provosts in Agia Lavra, together with Reader Kordis and other thieves, on March 14, 1821, they set up an ambush and knocked on the site "Portes" near the village of Agridi three plasterers and three postmen who were transporting letters of the Kaimakami of Tripolitsa, Mehmet Salih, to Khursit Pasha in Ioannina, at the urging of Sotiris Charalambis.
This was followed on March 16, 1821 by the attack of Chondrogiannis in the location "Helonospilia" of Lykouria, against the tax collector Lalaios Tourkalvanos Seidis, who together with the native of Vytina "Sarafi" Nikolaos Tabakopoulos, was transporting debt securities from Kerpini Kalavryton to Tripolitsa. In the afternoon of the same day, there was an attack against the Turkish commander (voivode) of Kalavryta Ibrahim Pasha Arnautoglou, who, worried because of the events that preceded him, set out with his entire garrison for Tripolitsa.
Arnautoglou, when he was informed of what had happened, was terrified and hurried to shut himself up with the rest of the Turks in the three fortified towers of Kalavryta. On March 21, 1821, 650 armed fighters led by Sotiris Charalambis, A. Fotilas, Sotiris Theocharopoulos, Ioannis Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Soliotis and the Petimezai attacked the Turks who had taken refuge in the towers and forced them to surrender. This was the first military success of the revolution.
At the same time, Patras rose up from the Friendly Panagiotis Karatzas, Vangelis Livadas and N. Gerakaris, forcing the Muslims to shut themselves in its fortress. At the beginning of the struggle the whole of the armed forces came from the thieves and charioteers of the pre-revolutionary period; they would form the main part of the revolutionary forces throughout the revolution.
The first revolutionary camp was formed in Verbaina on March 25, by the Reader Kontakis with warriors from Agios Petros, Doliana, ambitious Tripolitsiotes, and by the late Bresthenis Theodoritos and P. Varvitsiotis. There gradually gathered chieftains and warriors from various places and there the first supply unit was organized ("tutorship" according to Photakos).
The scene of the ceremonial proclamation of the revolution in Agia Lavra remained legendary. This is mentioned by several sources of the time, while it was considered unreal by younger historians. The legend acquired an important place in the official Greek national narrative, as it associated religion with the revolution and equated national and religious identity. The German himself does not mention the scene in his unfinished memoirs of that day.
Of the memoirists of the Revolution, only Kanellos Deligiannis mentions it, while Michael Oikonomou mentions in general that in all the provinces of the Peloponnese the raising of the flag of the Cross took place on March 25. It is known that in his memoirs the German mentions very little about his personal action. According to the historian B. Kremmidas, its creation is due to the French consul Francois Pouqueville, who channeled to the French press what the German sent him and in 1824 composed a fantastic detailed account of the incident.
Some historians argue that the core of the legend preserves some historical truth, relying on personal records of fighters and hierarchs from 1821, who claim that the Old Patronus Germanos performed a doxology on March 17 in Agia Lavra and swore in some kojabasides and bishops of Moria, who were there for the celebration of Saint Alexios.
Most historians, as mentioned by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, are of the opinion mentioned in the memoirs of Old Patras Germanos, that is, "the [...] congregants decided not to give cause, but as they were afraid, to move aside to safe places". The only thing that is certain is that those gathered left Agia Lavra on March 17 knowing of the imminent start of a revolution. The proclamation of the Revolution in Agia Lavra is mentioned in the autobiographies of fighters from 1821 and in the London Times newspaper of 11-6-1821.
In Mani the revolution was mobilized by Kolokotroni, Papaflessa, Nikitaras and Kefala. There 2,000 Maniatians and Messenians were armed with munitions that had been sent by the Friends of Smyrna and had arrived there in ships. On March 23, Kalamata was liberated. On March 24, around 5,000 Greeks gathered in the outskirts of Kalamata to receive the blessing of the Church and on the same day, Phocis rose up in Roumeli.
The Messinian senate was established in Kalamata and Petrobeis Mavromichalis was placed at its head. The first act of the new power was to send a document to the Christian nations asking for their help, and this document was also the first act of international law of the revolution. The Achaean directorate was founded in Patras, by the provosts Andreas Londo and Charalambis, Papadiamantopoulos and the despot of Old Patras Germanos, who on March 26 delivered a revolutionary declaration to the foreign diplomats who were in Patras.
From the Proclamation of the Revolution to the Fall of Tripolitsa
The escalating tension observed since the beginning of January 1821 culminated in the last ten days of March. In those days, the revolution was declared in Gortynia, Kalavryta, Patras, Mani, Kalamata, Gastouni, Bostitsa (Aigio) and from there the revolutionary effervescence spread to almost all corners of the Moria peninsula. The incidents developed more or less in a similar way. The dignitaries and hierarchs of these provinces overcame any hesitations, often pressured by their local rivals (eg the Mavromichalians from the Tzanetakis), put themselves in charge of armed forces and declared the revolution in their region.
Flags were made in which the symbol of the cross and not the palm tree, the symbol of the Friendly Society, dominated, eulogies were held where weapons were blessed, proclamations were issued, while the first attempts were made for a rudimentary local organization with the aim of directing the revolution (Achaic Directory , Messinian Senate). From the events of the first days, let's single out the occupation of Kalamata by the Maniates and the proclamation issued there on March 23 by Petrobeis Mavromichalis.
The initial surprise of the Ottomans led to panic movements that facilitated the spread of the revolution. The Muslim population, alarmed and worried by the absence of the greater part of the Ottoman forces, fled to the many fortresses that had been in the Peloponnese since the time of the Venetian occupation (1685-1715). Especially in Tripolitsa (Tripolis), a fortified city that was the administrative and military center of the Ottomans in the Peloponnese.
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At the same time, the first groups of revolutionaries recruited armed men and engaged in sieges of the fortresses (Methoni, Koroni, Neokastro/Pylos, Chlomoutsi/Gastouni, Akrokorinthos, Nafplio, Monemvasia). In the first two months, there were many problems and almost no successes. The preparations for the revolution were inadequate and the sieges were carried out by nominally armed armies only, without cannon and sufficient ammunition. Few had weapons beyond knives and farm implements and even fewer actually knew how to fight.
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Thus, in the forays carried out by the Ottomans to find supplies, the besiegers would flee and their camp would break up. It took time for them to become warrior farmers who until then had not known armed conflicts and sieges. The war with Ali Pasha of Ioannina, which occupied a large part of the Ottoman forces, offered the Peloponnesians the opportunity to form a fighting army.
At that time, only the Maniates, the Kapi and the old thieves such as the Kolokotronians and the Plaputians had experienced armed men. The famous phrase of Kolokotronis "fire and ax to the pilgrims" proved in several cases to be an effective antidote to overcome the fear caused by the Ottomans and to regroup the rebel camp. The fear was gradually overcome and the first victories on the battlefield, in Baltetsi and Doliana in mid-May 1821, more than the result proved to everyone that the Ottomans were not invincible.
Since the summer, the efforts of the revolutionaries have been focused on the siege of Tripolitsa. The capture of the administrative and military center of the Ottomans that dominated the center of the peninsula was more than necessary for the consolidation of the revolution in the Peloponnese. The siege of Tripolitsa, in which more than twenty thousand Muslim civilians and several thousand armed men had gathered, lasted several months, until the last days of September.
Especially in the last month, when the cordon had now become suffocating and the city's supplies had been exhausted, a large number of Christians had gathered in the Greek camp in anticipation of the spoils that would be obtained from the capture of the city. The fall of Tripolitsa was followed by scenes of blind violence. Thousands of Ottomans, mostly civilians, but also the Jews of the city became victims of an indescribable massacre that lasted three days. These events showed that there was no longer ground for reconciliation with the Ottoman power. The central slogan of the revolution Freedom or Death now acquired a different dynamic, a stronger base.
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The Revolution in the Aegean Islands
The reinforcement with troops and supplies of the besieged Ottomans in the fortresses of Moria could be carried out both by land and by sea. Dealing with the second eventuality presupposed the mobilization of numerous water-based, spetsian and mainly fish-based ships. The fleet of the three islands numbered a few hundred lightly armed small merchant ships, which, however, often engaged in piracy just as effectively.
Although these ships did not constitute a real war fleet, the experience of their crews and the flexibility of the small boats in the islands and rocky islets of the Aegean waters could not hinder the action of the Ottoman fleet. Inhabited almost exclusively by Greek populations, except for Rhodes, Kos and Chios where Muslims also lived, the Aegean islands gradually declared the revolution from the first ten days of April onwards.
Exceptions were Cycladic islands such as Syros, Tinos and Naxos, where the majority of the inhabitants were Catholic. Spetses, Psara, Samos and especially Hydra were the center of the revolutionary struggle in the Aegean, although the local leadership groups seemed hesitant at first - something that had also happened in the Peloponnese. In fact, in Hydra, the strongest naval center where the Kountouriotis family dominated, the revolution was declared thanks to the persistence of a smaller local factor.
This is Filiko Antonis Oikonomou, who initially led the revolution but was soon neutralized. Samos was dominated by the personality of Lykourgos Logothetis, an old local ruler and Philikos, who imposed his authority over the other local actors. In the first months of the revolution, Greek ships had relative freedom of movement in the Aegean. A part of the Ottoman fleet remained in the port of Polis, as there was the fear of a new Russo-Ottoman war, while another part was on the coast of Epirus taking part in the war with Ali Pasha.
Thus, the Greek fleet attempted almost undisturbed attacks on individual Ottoman ships, several of which were captured, while participating in the sieges of the fortresses in Nafplio (led by the famous Laskarina Bouboulina), in Monemvasia, in Nafpaktos and elsewhere. There were also acts of piracy against neutral merchant ships as well as raids on the coasts of Asia Minor. In fact, at that time there was no organized Greek fleet following any organized plan, but a partnership of crews in view of some operation.
Thus, when parts of the Ottoman fleet attempted to leave the Dardanelles with the aim of resupplying the besieged fortresses of the Peloponnese and transporting troops, it seemed difficult for the Greek ships to successfully oppose the Ottomans. Of course, there was no lack of individual successes that were based on the heroism of people but also on a war tactic that was adopted and was to characterize to a large extent the war actions in the maritime space.
We are referring to the incendiary, specially designed ships loaded with flammable materials and explosives, which attached themselves to the Ottoman ships, ignited and sank with them. The fear of the Ottomans from the action of the arsonists limited the movements of their fleet. In the first period, it seems that both sides tried to avoid conflicts, a development that certainly favored the spread of the revolution both in the continental and insular areas.
The Spread of the Revolution in Central Greece
Filiki Etairia had a small presence among the charioteers of central Greece. However, the position of the charioteers in the territories controlled by Ali Pasha was uncertain after his expected defeat by the Sultan's forces. After the outbreak of rebellion in the Peloponnese, the spread of revolutionary activity risked depriving them of power in their territories, as well as exposing them to the Ottoman authorities. Thus the Mainland charioteers overcame their reservations and placed themselves at the head of the rebel forces in their chariots.
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The Great Powers in 1821
The Greek Revolution exploded under the most unfavorable omens: seven years after Waterloo, from the Iberian Peninsula to Italy, Europe is shaking with revolts that threaten its monarchical regimes. In fact, exactly in the same period (January - March 1821) the news of the Greek Revolution found the representatives of the Great Powers meeting in Laibach about how the Holy Alliance would suppress the liberation movements in Naples and Piedmont.
And while the suppression of these movements did not seem a difficult task for the powerful European autocracies, the Greek case filled them with concerns because it threatened the long-desired balance for the European continent after the collapse of Napoleon and required a new strategy and diplomacy to maintain order.
The reason that Greece was a special case among the revolutionary movements of the time was not one, but two: first, Greece was a bridge between the two continents and, second, the upheaval of the status quo with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire created new and unpredictable dynamics in the area. The fate of the great patient, as the authority represented by the High Gate had been called, was once again at the center of attention of the Great Powers. The Eastern Question became international again.
Issues of foreign policy, national interests, and complex diplomatic calculations, which each European council and government kept to itself, rallied the Great Powers against the Greek cause. Then there were reasons of strategic interest, and these were again twofold: the protection of the great roads leading to Asia, and, moreover, the prevention of the descent of the Russians into the Mediterranean.
The latter eventuality was of particular concern to England and France who saw the Ottoman Empire as the only power capable of limiting Russian influence and, of course, any similar attempt by Russia to reach the warm seas of the Mediterranean. In fact, the suggestion that the Greek Revolution had been instigated by the Russians - the tsar's foreign minister at the same time was Kapodistrias - caused even stronger reflexes, especially from England which saw that an independent and free Greece would be a competitive naval power for English interests. This is precisely how English philo-Turkism at the beginning of the Struggle is explained.
Strangers to the sea, the Turks used English officers in the crews - it is even reported that more than eighty met their death at the time of the burning of the Turkish flagship in Chios by the Canary Islands. It is also well known that the English consuls, who sometimes turned into spies and sometimes into representatives of commercial companies, supplied the High Gate (Kyriakou Simopoulou) with goods and war material to supply the Turks in various sieges.
According to the historian CW Crawley (The Question of Greek Independence. A study of British policy in the Near East 1821-1833, Cambridge 1930, p. 5.), the English were for three generations pro-Turkish simply because they hated the Russians. At the same time, they feared a revival of the French threat and engaged in elaborate diplomatic maneuvers in order to secure a regulatory role in the transition period that would follow an eventual breakup of the Ottoman Empire.
England
The French consul in Thessaloniki Cousiniry in 1822 mentions in detail in his memorandum to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs the reasons that led England to adopt the specific and unpretended hostile attitude towards the Greek rebellion. In the reborn Greek nation England recognized a naval power, an adversary to be drowned in its cradle.
France
But even France, although an adversary of England, did not maintain a favorable attitude towards the insurgent Greeks from the beginning. On the one hand, her shared awe with England regarding a possible descent of the Russians into the Mediterranean, and on the other, her commercial competitiveness with the Greek navy that brought Greek merchants to every corner and market of the Ottoman East, both recommended , strong reasons for antipathy to any Greek effort for independence.
Issues of foreign policy, national interests, and complex diplomatic calculations, which each European council and government kept to itself, rallied the Great Powers against the Greek cause. Then there were reasons of strategic interest, and these were again twofold: the protection of the great roads leading to Asia, and, moreover, the prevention of the descent of the Russians into the Mediterranean.
The latter eventuality was of particular concern to England and France who saw the Ottoman Empire as the only power capable of limiting Russian influence and, of course, any similar attempt by Russia to reach the warm seas of the Mediterranean. In fact, the suggestion that the Greek Revolution had been instigated by the Russians - the tsar's foreign minister at the same time was Kapodistrias - caused even stronger reflexes, especially from England which saw that an independent and free Greece would be a competitive naval power for English interests. This is precisely how English philo-Turkism at the beginning of the Struggle is explained.
Strangers to the sea, the Turks used English officers in the crews - it is even reported that more than eighty met their death at the time of the burning of the Turkish flagship in Chios by the Canary Islands. It is also well known that the English consuls, who sometimes turned into spies and sometimes into representatives of commercial companies, supplied the High Gate (Kyriakou Simopoulou) with goods and war material to supply the Turks in various sieges.
According to the historian CW Crawley (The Question of Greek Independence. A study of British policy in the Near East 1821-1833, Cambridge 1930, p. 5.), the English were for three generations pro-Turkish simply because they hated the Russians. At the same time, they feared a revival of the French threat and engaged in elaborate diplomatic maneuvers in order to secure a regulatory role in the transition period that would follow an eventual breakup of the Ottoman Empire.
England
The French consul in Thessaloniki Cousiniry in 1822 mentions in detail in his memorandum to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs the reasons that led England to adopt the specific and unpretended hostile attitude towards the Greek rebellion. In the reborn Greek nation England recognized a naval power, an adversary to be drowned in its cradle.
France
But even France, although an adversary of England, did not maintain a favorable attitude towards the insurgent Greeks from the beginning. On the one hand, her shared awe with England regarding a possible descent of the Russians into the Mediterranean, and on the other, her commercial competitiveness with the Greek navy that brought Greek merchants to every corner and market of the Ottoman East, both recommended , strong reasons for antipathy to any Greek effort for independence.
Countries where the French did not see the Struggle of the Greeks as liberating, but as a rebellion, a rebellion against the established order that deserved to be punished and limited in its birth. The French monarchy still had very fresh in its memory the wound of the French Revolution and was worried "about the terrifying progress of the new ideas that manifested each time under the cloak of humanism".
Austria
The one that, however, was not going to cause surprise with its attitude was Austria. For the internal and external policy of Chancellor Metternich who wanted to stifle any idea of liberalizing the country's governance regime and oppressing the people, the Greek case was a dangerous example because it could cause the rebellion of other slaves, not even its own being excluded .
The crude formulation of the same: "Outside our eastern borders three or four hundred thousand hanged, strangled or beaten is not a great thing", summed up the cruelty of the obscurantist Metternich whom even his fellow speakers, German liberals, called him mispronunciation of the name Mitternacht ("midnight").
Of course, the fear of a possible Russian expansion in the South was also shared by Austria. That is why, even when in 1825 Vienna was obliged to recognize Greek independence, the reason was one: the neutralization of Russian influence. The removal of Kapodistrias two years earlier from his position in the Russian Foreign Ministry, a work of systematic undermining by Metternich, facilitated both Austrian and Turkish interests, a fact recognized by the High Gate.
In a conversation between Khosref Pasha and the ambassador of Austria in Constantinople, Franz Xavier Freiherr von Otenfels-Gswind, the gratitude of the Sultan for this and other important servitudes of the Austrian Imperial Court to the Ottoman Empire was interpreted.
Russia
In the case of Russia, which, as a co-religion country, seemed to be the natural protector of the Greeks. It seemed, but it was not, regardless of the role attributed to it and the attitude ultimately adopted by Russian foreign policy against its staunch enemy, the Turks. The tsars actually had to deal with a hostile Turkey on the one hand and a coalition of Anglo-French interests threatening to enter the Balkans after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.
Of course, the development of things then took on a new momentum, and although Russia, influenced by Metternich, repudiated the Ypsilanti movement, the hanging of the Patriarch and the massacres in the City changed Russian policy, although not drastically at first. However, what was a constant factor in encouraging the Balkan peoples was the permanent Russo-Turkish dispute which, with the explosion of the Greek Revolution, dragged Russia into a war against Turkey in front of a Europe surprised by the unexpected developments.
Finally , America
was pro-Turkish, and the policy of America, committed to the Monroe doctrine, despite the official declarations in favor of Greek independence, expected, apathetic and uninvolved in helping the revolted Greeks, the favor of the Ottoman Empire in order to finally sign the much-desired ' this commercial agreement with Turkey and thus displace English interests. Of course, American Philhellenism existed and is also documented by the sources. However, the American support had only a popular expression and not a state one.
The First Official Mixing of Foreigners
The first official involvement of foreigners in Greek affairs was the naval battle of Navarino, which definitively defined the relations of the Great Powers with the Sublime Gate. The British government described it as an "unfortunate event". Indeed, unforeseen and fortuitous incidents caused the cannons of the combined fleet of the three Powers to ring. The Greeks were once again given the opportunity to heroize the help from outside. Navarino, however, effectively legalized foreign interventions in the country's internal affairs.
However, the High Gate's decision to sever diplomatic relations with the three Powers and declare holy war with them favored the rebels, since it internationalized the conflict. In the meantime, twenty days after the departure of the ambassadors of the three Powers from Constantinople, Kapodistrias appears on the Greek diplomatic scene (December 1827), who begins the great battle, on the one hand in order to ensure the international status of the country's autonomy, and on the other hand to ensure the northern border line at the height of Pagasitikos and Amvrakikos.
The defeat of the Turks during the second Russo-Turkish war and the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) obliged Turkey to accept all the conditions that the three Great Powers would set for Greece. In 1832 the final Settlement was signed in Constantinople.
The Action of Foreign Services
The military movements of the belligerents in revolutionary Greece immediately attracted the interest of foreign governments who rushed to send their secret agents to the region. The British even set up in the Ionian Islands an annex for the control of the circulating mail, which was managed in London by the competent service of Lombard Street. In this way, England was the best informed, and due to tradition in the organization of its secret services, European power, without of course meaning that France was lagging behind in this particular field.
In fact, the competition between the two was such that, while they had officially characterized the Greek Revolution as a rebellion, they even went so far as to facilitate travelers and volunteers who asked to reach Greece, choosing them in fact, in order to control them and be informed about what was happening so many miles away, in the revolted country. Thus, while according to the English law which made it a crime to enlist a British national in a foreign army Gordon and Byron should have been arrested, not only were they not detained, but the latter was even found to be hosted by the English army after his arrival in Cephalonia.
France, again, while supplying Mehmet Ali with warships, at the same time left open the port of Marseilles for the shipments of volunteer war material while not preventing the holding of fundraisers in favor of the Hellenic Struggle. However, he had set up a special service for the selection of volunteers who were given strict recommendations and instructions on the kind of information that interested the French monarch. Of these, the most disaffected were sent to Metternich as proof of service to the common goals of the Holy Alliance.
The proclamation of the Greek Revolution by Alexander Ypsilantis in Moldowallachia became known in Constantinople at the beginning of March 1821. The event upset the Christians of the City and especially the Phanariots and the Patriarchate who feared that the Sultan's reaction would turn against them. According to the Ottoman system, the Patriarch was surrounded with the responsibilities and responsibilities of the leader of the conquered Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman possessions.
The Phanariotes, some close or distant relatives of whom were with Al. Ypsilanti, they shared several important positions in the administrative apparatus of the Ottoman Empire both in Constantinople and in the Danubian hegemonies. So the fear was justified, although few of them cooperated or even knew about the plans of Philiki Etairia.
Some, however, moved away from Constantinople in time, confirming the suspicions of the Ottomans with their flight. Thus, during the first ten days of March, it was ordered to gather all the Phanariot families in Phanari, wherever they lived. Some were even arrested and some were killed for setting an example. Although the patriarch excommunicated Ypsilantis, the news about the abuse and killing of Muslims in the hegemony caused acts of revenge in Constantinople.
Nevertheless, until those days, around the end of March to the beginning of April 1821, acts of violence against Christians were limited in scope. However, the news about the declaration of the revolution in the Peloponnese and Central Greece caused a new and this time a large-scale wave of persecutions, violence and deaths which, with periods of recession and tension, lasted for several months.
On April 10, a date that coincided with Easter Sunday in the Orthodox calendar, Patriarch Gregory V was hanged. He had previously been relieved of his duties and replaced by another prelate. Until the end of May, several more hierarchs as well as prominent Phanariots were executed. In the following two months, the cases of persecution and violence were not limited to prominent Christians, while they extended to Smyrna and the other Asia Minor cities as well as Cyprus.
These incidents and especially the hanging and the impeachment of the patriarch caused the intervention of the Great Powers. Russia used these incidents to exert intense diplomatic pressure on the Sublime Porte, invoking earlier treaties that recognized its role as the protector of Orthodox Christians and their religion in the Ottoman Empire. In this way, she found the opportunity to project her visions again in the Ottoman-occupied Balkans as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean, areas of particular interest to her.
The treatment of the revolution by the Ottoman administration took place within the legal framework of Islamic law, sharia. For the Ottomans, the events constituted "malicious apostasy" the rebels had broken their agreement (dhimma/zimmet) with the Islamic administration, thereby losing their status as dhimmas, protected, i.e., non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan, and becoming seharbis, enemies at war.
While initially the Ottoman administration tried to distinguish between Greeks of Rum Millet and non-revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries, as the revolution spread the means and will of the Ottoman authorities to observe the distinction evolved and preventive actions took place.
When, at the end of March, news of a rebellion in Morea reached the High Gate, the first reaction was to try to contain the rebellion in Morea with terrorist massacres of distinguished persons and governors in Constantinople, but also in other cities of the empire where the Greek element was important, such as Thessaloniki, Kydonias (Aivali) and Rhodes, and in Cyprus. It is not possible to estimate the extent and number of victims of the massacres in these areas.
From March 24, a massacre of Greeks began in Constantinople as a distraction and revenge for the revolution. Greeks who held positions and their relatives were executed, clerics including the Metropolitan of Ephesus Dionysios Kalliarchis, but also anonymous people who were arrested in the provinces as suspects and sent to Constantinople.
On Easter day (April 10, 1821), after the divine service, Patriarch Gregory V (over 70 years old at the time) was deposed and hanged at the central gate of the patriarchate in Constantinople, in a purely political move by the Gate, since no one had been given kind of reason for this action. His body, after being hung for three days, was carried about the city by the mob, carried on an acacia, and thrown into the middle of the Horned Gulf.
The first military reaction from the Ottomans to the news of a revolt by the Greeks came from Yusuf Pasha Serezli (from Serres). He was with an army at Vrachori (Agrinio) on his way to Evia when he learned of the siege of Patras. He proceeded by way of Rio into the Peloponnese on April 3, burned Patras, surprised and routed the besiegers of its fortress, and established himself there.
The fortress (citadel) of Patras and the neighboring fortresses of Morea (Rio) and Roumeli (Antirrio) would remain in Ottoman hands throughout the war, giving Turkish troops an important access route into the interior of the Peloponnese. On May 3, 1821, a firman was issued by Sultan Mahmud II to the marshal of Rumeli, Ahmed Hursit Pasha, the hierarchs of all the kazads (provinces) and the pre-priests of the Muslims, which ordered a general massacre of the rebels, the destruction of their properties and the decapitation of women and children.
The military response of Hursit Pasha of the Peloponnese, who was in Ioannina directing the operations against Ali Pasha, provided for attacking the rebellion in the Peloponnese with a regular army, infantry and cavalry, from two sides: On the one hand, the direct dispatch of troops through Rio-Antirio and on the other descent through eastern Sterea by suppressing the rebellion that had already begun there.
The first part of the troops under the command of Mustafabei crossed the Peloponnese very early (April 6) and engaged in systematic destruction of cities that had fallen to the rebels. The second arm of troops under Omer Bryonis and Kiose Mehmet was in Fthiotida on 19 April with orders to carry out regular clearance operations from north to south.
The Greek military units that (one day before) had occupied Ypati, decided to abandon it and confront the Ottoman army in Fthiotida in three places: Panourgias in Chalkomata, Dyovouniotis in Gorgopotamos and Diakos in Alamana. On April 24, Omer Vryonis attacked all three points simultaneously. Panourgias and Diovouniotis were forced to retreat, but the section of Diakos who stubbornly resisted at the Alamana bridge was massacred and he himself was captured on the spot.
A few days later the Greek military forces were defeated at Eleftherochori in Lamia. On May 8, Odysseas Androutsos managed to hit Omer Vryonis in the inn of Gravia. With 120 fighters he successfully faced the Ottoman attacks throughout the day causing them significant losses and retreated at night to the mountains, with minimal losses of his own. A few days later the Ottoman military force failed to capture the Vlachohoria of Giona, which was defended by Giannis Gouras.
These last successes revived the morale of the rebels and troubled the Turks, who temporarily withdrew to Mendenitsa. On April 6, Mustafabeis, Kehayabey of Hursit Pasha, had passed through Rio in the Peloponnese, with orders to suppress the rebellion. He burned Vostitsa (Aegio), broke the siege of Acrocorinth, burned Argos, crushed the resistance he found at the river Xeria, broke the siege of Nafplion and entered Tripoli with solemnity on May 6.
On May 12 he made a first attempt to break the siege of Tripoli and attacked with strong forces against the besiegers, Valtetsi from the north and south. The position was defended by military corps of Mavromichalaia (Kyriakoulis, Ilias and Giannis), Kolokotronis, Plaputai and other captains. The next day, Mustafabeis began a retreat which the Greek counterattack turned into a disorderly flight with significant losses.
Seeking in every way to open a road to Messinia, Mustafabeis attacked on May 18 at Doliana and Verbaina, where he was defeated by the Greek military forces and returned to Tripoli inactive. These victories, which owe a lot to the persistence, methodicality and strategic abilities of Kolokotronis (commander-in-chief since the beginning of May), allowed for a closer siege of the fortresses, which began to lack the necessary supplies since the Greek fleet had already limited its activity, their supply from the sea.
The besieged of Monemvasia and Neokastro surrendered to the revolutionaries in June and August respectively, while Tripolitsa fell on September 23. The fall was followed by a general massacre of armed and civilians, Muslims and Jews.
In its first sorties and patrols in April, the Greek fleet captured several ships and collected large quantities of booty. The sight of the Greek fleet with the revolutionary flag, helped to revolt islands or coastal areas that had not yet revolted and the crews of the fleet did not hesitate to go out armed on land and participate in operations. The contribution of the fleet was also important in the sea blockade and cannonading of the besieged fortresses (Nafplio, Monemvasia).
Dress in the Revolutionary Era of 1821
After the liberation, the clothing of the Greeks begins to have European influences. Maybe not everyone dresses "European" yet, but the Greek costumes are starting to get many mutations. The uniforms of the presidential guard and the standardized and identical "traditional dress" that exists today bore little relation to the actual costumes of the time.
According to Takis Lappa, the clothing from the years 1600-1829 is an important topic for research, because the spectacle presented by subjugated Greece is not found in almost any other country in the world. That is, there are no minor variations from region to region, but completely different clothing from one village to another, villages whose distance was not two hours' drive.
Almost none of the neighboring villagers were dressed alike and this stood out more in the women's clothing. In those years, you could easily understand immediately where the xenovillager was keeping. Not from his accent and idioms, but his costume was enough to betray his village. Likewise, one could distinguish them professionally or by class. The kotzabasis dressed differently, the priest, the provost, the farmer, the shepherd, the shepherd... Later we will see the clothing of Roumeliotes and Moraites. The clothing in the revolution was kept the same as that of thieves and charioteers.
Head
They wore a small round and sharp red fez, which was wrapped around the base with a handkerchief. The kerchief was of three kinds: a silk handkerchief or kaspasti, the gold-embroidered possi, and the white cotton plumed napkin. At this point of their costume one finds the Turkish influence. As examples from well-known captains and copper engravings of that time, it is clear that only the Athenians had caspastis, such as Nikitaras, Mavromichalaios, Makrygiannis and sometimes the Old Man of Morea. Odysseas Androutsos and Panourgias are known for their napkins.
Many did not wear a headscarf, but a simple short fez with a little tassel on top. This is what Gouras and Kolokotronis always used to do. The old man had his helmet since he was a major - major - of the English army in the Ionian Islands in 1808 and he wore it in the official moments of his life, just like his breastplate. Others wore a large red tufted fez like Karaiskakis, the Petmezades, and its tassel was small and it stood at the top. A long tassel as long as almost the entire fez was worn later in the years of Otho and it was taken from the Souliotes who were so used to it.
This also became the official element of the costume of the presidential guard (formerly Royal). And in general the uniform of the presidential guard follows the uniform of the Souliots to a large extent. Also many poor fighters wore a simple usually black headscarf. In general, in the previous centuries in Europe and also in the East, the size of the hat one wore was proportional to one's social class and power. The hats of the officials were usually very large, as well as those of the high priests which were much higher than today's.
Hair
From their kerchief or fezz, their well-combed long hair flowed down their backs. Because then they did not cut their hair short, but left it proudly like a mane flowing over their shoulders. To make the alifans shine and stand well combed with oil or pith, an ointment made from pith and herbs. The Moraites used to grow their hair longer than the Rumeliotes. And the blond and curly hair of the Mavromichalis remained famous.
Jelly
Inside the body they wore the white shirt, but not long-sleeved as in later years. Always unbuttoned and open in front of the chest, winter and summer. Then they put on the geleki, and on top of it the fermela with the two large silver-embroidered buttons. Some, and later all, wore the meidani instead of a fermeli, the difference being that in the fermeli they wore the sleeves, while in the meidani they were falsely lined with red cloth and were crossed on the backs. Maidanogilekas, as they called geleki or meidani, were always embroidered with colorful and gold-plated silk papers, cords.
Dress
Belted around their waists, the dress hung around them. On the captains and elders they were long as the knee and below, with dense and many folds, doubles or lagiolia as they were called. For bachelors and younger men, the foustanella was short to the thighs and lighter with fewer doublets. In Roumeli, the short one with many doubles was more common - like today's presidential guard - while in Moria it was long and not very dense. The foustanella was established throughout Greece at that time. That's why those who came from abroad dressed as "Europeans" were teasingly called shalidokerides or splenanderos.
The islanders and the sailors in their breeches were called dudumides or haltoupides. The full-length frock lined with white fabric rarely kept its look for long. She was used for many jobs. With it they wiped their face and their hands, their knife and sometimes their chariots. Many lads so that their dress doesn't get easily "stained" by the mustard oil! Many of the fighters also didn't know what underpants meant, they avoided it since their dress covered them so well.
Shoes
Their feet were covered up to the ankles with long white socks, which were called vlachokalces. They were woven from sheep's wool and had a specialty in their manufacture in Agrafa. The felt black stockings, then red - they looked like leggings - covered only the calf and the upper part of the shoe and were worn during the screen years. At Twenty-one these socks were unknown. Their skirts were tsaruchia, but not with a tassel in front but pointed.
They were made of raw cow hide and were very light and strong. They supported them on their legs by tying them around their calf with a wide strap - the loops - and this strap was caught by their sock below the knee with the tsaruchotoka. There was another way to catch their shoes with a butt-strap, the cobbler. The first were worn in Roumeli, while the others in Moria. The poorest wore pigskins, made of pigskin.
Dulamas
The costume closes with the doulama. They threw it over them when they caught a cold and it was made of felt embroidered with black silk. The dulamas reached to the waist. For the dead of winter, however, they had the flokates. They were sleeveless like the old bertas and reached below the knee. They were woven with "floko" - fringes - which were worn inside to stand out more and its usual color was white.
If they were outside in the winter, they used the flokata for a layer and for a cover. For the same purpose, others had the cape - the same design as the flokati, but made of sheep's wool and put on the water-stripes to thicken and keep out the rain and cold.
Sellahi
A complement to their main costume was the Sellahi. They wore it in their waist, but it should reach the sides on the left side and half of the left side in front. The sellahi was made of red felt, rarely black, leaves - leaves to make the cases and embroidered with many styles of gold embroidery, but the most common dragons and mermaids. It remains unexplained why the landmen loved sea plumids, as well as those that adorned their glitzes and pipes. The leather shellachi was worn during the years of Otho.
In the inner pockets of the shellachi they put their silver tasi to drink water, the shoehorn to mend their shoes, their "time" as they called the clock, even if they knew letters and could carve their signature, the silver squid with the wing. Somewhere along the line there would always be the antidote for poisons, panchehri. But they were not the only ones that received the sellahi, below we will see the rest.
Ornaments
Their entire costume was complemented by their ornaments, chaprazia or tuslukia, as they called them. First was the little dog. A silver ornament with a series of thin chains hanging from its four sides and covering the entire chest. They were supported by loops on the four corners of the chest, with triangular breastplates that had painted on them with savvati (black enamel) usually the two-headed eagle and in the middle the chutcheki on a large plate had the war saints, Saint George and Saint Demetrius. Because most chaprazia were painted with sabbati, they were called sabbatlidikas.
From their left shoulder was suspended by a silver chain the round talisman enclosing various amulets. On both sides it had carved its patron saint and the Annunciation or the Resurrection. On the right side they had their turned silver knife. At the back, in their middle, on the strap of the saddle, were passed the two balaskes that had relief designs carved on them, e.g. the Virgin Athena.
Inside they put the cartridges for their rifles. On the left, again, from the strap of the shellac were hanging the pouches, with pouches for the buckles and a pouch for the flints, the marrow, a salve for the rifles made from marrow and other fatty substances. Their leather tobacco pouch also hung on the right side. All these were tied with silver and feathered bands. Round or triangular silver hooks or tokades hung in front of the left thigh, in long straps - in two or three rows.
Two identical hooks covered their knees. This ornament was used long before 1800. And we see that Odysseus' father, the old man Androutsos, is wearing something huge, as shown in an old painting.
Chariots
At that time the costume could not be imagined without chariots. It was an integral part. Many naked and ragged, but none without chariots. Flower-smoked, silver-plated, carved and sabbatical. It didn't matter if one was rich or poor, captain or lad the passion for chariots was the same. Most of the time the chariots were not bought, but booty taken from the hand or body of the enemy.
Buds-Harby
Two twin buds always popped out of the shellac. Pafilia and handle, smoked or silver. In the outer case of the shellachi was the harbi - arrow as the scribes called it. This had many uses. As it was in its case, it was used as a rod to fill the humps. When unsheathed it became a deadly weapon in the hands of the warrior. It was sharp and pointed, rounded on all sides. There was a fork in front and they used it instead of a fork and with the fork they also caught the coal from their beak.
Yatagani
The yatagani was caught from the sellahi. Knife half meter blade or more, made of strong steel. The best ones were from Damascus, known by the name damaski. They were so strong that they pierced sheet metal and could cut through thick chain. The jatagani had its handle carved in silver and its scabbard silver-smoked and plumed with mermaids and wild birds. Sometimes the scabbard was made from the skin of a wild boar or a snake.
Bel Hajari - Ax - Topuzi
In the middle of the warrior, to the right of the belt of the sellach, was held the small double-edged knife, the bel hajari. The Turks treated this more, the Greeks had it as a booty for those who acquired it. In the same direction beyond was their ax girded. Only captains used to wear this and it was symbolic. They had Kolokotronis, Karaiskakis, Mavromichalaoi et al.
Another thing is the marshal's rod, this was the Turkish topaz. A stick, two fathoms long, which on one side had a roundness with a cast pencil in it for weight and on the other side ended in a barbed arrow. The pasades have had it since the olden days and if they brought before them a culprit and wanted to punish him themselves, if his fault was small, they would hit him on the head with the round of the topuzi, if the pity was heavy they would pierce him in the stomach with the arrow.
Sword - Sword
From the left part of their body, from a silk braided strap, hung the glittering and curved pala. Its hilt always resembled the head of a wild dragon, whose eyes were often adorned with precious stones. The scabbard was beautifully decorated with reptiles, lions, wild boars and the case closed with what looked like a dragon's tail. In skilled hands it was one of the deadliest weapons. With one sword they could cut a man in two from the shoulder. The art and strength of Goura and Nikitaras in wrestling were well-known.
Cariophilia
The rifle of Ikosiena, the famous cariophile, was famous. In Greece it first appeared around 1700 and there have been many speculations about its name. Sathas claimed that it was named after its maker in Venice Carlo Figlio (Son of Charles). Valaoritis gives the poetic explanation "They were named so, because they carried the eponymous aromatic plant called caryophylla engraved in a cycloid belt". Again, Levidis transposes it from the word phyllokardi.
All the rifles were called cariofilia, in contrast to those held by the soldiers who had given them the name "soldiers". But even though all rifles were called cariophili, they were distinguished into types according to the lamni (barrel), the fires, its length and the pafilia that kept it tied to the stock, five to eight pafilia. Some of the types of cariophilia were: Filintra, Lazarina, Milioni, Daliani, Trikioni, Armouti, Gizair, Sisanes, Dantsika, Sarmas, Sarma-Sisanes, Hare Sharma, Papa Kariophili, Psalidias, Sade, Manjari, etc.
The karyophili was one of the favorite weapons of the fighters who baptized them with a separate name. Thanasis Diakos called it "papadia", Karaiskakis "Vasiliki", Dim. Makris "Liaro" etc. The saying "a woman, a rifle and a horse cannot be borrowed" was also typical.
The Arming of the Greeks during the revolution
The association of the Greek with weapons has deep roots, as has been pointed out. From the pre-revolutionary times, early 19th century, the weapons of mainland Greece came mainly from the East. On the contrary, the islanders procured weapons, trumpets and pistols from the European market, specifically from Marseilles, Italy, England and Spain. In the pre-revolutionary period there is a variety of armaments.
However, the dominant weapon that dominates the Greek area and that the Greek held in his hands until his release was the "karyophili". According to one version, its name comes from the caryophyllum plant that was carved on one side of the barrel. Another version is the Venetian armory Carlo e figli (Charles and Sons), where many cariophiles were manufactured and may be the most likely.
Austria
The one that, however, was not going to cause surprise with its attitude was Austria. For the internal and external policy of Chancellor Metternich who wanted to stifle any idea of liberalizing the country's governance regime and oppressing the people, the Greek case was a dangerous example because it could cause the rebellion of other slaves, not even its own being excluded .
The crude formulation of the same: "Outside our eastern borders three or four hundred thousand hanged, strangled or beaten is not a great thing", summed up the cruelty of the obscurantist Metternich whom even his fellow speakers, German liberals, called him mispronunciation of the name Mitternacht ("midnight").
Of course, the fear of a possible Russian expansion in the South was also shared by Austria. That is why, even when in 1825 Vienna was obliged to recognize Greek independence, the reason was one: the neutralization of Russian influence. The removal of Kapodistrias two years earlier from his position in the Russian Foreign Ministry, a work of systematic undermining by Metternich, facilitated both Austrian and Turkish interests, a fact recognized by the High Gate.
In a conversation between Khosref Pasha and the ambassador of Austria in Constantinople, Franz Xavier Freiherr von Otenfels-Gswind, the gratitude of the Sultan for this and other important servitudes of the Austrian Imperial Court to the Ottoman Empire was interpreted.
Russia
In the case of Russia, which, as a co-religion country, seemed to be the natural protector of the Greeks. It seemed, but it was not, regardless of the role attributed to it and the attitude ultimately adopted by Russian foreign policy against its staunch enemy, the Turks. The tsars actually had to deal with a hostile Turkey on the one hand and a coalition of Anglo-French interests threatening to enter the Balkans after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.
Of course, the development of things then took on a new momentum, and although Russia, influenced by Metternich, repudiated the Ypsilanti movement, the hanging of the Patriarch and the massacres in the City changed Russian policy, although not drastically at first. However, what was a constant factor in encouraging the Balkan peoples was the permanent Russo-Turkish dispute which, with the explosion of the Greek Revolution, dragged Russia into a war against Turkey in front of a Europe surprised by the unexpected developments.
was pro-Turkish, and the policy of America, committed to the Monroe doctrine, despite the official declarations in favor of Greek independence, expected, apathetic and uninvolved in helping the revolted Greeks, the favor of the Ottoman Empire in order to finally sign the much-desired ' this commercial agreement with Turkey and thus displace English interests. Of course, American Philhellenism existed and is also documented by the sources. However, the American support had only a popular expression and not a state one.
The First Official Mixing of Foreigners
The first official involvement of foreigners in Greek affairs was the naval battle of Navarino, which definitively defined the relations of the Great Powers with the Sublime Gate. The British government described it as an "unfortunate event". Indeed, unforeseen and fortuitous incidents caused the cannons of the combined fleet of the three Powers to ring. The Greeks were once again given the opportunity to heroize the help from outside. Navarino, however, effectively legalized foreign interventions in the country's internal affairs.
However, the High Gate's decision to sever diplomatic relations with the three Powers and declare holy war with them favored the rebels, since it internationalized the conflict. In the meantime, twenty days after the departure of the ambassadors of the three Powers from Constantinople, Kapodistrias appears on the Greek diplomatic scene (December 1827), who begins the great battle, on the one hand in order to ensure the international status of the country's autonomy, and on the other hand to ensure the northern border line at the height of Pagasitikos and Amvrakikos.
The defeat of the Turks during the second Russo-Turkish war and the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) obliged Turkey to accept all the conditions that the three Great Powers would set for Greece. In 1832 the final Settlement was signed in Constantinople.
The Action of Foreign Services
The military movements of the belligerents in revolutionary Greece immediately attracted the interest of foreign governments who rushed to send their secret agents to the region. The British even set up in the Ionian Islands an annex for the control of the circulating mail, which was managed in London by the competent service of Lombard Street. In this way, England was the best informed, and due to tradition in the organization of its secret services, European power, without of course meaning that France was lagging behind in this particular field.
In fact, the competition between the two was such that, while they had officially characterized the Greek Revolution as a rebellion, they even went so far as to facilitate travelers and volunteers who asked to reach Greece, choosing them in fact, in order to control them and be informed about what was happening so many miles away, in the revolted country. Thus, while according to the English law which made it a crime to enlist a British national in a foreign army Gordon and Byron should have been arrested, not only were they not detained, but the latter was even found to be hosted by the English army after his arrival in Cephalonia.
France, again, while supplying Mehmet Ali with warships, at the same time left open the port of Marseilles for the shipments of volunteer war material while not preventing the holding of fundraisers in favor of the Hellenic Struggle. However, he had set up a special service for the selection of volunteers who were given strict recommendations and instructions on the kind of information that interested the French monarch. Of these, the most disaffected were sent to Metternich as proof of service to the common goals of the Holy Alliance.
The Reaction of the Ottoman Authorities
The proclamation of the Greek Revolution by Alexander Ypsilantis in Moldowallachia became known in Constantinople at the beginning of March 1821. The event upset the Christians of the City and especially the Phanariots and the Patriarchate who feared that the Sultan's reaction would turn against them. According to the Ottoman system, the Patriarch was surrounded with the responsibilities and responsibilities of the leader of the conquered Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman possessions.
The Phanariotes, some close or distant relatives of whom were with Al. Ypsilanti, they shared several important positions in the administrative apparatus of the Ottoman Empire both in Constantinople and in the Danubian hegemonies. So the fear was justified, although few of them cooperated or even knew about the plans of Philiki Etairia.
Some, however, moved away from Constantinople in time, confirming the suspicions of the Ottomans with their flight. Thus, during the first ten days of March, it was ordered to gather all the Phanariot families in Phanari, wherever they lived. Some were even arrested and some were killed for setting an example. Although the patriarch excommunicated Ypsilantis, the news about the abuse and killing of Muslims in the hegemony caused acts of revenge in Constantinople.
Nevertheless, until those days, around the end of March to the beginning of April 1821, acts of violence against Christians were limited in scope. However, the news about the declaration of the revolution in the Peloponnese and Central Greece caused a new and this time a large-scale wave of persecutions, violence and deaths which, with periods of recession and tension, lasted for several months.
On April 10, a date that coincided with Easter Sunday in the Orthodox calendar, Patriarch Gregory V was hanged. He had previously been relieved of his duties and replaced by another prelate. Until the end of May, several more hierarchs as well as prominent Phanariots were executed. In the following two months, the cases of persecution and violence were not limited to prominent Christians, while they extended to Smyrna and the other Asia Minor cities as well as Cyprus.
These incidents and especially the hanging and the impeachment of the patriarch caused the intervention of the Great Powers. Russia used these incidents to exert intense diplomatic pressure on the Sublime Porte, invoking earlier treaties that recognized its role as the protector of Orthodox Christians and their religion in the Ottoman Empire. In this way, she found the opportunity to project her visions again in the Ottoman-occupied Balkans as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean, areas of particular interest to her.
The treatment of the revolution by the Ottoman administration took place within the legal framework of Islamic law, sharia. For the Ottomans, the events constituted "malicious apostasy" the rebels had broken their agreement (dhimma/zimmet) with the Islamic administration, thereby losing their status as dhimmas, protected, i.e., non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan, and becoming seharbis, enemies at war.
When, at the end of March, news of a rebellion in Morea reached the High Gate, the first reaction was to try to contain the rebellion in Morea with terrorist massacres of distinguished persons and governors in Constantinople, but also in other cities of the empire where the Greek element was important, such as Thessaloniki, Kydonias (Aivali) and Rhodes, and in Cyprus. It is not possible to estimate the extent and number of victims of the massacres in these areas.
From March 24, a massacre of Greeks began in Constantinople as a distraction and revenge for the revolution. Greeks who held positions and their relatives were executed, clerics including the Metropolitan of Ephesus Dionysios Kalliarchis, but also anonymous people who were arrested in the provinces as suspects and sent to Constantinople.
On Easter day (April 10, 1821), after the divine service, Patriarch Gregory V (over 70 years old at the time) was deposed and hanged at the central gate of the patriarchate in Constantinople, in a purely political move by the Gate, since no one had been given kind of reason for this action. His body, after being hung for three days, was carried about the city by the mob, carried on an acacia, and thrown into the middle of the Horned Gulf.
The first military reaction from the Ottomans to the news of a revolt by the Greeks came from Yusuf Pasha Serezli (from Serres). He was with an army at Vrachori (Agrinio) on his way to Evia when he learned of the siege of Patras. He proceeded by way of Rio into the Peloponnese on April 3, burned Patras, surprised and routed the besiegers of its fortress, and established himself there.
The fortress (citadel) of Patras and the neighboring fortresses of Morea (Rio) and Roumeli (Antirrio) would remain in Ottoman hands throughout the war, giving Turkish troops an important access route into the interior of the Peloponnese. On May 3, 1821, a firman was issued by Sultan Mahmud II to the marshal of Rumeli, Ahmed Hursit Pasha, the hierarchs of all the kazads (provinces) and the pre-priests of the Muslims, which ordered a general massacre of the rebels, the destruction of their properties and the decapitation of women and children.
The military response of Hursit Pasha of the Peloponnese, who was in Ioannina directing the operations against Ali Pasha, provided for attacking the rebellion in the Peloponnese with a regular army, infantry and cavalry, from two sides: On the one hand, the direct dispatch of troops through Rio-Antirio and on the other descent through eastern Sterea by suppressing the rebellion that had already begun there.
The Greek military units that (one day before) had occupied Ypati, decided to abandon it and confront the Ottoman army in Fthiotida in three places: Panourgias in Chalkomata, Dyovouniotis in Gorgopotamos and Diakos in Alamana. On April 24, Omer Vryonis attacked all three points simultaneously. Panourgias and Diovouniotis were forced to retreat, but the section of Diakos who stubbornly resisted at the Alamana bridge was massacred and he himself was captured on the spot.
A few days later the Greek military forces were defeated at Eleftherochori in Lamia. On May 8, Odysseas Androutsos managed to hit Omer Vryonis in the inn of Gravia. With 120 fighters he successfully faced the Ottoman attacks throughout the day causing them significant losses and retreated at night to the mountains, with minimal losses of his own. A few days later the Ottoman military force failed to capture the Vlachohoria of Giona, which was defended by Giannis Gouras.
These last successes revived the morale of the rebels and troubled the Turks, who temporarily withdrew to Mendenitsa. On April 6, Mustafabeis, Kehayabey of Hursit Pasha, had passed through Rio in the Peloponnese, with orders to suppress the rebellion. He burned Vostitsa (Aegio), broke the siege of Acrocorinth, burned Argos, crushed the resistance he found at the river Xeria, broke the siege of Nafplion and entered Tripoli with solemnity on May 6.
On May 12 he made a first attempt to break the siege of Tripoli and attacked with strong forces against the besiegers, Valtetsi from the north and south. The position was defended by military corps of Mavromichalaia (Kyriakoulis, Ilias and Giannis), Kolokotronis, Plaputai and other captains. The next day, Mustafabeis began a retreat which the Greek counterattack turned into a disorderly flight with significant losses.
Seeking in every way to open a road to Messinia, Mustafabeis attacked on May 18 at Doliana and Verbaina, where he was defeated by the Greek military forces and returned to Tripoli inactive. These victories, which owe a lot to the persistence, methodicality and strategic abilities of Kolokotronis (commander-in-chief since the beginning of May), allowed for a closer siege of the fortresses, which began to lack the necessary supplies since the Greek fleet had already limited its activity, their supply from the sea.
The besieged of Monemvasia and Neokastro surrendered to the revolutionaries in June and August respectively, while Tripolitsa fell on September 23. The fall was followed by a general massacre of armed and civilians, Muslims and Jews.
Dress in the Revolutionary Era of 1821
After the liberation, the clothing of the Greeks begins to have European influences. Maybe not everyone dresses "European" yet, but the Greek costumes are starting to get many mutations. The uniforms of the presidential guard and the standardized and identical "traditional dress" that exists today bore little relation to the actual costumes of the time.
According to Takis Lappa, the clothing from the years 1600-1829 is an important topic for research, because the spectacle presented by subjugated Greece is not found in almost any other country in the world. That is, there are no minor variations from region to region, but completely different clothing from one village to another, villages whose distance was not two hours' drive.
Almost none of the neighboring villagers were dressed alike and this stood out more in the women's clothing. In those years, you could easily understand immediately where the xenovillager was keeping. Not from his accent and idioms, but his costume was enough to betray his village. Likewise, one could distinguish them professionally or by class. The kotzabasis dressed differently, the priest, the provost, the farmer, the shepherd, the shepherd... Later we will see the clothing of Roumeliotes and Moraites. The clothing in the revolution was kept the same as that of thieves and charioteers.
Head
They wore a small round and sharp red fez, which was wrapped around the base with a handkerchief. The kerchief was of three kinds: a silk handkerchief or kaspasti, the gold-embroidered possi, and the white cotton plumed napkin. At this point of their costume one finds the Turkish influence. As examples from well-known captains and copper engravings of that time, it is clear that only the Athenians had caspastis, such as Nikitaras, Mavromichalaios, Makrygiannis and sometimes the Old Man of Morea. Odysseas Androutsos and Panourgias are known for their napkins.
Many did not wear a headscarf, but a simple short fez with a little tassel on top. This is what Gouras and Kolokotronis always used to do. The old man had his helmet since he was a major - major - of the English army in the Ionian Islands in 1808 and he wore it in the official moments of his life, just like his breastplate. Others wore a large red tufted fez like Karaiskakis, the Petmezades, and its tassel was small and it stood at the top. A long tassel as long as almost the entire fez was worn later in the years of Otho and it was taken from the Souliotes who were so used to it.
This also became the official element of the costume of the presidential guard (formerly Royal). And in general the uniform of the presidential guard follows the uniform of the Souliots to a large extent. Also many poor fighters wore a simple usually black headscarf. In general, in the previous centuries in Europe and also in the East, the size of the hat one wore was proportional to one's social class and power. The hats of the officials were usually very large, as well as those of the high priests which were much higher than today's.
From their kerchief or fezz, their well-combed long hair flowed down their backs. Because then they did not cut their hair short, but left it proudly like a mane flowing over their shoulders. To make the alifans shine and stand well combed with oil or pith, an ointment made from pith and herbs. The Moraites used to grow their hair longer than the Rumeliotes. And the blond and curly hair of the Mavromichalis remained famous.
Jelly
Inside the body they wore the white shirt, but not long-sleeved as in later years. Always unbuttoned and open in front of the chest, winter and summer. Then they put on the geleki, and on top of it the fermela with the two large silver-embroidered buttons. Some, and later all, wore the meidani instead of a fermeli, the difference being that in the fermeli they wore the sleeves, while in the meidani they were falsely lined with red cloth and were crossed on the backs. Maidanogilekas, as they called geleki or meidani, were always embroidered with colorful and gold-plated silk papers, cords.
Dress
Belted around their waists, the dress hung around them. On the captains and elders they were long as the knee and below, with dense and many folds, doubles or lagiolia as they were called. For bachelors and younger men, the foustanella was short to the thighs and lighter with fewer doublets. In Roumeli, the short one with many doubles was more common - like today's presidential guard - while in Moria it was long and not very dense. The foustanella was established throughout Greece at that time. That's why those who came from abroad dressed as "Europeans" were teasingly called shalidokerides or splenanderos.
The islanders and the sailors in their breeches were called dudumides or haltoupides. The full-length frock lined with white fabric rarely kept its look for long. She was used for many jobs. With it they wiped their face and their hands, their knife and sometimes their chariots. Many lads so that their dress doesn't get easily "stained" by the mustard oil! Many of the fighters also didn't know what underpants meant, they avoided it since their dress covered them so well.
Shoes
Their feet were covered up to the ankles with long white socks, which were called vlachokalces. They were woven from sheep's wool and had a specialty in their manufacture in Agrafa. The felt black stockings, then red - they looked like leggings - covered only the calf and the upper part of the shoe and were worn during the screen years. At Twenty-one these socks were unknown. Their skirts were tsaruchia, but not with a tassel in front but pointed.
They were made of raw cow hide and were very light and strong. They supported them on their legs by tying them around their calf with a wide strap - the loops - and this strap was caught by their sock below the knee with the tsaruchotoka. There was another way to catch their shoes with a butt-strap, the cobbler. The first were worn in Roumeli, while the others in Moria. The poorest wore pigskins, made of pigskin.
Dulamas
The costume closes with the doulama. They threw it over them when they caught a cold and it was made of felt embroidered with black silk. The dulamas reached to the waist. For the dead of winter, however, they had the flokates. They were sleeveless like the old bertas and reached below the knee. They were woven with "floko" - fringes - which were worn inside to stand out more and its usual color was white.
Sellahi
A complement to their main costume was the Sellahi. They wore it in their waist, but it should reach the sides on the left side and half of the left side in front. The sellahi was made of red felt, rarely black, leaves - leaves to make the cases and embroidered with many styles of gold embroidery, but the most common dragons and mermaids. It remains unexplained why the landmen loved sea plumids, as well as those that adorned their glitzes and pipes. The leather shellachi was worn during the years of Otho.
In the inner pockets of the shellachi they put their silver tasi to drink water, the shoehorn to mend their shoes, their "time" as they called the clock, even if they knew letters and could carve their signature, the silver squid with the wing. Somewhere along the line there would always be the antidote for poisons, panchehri. But they were not the only ones that received the sellahi, below we will see the rest.
Ornaments
Their entire costume was complemented by their ornaments, chaprazia or tuslukia, as they called them. First was the little dog. A silver ornament with a series of thin chains hanging from its four sides and covering the entire chest. They were supported by loops on the four corners of the chest, with triangular breastplates that had painted on them with savvati (black enamel) usually the two-headed eagle and in the middle the chutcheki on a large plate had the war saints, Saint George and Saint Demetrius. Because most chaprazia were painted with sabbati, they were called sabbatlidikas.
From their left shoulder was suspended by a silver chain the round talisman enclosing various amulets. On both sides it had carved its patron saint and the Annunciation or the Resurrection. On the right side they had their turned silver knife. At the back, in their middle, on the strap of the saddle, were passed the two balaskes that had relief designs carved on them, e.g. the Virgin Athena.
Inside they put the cartridges for their rifles. On the left, again, from the strap of the shellac were hanging the pouches, with pouches for the buckles and a pouch for the flints, the marrow, a salve for the rifles made from marrow and other fatty substances. Their leather tobacco pouch also hung on the right side. All these were tied with silver and feathered bands. Round or triangular silver hooks or tokades hung in front of the left thigh, in long straps - in two or three rows.
Two identical hooks covered their knees. This ornament was used long before 1800. And we see that Odysseus' father, the old man Androutsos, is wearing something huge, as shown in an old painting.
At that time the costume could not be imagined without chariots. It was an integral part. Many naked and ragged, but none without chariots. Flower-smoked, silver-plated, carved and sabbatical. It didn't matter if one was rich or poor, captain or lad the passion for chariots was the same. Most of the time the chariots were not bought, but booty taken from the hand or body of the enemy.
Buds-Harby
Two twin buds always popped out of the shellac. Pafilia and handle, smoked or silver. In the outer case of the shellachi was the harbi - arrow as the scribes called it. This had many uses. As it was in its case, it was used as a rod to fill the humps. When unsheathed it became a deadly weapon in the hands of the warrior. It was sharp and pointed, rounded on all sides. There was a fork in front and they used it instead of a fork and with the fork they also caught the coal from their beak.
Yatagani
The yatagani was caught from the sellahi. Knife half meter blade or more, made of strong steel. The best ones were from Damascus, known by the name damaski. They were so strong that they pierced sheet metal and could cut through thick chain. The jatagani had its handle carved in silver and its scabbard silver-smoked and plumed with mermaids and wild birds. Sometimes the scabbard was made from the skin of a wild boar or a snake.
Bel Hajari - Ax - Topuzi
In the middle of the warrior, to the right of the belt of the sellach, was held the small double-edged knife, the bel hajari. The Turks treated this more, the Greeks had it as a booty for those who acquired it. In the same direction beyond was their ax girded. Only captains used to wear this and it was symbolic. They had Kolokotronis, Karaiskakis, Mavromichalaoi et al.
Another thing is the marshal's rod, this was the Turkish topaz. A stick, two fathoms long, which on one side had a roundness with a cast pencil in it for weight and on the other side ended in a barbed arrow. The pasades have had it since the olden days and if they brought before them a culprit and wanted to punish him themselves, if his fault was small, they would hit him on the head with the round of the topuzi, if the pity was heavy they would pierce him in the stomach with the arrow.
Sword - Sword
From the left part of their body, from a silk braided strap, hung the glittering and curved pala. Its hilt always resembled the head of a wild dragon, whose eyes were often adorned with precious stones. The scabbard was beautifully decorated with reptiles, lions, wild boars and the case closed with what looked like a dragon's tail. In skilled hands it was one of the deadliest weapons. With one sword they could cut a man in two from the shoulder. The art and strength of Goura and Nikitaras in wrestling were well-known.
Cariophilia
The rifle of Ikosiena, the famous cariophile, was famous. In Greece it first appeared around 1700 and there have been many speculations about its name. Sathas claimed that it was named after its maker in Venice Carlo Figlio (Son of Charles). Valaoritis gives the poetic explanation "They were named so, because they carried the eponymous aromatic plant called caryophylla engraved in a cycloid belt". Again, Levidis transposes it from the word phyllokardi.
The karyophili was one of the favorite weapons of the fighters who baptized them with a separate name. Thanasis Diakos called it "papadia", Karaiskakis "Vasiliki", Dim. Makris "Liaro" etc. The saying "a woman, a rifle and a horse cannot be borrowed" was also typical.
The Arming of the Greeks during the revolution
The association of the Greek with weapons has deep roots, as has been pointed out. From the pre-revolutionary times, early 19th century, the weapons of mainland Greece came mainly from the East. On the contrary, the islanders procured weapons, trumpets and pistols from the European market, specifically from Marseilles, Italy, England and Spain. In the pre-revolutionary period there is a variety of armaments.
However, the dominant weapon that dominates the Greek area and that the Greek held in his hands until his release was the "karyophili". According to one version, its name comes from the caryophyllum plant that was carved on one side of the barrel. Another version is the Venetian armory Carlo e figli (Charles and Sons), where many cariophiles were manufactured and may be the most likely.
The cariophili was a forward-facing weapon, a lance and operated with a flint mechanism. Its length was between 1.20 and 1.70 with a peculiar stock. The long barrel allowed enough range, but for accuracy the gun had to be supported. The caryophili was a heavy and difficult weapon, and the mechanism of the flint often did not fire mainly due to the weather conditions. The oldest cariophiles date to around 1750 and their firing mechanisms came mainly from Italy.
In addition to the cariophili, the thieves and charioteers were additionally armed with 1 or 2 pistols and an additional knife, jatagani (hanjara) and pala (sword). The pistols were also brachycane, leiocan weapons with a flintlock mechanism and depending on their origin, they can be distinguished into European, Oriental or Albanian. Carried on the warrior's belt, "selahi," in shaped pouches. The yatagani was a slightly curved sword with a simple hilt.
The pala was a very curved sword with a cross hilt, the main offensive weapon in hand-to-hand combat (yurusia) and carried by the fighters at their waists or on their shoulder straps. Many times the yataganias and pales as well as their cases were elaborately decorated with silver or gold. The weapons were complemented by palaskas, pouches that had the ammunition (volleys) as well as various other accessories.
The gunpowder mills of the Spiliotopou Brothers in Dimitsana, which were essentially the seat of the first Greek war industry, were the main suppliers of the weapons of the revolution with ammunition. To recap, the armament of the irregulars, semi-regulars and regular troops throughout the revolution, initially consisted of cariophiles and pistols that came from Turkish and Balkan gunsmiths and crafts, while some fighters also carried European weapons.
Gradually, however, this scene changed when cargoes of European weapons began to arrive from the Philhellenic committees (committees) that had been established in the countries of Europe and were working to strengthen the revolution, as well as from the spoils that the rebel Greeks seized from the Turkish army, who had the same arms as we have already mentioned. Finally, the first regular army of the revolution used the CHARLEVILLE type lance rifle, of French origin, model 1777, forelocks, with a flintlock mechanism and a caliber of 17.53 millimeters.
Also, a factory for the repair of rifles and cannons and the manufacture of ammunition and projectiles began operating in Nafplion in September 1825 under the command of the French colonel Arnaud, who brought the necessary machinery and a staff of pyrotechnicians from France.
Detailed Description and Significance of Weapons
Fighters of those times considered "their chariots", as they called their weapons, to be an integral part of their attire. It was their honor and their manhood, their jewels and their pride. When indeed they were booty acquired in battle from the hand of the dead enemy, then their owner had a more prominent position. Their weapons were considered sacred as well as holy images. They had them as their children and their love was so great that they baptized them like their children. Karaiskakis called his caryophile "Vasiliki", Thanasis Diakos "Papadia", Dimitris Makris "Liaro", Grivas "Maurikio", Odysseas Androutsos "Matzari".
Revolution carnations also had various names derived from their style or place of manufacture. Some of them were: "Lazarina", "Milioni", "Trikon", "Armuti", "Gizair", "Daliani" (from the Italians), "Sisanes", "Sharmas", "Hare Sharmas", "Moutsonigos" , "Venetianos", "Psalidias", "Sade", "Dansika", "Filyntra" (it was the weapon that had been repaired) etc. The above types of their rifles have been preserved in their songs: "My daliani in the war and armuti in the sign and cariophile in the voice like a worthy lad".
In their Selachi (belt), in cases they had the pistols, usually with embroidery and silver, both in the "lamni" (barrel) and in the "pafilia" (connecting links) and upright handle. In the outer case of the selachi they had the "harbi" used for cleaning and loading the pistol. The "harbi", when it came out of its sheath, became a formidable dagger (disc or single-edged). Also in a separate place in the selahi was their yatagani in its case, usually also embroidered with silver.
The swords of the fighters deserve a longer description since, if they considered their chariots sacred, their swords were the holiest of holies. It was the weapon of the lad that qualified the manly in hand-to-hand combat. The cariophili and the pistol kept the enemy at bay. But victory was given by the sword and that is why it was the honored weapon of his armoury. Warriors took their holy oath on their swords. The heaviest oath among the Souliotes was "Let the sword of Botsaris or Xavela cut me".
Women and children were also "burdened" with the carnation, if it happened, but the sword required a manly hand, strong and fearless. This is what the poem of the Kolokotronians says: "They all ride in the church, they worship on horseback/ they throw flowers to the Virgin Mary, they throw flowers to the saints/ and to the master Christ the silver swords./ Our Christ, burn our swords, burn our hands" . The pala was the dominant offensive weapon in the fights and that is why in the images of the fighters we have it is always raised, ready for a terrible blow.
Its shape (very curved), gave it the ability to cut deep into the human body, cutting off hands and heads with a single blow. In their "yurusias" (attacks), the fighters left their other weapons in their "drums" and rushed at the Turks, bare-chested. The descriptions of the "yurusia" are shocking and the sight of the wild attacking men shook even the most emaciated enemy.
A famous such raid was the exit of Messolongius, the "Great Jurusi" as they called it, which shocked the whole world, since, although the besieged Greeks had betrayed and the Turks were waiting for them fully prepared, they managed to open a way with their swords and pass , "harvesting" them like farmers their fields, who enter with the sickle from one end and exit at the other.
Also famous for their dexterity with the sword were the chieftains Nikitaras, the so-called Turkophagus who in Dervenakia exchanged three fights that broke from the incessant blows until his hand "wooden" on the handle and he could not open it, and Gouras who he suffered the same in the battle at the basilicas.
The yatagani was also a famous sword but mainly a defensive weapon in the yurusia, which came out of the selahi, when the blade broke or fell down. Finally, among the warriors, whoever killed the enemy rightfully took his sword as loot. The captains, when handing over the leadership to the protopalikaro of their "daifa", also gave him their sword. Thus many swords passed from the hands of old illustrious captains into the hands of younger ones who honored them as relics sacred to the struggle of "21".
The following verse by our national poet K. Palamas gives us the meaning that the equipment and weapons of the revolutionaries of 1821 must have for the younger Greeks: chariots, the solid or the golden./ Sanctify them with blood and fire, bring censers/ put them in the powder and light the candles".
The Navy of the Insurrection
We are at the beginning of the 18th century, a time when the once mighty Ottoman Empire, whose slow decline had long since shown its first symptoms, being unable to exploit the "dominion of the sea" and its benefits, either because of the indifferent, without special abilities of its sultans, either due to the ignorance of naval matters but also an innate fear of the Turks towards the sea element, essentially left to its subjects - consequently also to the Greek sailors, a completely free field of development and almost complete supremacy of the of their merchant fleets not only in the Aegean region but also in the entire eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
The existing question of the dismemberment of the great Ottoman empire had already been raised more acutely at that time, by the Great European Powers of the time. The Ottomans, on the other hand, also had to deal with the ever-increasing power of local semi-independent Rulers of their empire, who, being aware of their abilities and power, were beginning to raise sovereign claims on territories of the empire that they possessed.
Also a serious threat to the Ottoman status quo was the National Awakening of the peoples enslaved in the Empire, and particularly the Greeks and Serbs, expressed through various local uprisings and claims. The negative consequences of all these issues contributed to the fact that in the 18th century the Divanian empire, although the owner of most of the coastal areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, had already lost control over shipping and trade in these areas.
On the other hand, the living conditions in Western Europe at the beginning of the 18th century and the war conflicts between the major European states, as well as the fierce commercial and colonial competition between these states, particularly favored the birth of the first Greek shipping companies.
In this context, the seaports of the Ionian Islands and Western Greece were initially developed, while the maritime power of Eastern Greece, although one would not expect it, developed several years later, starting from the large islands of the Asia Minor coast and a little later, mainly from the middle of From the 18th century onwards, we have naval development in Hydra, Spetses, Kasos, Mykonos and the other Cycladic islands.
In the meantime, in the European foreground we now have the war for the succession to the Austrian throne, the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and mainly the great bourgeois French Revolution (1789), in the naval skirmishes in which many Greek ships and crews took part in cruisers, a fact which had as a direct consequence, the acquisition of combat experience of these crews.
From the regime of Europe at war, the Ottomans seemed incapable, as we mentioned above, of extracting benefits, who, on the contrary, by granting a multitude of commercial privileges in the form of "concessions" to foreigners, initially to the French and a little later to the English and the Dutch, contributed to the long-term to the near total destruction of their empire's economy. Thus the English and Dutch navies as well as the rising naval powers of the time, Austria and Russia are now firmly thrust into the international foreground of commercial relevance and define the new terms of navigation.
The successive Russo-Turkish wars from 1768 to 1812, in the meantime, inaugurate the period of an open Balkan and Mediterranean policy of Russia and allow the Greek merchant, particularly favored by the institution of the Russian trade declarations, to become even more competitive, to reach on the shores of the Black Sea and trade with southern Russia, Ukraine and Egypt, supply Istanbul with raw materials and extend his travels to America.
Moreover, the narrow blockade of the Spanish-French ports by the English of Nelson at the end of the 18th-beginning of the 19th century, which was often broken by the flexible Greek ships, smuggling to the blockaded mainly grain from the large granaries of S. Russia, but also various goods such as cotton, wool, olive oil, wine, corn, wax, etc., and finally the bloody Napoleonic wars that followed (1810-1815), did not simply create the conditions for wealth and capital accumulation due to the commercial profit for the Greek sailors:
With the purpose and ultimate goal of trade, they literally transformed them from timid-appearing novice sailors into sharp, capable, experienced sea warriors. After all, the huge commercial profits for the time were a catalytic factor in compensating for any risks created in these maritime enterprises.
The landmark treaty of Kiucchuk Kaynartzis, which ended the first Russo-Turkish war in 1774, and which granted a number of commercial privileges to the citizens of the Ottoman Empire and, on the other hand, the hoisting of the Royal-Ottoman flag or other "protection" flags - depending on the current conditions - in many of the slave ships, but also the treaty of Kavak-Ainali (1779) that followed were factors that stood for all the Aegean citizens of the High Gate, decisively helpful, with the comfort of neutrality they granted. Greek trips are therefore longer and safer from now on.
The Gradual and Complete Conversion
The combination of all these factors, but also the accumulation of capital from piracy and the commercial capital that came from the various commercial activities of the Greeks, were the main contributors to the miracle of the flourishing Greek merchant shipping of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. . This is exactly what happened with the case of the pre-eminent maritime Hydra, the neighboring Spetses and the unspoiled Psara whose ports, and especially Hydra's, were, until almost the end of the 18th century, important transit stations, mainly for grain smuggling.
We speak almost identically of the three pre-eminent naval islands of the Aegean because, according to general, historical confession, they constitute the "sample", the "measure" of the Greek navy during this particular period, since all three starred at every level, having the largest participation in the maritime revolutionary struggle.
The barren Hydra, Spetses, Psara, Mykonos, Kasos and the other famous seaports of the Aegean did not offer employment for their inhabitants in many professional fields anyway. The restless spirit of their first settlers, mostly farmers, fishermen and shepherds, the needs of everyday life, the harsh living conditions on these barren and arid islands, forced their interests outside their place and created year after year the conditions of a substantial and intense presence of these islands in the surrounding continental areas.
Their bio-wrestling inhabitants united in a difficult struggle of common goals. The end and completion of this struggle, brought them to the most natural and unique way out: the path of the sea and the ships. The shipowners of these islands, in the course of the years of the 18th and especially the 19th century, were indeed able to invest in the best way their accumulated funds in the most efficient and efficient Greek industrial production of the time: shipyards, shipbuilding.
The systematic communication of the Aegean islanders with neighboring rich productive and commercial centers began timidly, around the middle of the 17th century, with their first rudimentary sailing ships, the trehanterias. Spetses and Hydra benefited directly from the commercial and productive situation in the neighboring Peloponnese, while Psara took advantage of the opportunities granted to them by their proximity to two large and rich productive centers, Chios and Smyrna.
Meanwhile, the Peaceful Republic of Venice, after a long and hard struggle with the Ottomans, will definitively lose Crete and Cyprus, while, as mentioned above, it will submit to them in 1718, during the reign of Sultan Ahmed III, and the Peloponnese centers all productive whose commercial and economic activity is significantly shaken. It's time "
The first timid steps in Greek shipping began at the beginning of the 18th century. The first to empirically teach, at least in Hydra, the shipbuilding art of large-for that time-ships, was Hydraeus Sakellarios, who built the first "always asymmetrical and ugly ship..." with the help of only three tools: of the drill of the chipper and the saw...". It is characteristic that the initial voyages of the Greek sailors were made with only the polar star as a guide, without compass, maps, odometers and other nautical instruments.
At the same time, there is a strong need for more frequent and longer sailings across the Aegean. Thus, as early as 1716, new types of boats were built in the islands' carnaias, the sakhturias, that is, small ships with crucifixes, with a capacity of 15-20 tons, for the needs of closed, coastal trade and later the even larger Latinadikas, boats of 40-50 tons, with which the islanders reach Chios, Smyrna, Constantinople.
From 1745 onwards, the year in which Lazaros Kokkinis built the first large Latin schooner in Hydra, with a capacity of 116 tons, the commercial ships expanded, with even larger ships, to the hitherto unknown Alexandria, to neighboring Italy, but also to all the coasts of central and eastern Europe. At the same time, the islanders of the Aegean built a new type of large schooner, the karavosaita or saitia.
The successive Russo-Turkish wars from 1768 to 1812, in the meantime, inaugurate the period of an open Balkan and Mediterranean policy of Russia and allow the Greek merchant, particularly favored by the institution of the Russian trade declarations, to become even more competitive, to reach on the shores of the Black Sea and trade with southern Russia, Ukraine and Egypt, supply Istanbul with raw materials and extend his travels to America.
Moreover, the narrow blockade of the Spanish-French ports by the English of Nelson at the end of the 18th-beginning of the 19th century, which was often broken by the flexible Greek ships, smuggling to the blockaded mainly grain from the large granaries of S. Russia, but also various goods such as cotton, wool, olive oil, wine, corn, wax, etc., and finally the bloody Napoleonic wars that followed (1810-1815), did not simply create the conditions for wealth and capital accumulation due to the commercial profit for the Greek sailors:
With the purpose and ultimate goal of trade, they literally transformed them from timid-appearing novice sailors into sharp, capable, experienced sea warriors. After all, the huge commercial profits for the time were a catalytic factor in compensating for any risks created in these maritime enterprises.
The landmark treaty of Kiucchuk Kaynartzis, which ended the first Russo-Turkish war in 1774, and which granted a number of commercial privileges to the citizens of the Ottoman Empire and, on the other hand, the hoisting of the Royal-Ottoman flag or other "protection" flags - depending on the current conditions - in many of the slave ships, but also the treaty of Kavak-Ainali (1779) that followed were factors that stood for all the Aegean citizens of the High Gate, decisively helpful, with the comfort of neutrality they granted. Greek trips are therefore longer and safer from now on.
The Gradual and Complete Conversion
The combination of all these factors, but also the accumulation of capital from piracy and the commercial capital that came from the various commercial activities of the Greeks, were the main contributors to the miracle of the flourishing Greek merchant shipping of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. . This is exactly what happened with the case of the pre-eminent maritime Hydra, the neighboring Spetses and the unspoiled Psara whose ports, and especially Hydra's, were, until almost the end of the 18th century, important transit stations, mainly for grain smuggling.
We speak almost identically of the three pre-eminent naval islands of the Aegean because, according to general, historical confession, they constitute the "sample", the "measure" of the Greek navy during this particular period, since all three starred at every level, having the largest participation in the maritime revolutionary struggle.
Their bio-wrestling inhabitants united in a difficult struggle of common goals. The end and completion of this struggle, brought them to the most natural and unique way out: the path of the sea and the ships. The shipowners of these islands, in the course of the years of the 18th and especially the 19th century, were indeed able to invest in the best way their accumulated funds in the most efficient and efficient Greek industrial production of the time: shipyards, shipbuilding.
The systematic communication of the Aegean islanders with neighboring rich productive and commercial centers began timidly, around the middle of the 17th century, with their first rudimentary sailing ships, the trehanterias. Spetses and Hydra benefited directly from the commercial and productive situation in the neighboring Peloponnese, while Psara took advantage of the opportunities granted to them by their proximity to two large and rich productive centers, Chios and Smyrna.
Meanwhile, the Peaceful Republic of Venice, after a long and hard struggle with the Ottomans, will definitively lose Crete and Cyprus, while, as mentioned above, it will submit to them in 1718, during the reign of Sultan Ahmed III, and the Peloponnese centers all productive whose commercial and economic activity is significantly shaken. It's time "
The first timid steps in Greek shipping began at the beginning of the 18th century. The first to empirically teach, at least in Hydra, the shipbuilding art of large-for that time-ships, was Hydraeus Sakellarios, who built the first "always asymmetrical and ugly ship..." with the help of only three tools: of the drill of the chipper and the saw...". It is characteristic that the initial voyages of the Greek sailors were made with only the polar star as a guide, without compass, maps, odometers and other nautical instruments.
At the same time, there is a strong need for more frequent and longer sailings across the Aegean. Thus, as early as 1716, new types of boats were built in the islands' carnaias, the sakhturias, that is, small ships with crucifixes, with a capacity of 15-20 tons, for the needs of closed, coastal trade and later the even larger Latinadikas, boats of 40-50 tons, with which the islanders reach Chios, Smyrna, Constantinople.
From 1745 onwards, the year in which Lazaros Kokkinis built the first large Latin schooner in Hydra, with a capacity of 116 tons, the commercial ships expanded, with even larger ships, to the hitherto unknown Alexandria, to neighboring Italy, but also to all the coasts of central and eastern Europe. At the same time, the islanders of the Aegean built a new type of large schooner, the karavosaita or saitia.
Every time the shipwrights returned from Trieste and elsewhere loaded with "all good things" and new ideas and plans, they also carried new tools: rulers, compasses, large chisels, heavy files and giant pliers and hammers and wire ropes and everything else perfect of the season. In particular, Hydreus Michael Kriezis, also known as Murselas, who traveled as far as Trieste and Venice, obtained nautical charts, compasses and other nautical instruments from there, learned to use them and became the first "teacher" of the nautical art. to his fellow citizens. The upward shipping trend had already begun.
In the meantime, the military conflicts, especially of the first and second Russo-Turkish wars with the participation of the Greek crews in the famous Orlofika in 1770, - with the exception of the Hydra who, for reasons of political tactics and for fear of reprisals, avoided overt involvement in these bloody conflicts - gave , in a way it gives to the subordinates, the trigger of a warlike, now "professional" engagement with the sea.
Moreover, the amazing action of the sea corsair Lambros Katsonis in 1787, in whose ships the best Greek sailors of the time served from time to time, continued the upward course of the Greek naval war. So with all this and with the entry into the 19th century, around 1800, the Greeks will reach with their newly built ships as far as this America, where, as it is witnessed, the Hydrean captain Dimitrios Christofilou was the first to arrive after a voyage of 40 days and in fact without the help of a pilot (pilot,) carrying goods from Barcelona to Montevideo.
In fact, such was the power and activity of the Greek and especially the Hydra merchant fleet that it caused the intense concern of the European competitors and especially the French. Very characteristic are the statements made by the French consul of Thessaloniki, Felix de Beaujour, in his relevant chronicle, with which he characterizes the Hydrians as new competitors of the French in the trade of the East, and considers that although they do not inspire much confidence and are adventurers in their travels, they could to prove useful in supplying the French in time of war.
And in the last case, when the Greeks and especially the Hydraians would prove to be very troublesome, Beaujour had a very "effective" solution ready: "we can unleash the Maltese pirates against them" he wrote, fully revealing the fraudulent means used by the Western European competitors , in order to neutralize the "dangerous" Greek sailors.
For neighboring Spetses, overseas trips began in 1792 with Vassilis Malokini's ship which first sailed to Lisbon, while Hadzianargyrou's "Pelias" ship arrived in Cadiz, Spain in 1798. His example was followed by Gikas Botasis, Theodorakis Mexis and many other Speciotians,
In the akritic Psara, Ioannis Varvakis, later a great national benefactor, will be one of the first to set sail on long voyages with his Frigadella, a 400-ton vessel, arriving at the end of the 18th century in Livorno, in Constantinople, and conquering the Black Sea. his example will be followed by many of Psariani's fellow citizens, Markis Melaitis, the Mamouni brothers, the Giannitsides and others. Fishermen, soon to become distinguished sailors.
In most Greek maritime communities, the dangers of the sea, the so-called "maritime risks" (shipwrecks, pirate attacks, etc.) but also the high cost of building the ships, forced the shipowners to co-own, to create a kind of self-insurance, an ownership cooperative, whose lifetime was equal to the lifetime of the ship.
Thus prevailed the institution of "sermayia", i.e. the contribution of equity capital for the construction of each ship by many partners together (partcinevelus). The co-owners could be as many as eight or even twelve, sometimes. Rarely was there only one owner of a ship and when this happened - usually in the wealthiest families - (we have, for example, many examples of single ownership in the family of Kounduriots of Hydra) it was done only for reasons of personal prestige.
The second actual stage after the construction, i.e. the movement and the commercial voyage of the ship, was once again done in partnership with the method of "sermayia", that is, the gathering of the required capital both for the fare and for the merchandise. Usually most of the capital (about 50% or more) was secured by the large shipowners themselves. The rest was secured by all sorts of shareholders (cabiadores), who were mainly either the crew themselves, or people who were usually relatives of the captain, or people who, regardless of profession and social class, simply invested their capital in seafaring businesses.
In a document e.g. of 1804, a "Sermayia Agreement" signed in October of the same year in Hydra for the Hydra ship Santa Rosalina owned by Georgios Gionis, Georgios Hatzigionis and Nikolaos Fokas, among the others listed as shareholders, "Abbot Dionysios 700 (tallara) Gavriils previous 300... Ioasaph of the monastery 200..." and the most impressive "...George the servant of Cap' George 50...", testimony denoting the broad representative participation of all the social classes of the island in the institution of the sharing of seafood businesses.
After the trip there was, almost always with strict formality, the liquidation of the finances and the actual or accounting return of the profits to the beneficiaries, while the power of the company also evaporated. The ship, or rather the merchant ship of which we must as a rule speak when referring to this particular period, since shipping and trade were two concepts completely intertwined and interdependent, was built as a rule, as we mentioned above, in well-organized local shipyards, in the large especially islands.
However, the shipyards of large ships of Hydra were also quite numerous, e.g. or of Spetses in places adjacent to these islands or in coastal locations of the Peloponnese (Sofiko etc.) that offered plenty of shipbuilding timber as well as in large European carnages, mainly in neighboring Italy, (Genoa, Fiume, Livorno, etc.) under the supervision, preferably, of specially sent Greek architects and "masters" who often moved for such needs.
And to talk about Hydra, always in the abundance of archival evidence that its remarkable archive provides us with, as early as 1787 we have evidence of the construction in Fiume, Italy of one of the first Greek cisterns, ordered by Kyriakos Bruskos or Peslikis, an order denoting, among other things, the economic prosperity of the Hydra society of those years.
Characteristic will also be the competitive mood among the fellow islanders themselves, for who would build the biggest and richest ship. We mention the characteristic example of the Hydraic ship Iris, a 600-ton corvette owned by Dimitrios Sachinis whose construction we know from archival evidence cost 70,000 two-masted Spanish thalers, an exorbitant amount for the time.
After all, Andreas Miaoulis himself spent in 1802 the amount of 45,000 Spanish two-columns for the construction in Carnaio of Venice of the ship of Achilles, 480 tons, whose luxurious master's room became famous for its opulence. Lined throughout with mahogany wood, with velvet furniture, couches, mirrors, expensive oriental carpets and exquisite silverware, it cost - this alone - about 5,000 silver Spanish two-columns, a sum also extremely excessive.
The shipbuilding art in the Greek seaports of the time, initially followed the local tradition. Many times the owner himself was also the shipbuilder of his ship: known e.g. were the shipbuilding achievements of the Tombazi family in Hydra. However, as the master shipbuilders moved frequently, their ingenuity and ingenuity was slowly but surely enriched by the "infusion" of new elements, the knowledge of new materials and sophisticated methods of Western European shipbuilding. The ships built in Greek hulls thus began to become competitive in size, quality and performance.
Wood, the so-called "kereste", was procured by the Hydraians and the Speciotes for their ships from Evia, Taygetus, Karamania, Olympia and Kranidi. The wood for the masts was usually transported from Parnassos while the sails were usually woven and sewn unprofitably in their homes by the sailors' wives. For the completion of the construction of an average tonnage Greek ship, we know that an amount of around 120,000 grosci was needed, while during the period 1801-1815 we have the testimony that about 6-7 ships were built annually in the shipyards of the island of Hydra.
The Community of Hydra had even passed a special law on December 27, 1819 that registered its ship carpenters and protected them professionally. According to him, the chief carpenter (bass-maragos) and the chief carpenter (bass-bouhurtzimbasis) were the supervisors and foremen of the shipyards in the various synafias. These two supervised a multitude of craftsmen, "masters" or "journeymen" and apprentices.
After all, shipbuilding, one of the most important expressions of the technical culture of the eastern Mediterranean, became over time a high-level technique for the Greek data of the time and was systematically taught. There were even special informative manuals for apprentice shipbuilders. Life on the ship was simple, simple, hierarchical. The center and undisputed authority of the ship is the captain or "reizis".
"Soul and mother" of the ship, however, was the pilot or "nauvleros" or "navcleros", the second rank officer, a kind of general supervisor of the work on the ship and a substitute for the captain in his absence. Next in hierarchy was the ship's scholar, the grammarian or "scribe", responsible for everything related to the ship's official papers. And finally the caterer or "despeggeros" responsible for everything that had to do with the catering, the food warehouse and generally the housekeeping on the ship.
Finally, the crew, the "tsourmo" (or "tsourmo", or "equipagi" or "taifas"), consisted of the sailors, the "sailors", or gemitzis or daifades or fellow sailors" as they were called, and who generally dealt with the sails. The group was completed by the "coalous" or "coalous" old sailors, knowledgeable about the waters and the difficulties in the harbors, who advised the captain during the voyage. In many ships flying a foreign flag of protection, there was by general custom and the "boat captain", usually an English or Maltese national.
Finally, there was a number of first-ship youths up to 16 years old, usually relatives of the crew, the "jovens" or "mutsas", as they are referred to, who were in charge of cleaning the ship and all the auxiliary work on board. The composition of the crew was made according to the capacity of the ship and the number of its cannons as well as the journey it would make. Thus a ship equipped with 8 cannons usually had a crew of around 35 people, while a ship with 20 cannons had a crew of around 70.
The Greek crews were famous for their dexterity in handling the sails, their constant vigilance, their well-trained, well-fed and tireless character. Greek shipping activity showed a steady upward trend until about 1813: these are the years when the Greek merchant fleet as a whole was the key factor in shaping not only the economic but also the social reality of Greece.
The records of Hydra undoubtedly testify that the "golden age" for Greek commercial shipping in general was the first decade of the 19th century (1800-1810). The progressive decline of the Greek naval boom began immediately after. The lively activity of the Greek merchant fleet had already increased to levels dramatically dangerous for the interests of the major European countries. Therefore, this upward Greek course had to be stopped or at least curtailed in every way so that it does not develop over time into an intractable, for the Western Europeans, competitive force.
The conditions for Greek things worsened even more, especially in the years between 1815-1818, when the restoration of peace in Europe began and trade again passed into the hands of European competitors and especially the English. This trade decline was mainly due to the suppression of high demand for agricultural products from Western European countries and, in part, to the fall in grain prices.
Undeniable proof of this change, which is detrimental to Greek affairs, is the huge reduction in the profits of the Hydra ships which, while during the first decade of the 19th century they exceeded 100% many times, reached the lowest limit of 18% on the eve of the Greek Revolution and 13% or even on passive trips. And while this was happening in the international commercial arena, things and circumstances in Greece were heading full speed towards the Revolution.
How did the simple sailor of the wheat barge finally transform into the fearless nautilus of the 21st century? There is a clear and documented answer to the question! The particular diligence and exceptional skills acquired by the Greek sailors of the time in matters of war tactics were the result of two main factors. The first - and most important - was undoubtedly endemic at that time in the Mediterranean piracy: the terrible activity of the pirates who were then ravaging the Mediterranean seas, clashing in many cases with the crews of Greek commercial grain ships.
It was a real scourge for the islands and the Greek island populations, who lived having adapted accordingly their way of life, even their character and their behavior and experienced daily the fear of a pirate capture in the Algerian ships, where the living conditions were really miserable, or - at best - of captivity on some pirate sailing ship, Christian pirates of the West.
Moreover, the international circumstances created for the shipowners of the Aegean the need to constantly acquire larger ships, fully equipped and ready for war (armamenta), with which, not infrequently, they engaged in real naval battles against enemy ships, mainly Algerian and Tunisian pirates.
In other cases, the main reason for the creation of an experienced, ready-to-war fleet was the action of the islanders themselves as commandos or pirates who operated with various flags for the account of a foreign power, even provided in many cases by rulers of European states with the so-called "red letters" ( lettres de marque) or, later, with the special "raiding diplomas".
It is known, for example, the participation of Hydra crews in the pirate fleets of the knights of the Order of Saint John, especially when the latter settled in Malta after 1530 and engaged in terrible raids, having it as a base. The pirate races of the 18th century were anyway a legitimate - by the standards of the time - way of acquiring commercial capital, especially when times were bad for Greek trade.
So the participation in these of the Greek ships and their crews, apart from the expected profits, transmitted as it was natural, year after year, the secrets of the art of war to the ordinary Greek sailors. What should be emphasized at this point is the fact that the Greeks, when they transformed into pirates and commandos, avoided as much as possible their involvement in the slave trade, which was created by the abduction and subsequent sale of men and women and children in the slave markets of Africa and Asia.
Regarding this important factor of the Greek practice of seamanship, the participation in the pirate races, I would like to inform you that already in 1770 the Venetian consul of Thessaloniki De la Rocca complained that a large number of corsairs were ravaging the Archipelago "...most of them were Sfakians, Hydraians and Speciotai.," as he mentions, while as characteristically proves relevant testimony from the Archives of Hydra "...the Hydraians went to the course born Sudites (nationals) English with the bairaki (flag) of this Nationa (nation) ...".
It seems that the English, pioneers of the genre, had succeeded among others in securing the cooperation of the Hydra, in order to use them in their continuous struggle against the French and their trade, especially during the period of the Seven Years' War. In fact, the pirate operations with the participation of the Greeks were so well organized that the English created in 1745 a colony of Greek corsairs in Port Mahon, Spanish Minorca, which was maintained beyond 1770.
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The pirates and their families had even established an Orthodox church there with a "God-fearing" congregation. This church functioned until 1782. The second factor that contributed to the creation of an extremely experienced Greek navy was the Turks' ignorance of naval matters, or even perhaps their innate fear of the sea, with which they never had particularly good relations. and which created permanent uncertainty and insecurity for the leaders of the Ottoman fleet.
Ottoman sailors were nothing more than simple land soldiers, useful - at best - for close combat (resalta) from ship to ship. This was also the reason that forced the Port to resort annually to compulsory conscription of experienced Greek sailors. In fact, from 1749 onwards, the institutionalized enlistment of young Greek islanders in the Ottoman fleet as mercenaries, mainly specialized in the rigging of sails (gemitzides) or in the art of war itself (mellahs or seferlis), ensured, for them, preliminary training in matters of naval warfare tactics, and in the Ottoman fleet a body fully capable and manned with effective human resources.
From 1797 until the eve of the Revolution we know e.g. that Hydra gave annually to the Ottoman fleet from 100 to 500 men depending on the needs of the armada, additionally providing the required sums of money for their maintenance. Usually the conscripts served there for 6 months or a year unless Kapudan Pasha deemed it necessary to extend their term.
The performance and abilities of the Hydrean sailors in particular who served compulsorily in the Ottoman fleet were such that from the end of the 18th century the leader of the Greek sailors of the flagship was always a Hydrean (he had the title of bass-reize) who rightfully ruled the bow part of the ship and was "enthroned" with a special official ceremony during which the Kapudan Pasha wore his deep blue "kaftan" - a symbol of Ottoman power. Basreizis was a powerful and respected person who represented the Hydraians in Constantinople and regulated - usually positively - many of their affairs with the Gate.
Circumstances, as we see in this case as well, foretold the transformation of these simple sailors into experienced, war-ready sailors, with a constant and intense presence throughout the period of the naval Race. Due to the unfavorable commercial conditions that had prevailed for the Greeks, as we have seen data, the ships in the ports of the maritime islands of the Aegean, mostly tied up and idle, had meanwhile multiplied.
After all, Greek commercial activities being on a downward scale, due to the formation of a new order of things in Europe, it was only natural that the naval potential would be dragged along in their almost vertical decline. There was therefore a strongly shaken bourgeoisie and a society of the unemployed in all the Greek seas, whose members involuntarily offered themselves as a cheap labor force.
The revolution thus, apart from the moral-patriotic reasons that imposed it, undoubtedly also became an imperative necessity, a kind of relaxation of the threatened, almost complete, economic and social upheaval and an essential way out of the problem of unemployment, both for the Hydraiospetsians and the Psarians shipwrights as well as for the economically impoverished crews that the misery of the circumstances pushed them to constant riots and rebellions.
The war that followed, was for the already impoverished and desperate crews, a livelihood project since it effectively solved the most important problem that had arisen in the meantime: that of unemployment and poverty. Thus, when the Revolution later broke out, many of the up to then commercial Greek ships, armed the largest of them with 18-29 cannons and the smaller ones with 4-18 cannons of shorter range, entered the Battle ready and willingly.
In 1821 we indeed find that the Hydra fleet had a capacity of 186 small and large ships with a total capacity of 27,736 tons, a force that was to be used in the majority as a warship in the subsequent struggles of the enslaved Hellenism. Neighboring Spetses had a force of 64 ships of 15,907 tons, Psara 40 or 35 ships and Kasos 15. The contribution of the head of the Greek naval force Trinisios fleet to the Battle is known. After all, the Revolution of 1821 coincided with the peak of the era of sailing fleets, such as that possessed by the three great naval islands.
On the contrary, the Ottoman navy, which in essence had been in a long period of inactivity and abandonment, at the critical moment of the beginning of the naval struggle was found to be greatly weakened by capable officers and crews, by the Greek, i.e. its main element, either because of the persecution of the Greek sailors, to which the Gate resorted vengefully from time to time, either because of the desertions of these crews and their corresponding inclusion in the Greek military force.
In the meantime, the military conflicts, especially of the first and second Russo-Turkish wars with the participation of the Greek crews in the famous Orlofika in 1770, - with the exception of the Hydra who, for reasons of political tactics and for fear of reprisals, avoided overt involvement in these bloody conflicts - gave , in a way it gives to the subordinates, the trigger of a warlike, now "professional" engagement with the sea.
Moreover, the amazing action of the sea corsair Lambros Katsonis in 1787, in whose ships the best Greek sailors of the time served from time to time, continued the upward course of the Greek naval war. So with all this and with the entry into the 19th century, around 1800, the Greeks will reach with their newly built ships as far as this America, where, as it is witnessed, the Hydrean captain Dimitrios Christofilou was the first to arrive after a voyage of 40 days and in fact without the help of a pilot (pilot,) carrying goods from Barcelona to Montevideo.
In fact, such was the power and activity of the Greek and especially the Hydra merchant fleet that it caused the intense concern of the European competitors and especially the French. Very characteristic are the statements made by the French consul of Thessaloniki, Felix de Beaujour, in his relevant chronicle, with which he characterizes the Hydrians as new competitors of the French in the trade of the East, and considers that although they do not inspire much confidence and are adventurers in their travels, they could to prove useful in supplying the French in time of war.
And in the last case, when the Greeks and especially the Hydraians would prove to be very troublesome, Beaujour had a very "effective" solution ready: "we can unleash the Maltese pirates against them" he wrote, fully revealing the fraudulent means used by the Western European competitors , in order to neutralize the "dangerous" Greek sailors.
For neighboring Spetses, overseas trips began in 1792 with Vassilis Malokini's ship which first sailed to Lisbon, while Hadzianargyrou's "Pelias" ship arrived in Cadiz, Spain in 1798. His example was followed by Gikas Botasis, Theodorakis Mexis and many other Speciotians,
In the akritic Psara, Ioannis Varvakis, later a great national benefactor, will be one of the first to set sail on long voyages with his Frigadella, a 400-ton vessel, arriving at the end of the 18th century in Livorno, in Constantinople, and conquering the Black Sea. his example will be followed by many of Psariani's fellow citizens, Markis Melaitis, the Mamouni brothers, the Giannitsides and others. Fishermen, soon to become distinguished sailors.
Thus prevailed the institution of "sermayia", i.e. the contribution of equity capital for the construction of each ship by many partners together (partcinevelus). The co-owners could be as many as eight or even twelve, sometimes. Rarely was there only one owner of a ship and when this happened - usually in the wealthiest families - (we have, for example, many examples of single ownership in the family of Kounduriots of Hydra) it was done only for reasons of personal prestige.
The second actual stage after the construction, i.e. the movement and the commercial voyage of the ship, was once again done in partnership with the method of "sermayia", that is, the gathering of the required capital both for the fare and for the merchandise. Usually most of the capital (about 50% or more) was secured by the large shipowners themselves. The rest was secured by all sorts of shareholders (cabiadores), who were mainly either the crew themselves, or people who were usually relatives of the captain, or people who, regardless of profession and social class, simply invested their capital in seafaring businesses.
In a document e.g. of 1804, a "Sermayia Agreement" signed in October of the same year in Hydra for the Hydra ship Santa Rosalina owned by Georgios Gionis, Georgios Hatzigionis and Nikolaos Fokas, among the others listed as shareholders, "Abbot Dionysios 700 (tallara) Gavriils previous 300... Ioasaph of the monastery 200..." and the most impressive "...George the servant of Cap' George 50...", testimony denoting the broad representative participation of all the social classes of the island in the institution of the sharing of seafood businesses.
After the trip there was, almost always with strict formality, the liquidation of the finances and the actual or accounting return of the profits to the beneficiaries, while the power of the company also evaporated. The ship, or rather the merchant ship of which we must as a rule speak when referring to this particular period, since shipping and trade were two concepts completely intertwined and interdependent, was built as a rule, as we mentioned above, in well-organized local shipyards, in the large especially islands.
However, the shipyards of large ships of Hydra were also quite numerous, e.g. or of Spetses in places adjacent to these islands or in coastal locations of the Peloponnese (Sofiko etc.) that offered plenty of shipbuilding timber as well as in large European carnages, mainly in neighboring Italy, (Genoa, Fiume, Livorno, etc.) under the supervision, preferably, of specially sent Greek architects and "masters" who often moved for such needs.
And to talk about Hydra, always in the abundance of archival evidence that its remarkable archive provides us with, as early as 1787 we have evidence of the construction in Fiume, Italy of one of the first Greek cisterns, ordered by Kyriakos Bruskos or Peslikis, an order denoting, among other things, the economic prosperity of the Hydra society of those years.
After all, Andreas Miaoulis himself spent in 1802 the amount of 45,000 Spanish two-columns for the construction in Carnaio of Venice of the ship of Achilles, 480 tons, whose luxurious master's room became famous for its opulence. Lined throughout with mahogany wood, with velvet furniture, couches, mirrors, expensive oriental carpets and exquisite silverware, it cost - this alone - about 5,000 silver Spanish two-columns, a sum also extremely excessive.
The shipbuilding art in the Greek seaports of the time, initially followed the local tradition. Many times the owner himself was also the shipbuilder of his ship: known e.g. were the shipbuilding achievements of the Tombazi family in Hydra. However, as the master shipbuilders moved frequently, their ingenuity and ingenuity was slowly but surely enriched by the "infusion" of new elements, the knowledge of new materials and sophisticated methods of Western European shipbuilding. The ships built in Greek hulls thus began to become competitive in size, quality and performance.
Wood, the so-called "kereste", was procured by the Hydraians and the Speciotes for their ships from Evia, Taygetus, Karamania, Olympia and Kranidi. The wood for the masts was usually transported from Parnassos while the sails were usually woven and sewn unprofitably in their homes by the sailors' wives. For the completion of the construction of an average tonnage Greek ship, we know that an amount of around 120,000 grosci was needed, while during the period 1801-1815 we have the testimony that about 6-7 ships were built annually in the shipyards of the island of Hydra.
The Community of Hydra had even passed a special law on December 27, 1819 that registered its ship carpenters and protected them professionally. According to him, the chief carpenter (bass-maragos) and the chief carpenter (bass-bouhurtzimbasis) were the supervisors and foremen of the shipyards in the various synafias. These two supervised a multitude of craftsmen, "masters" or "journeymen" and apprentices.
After all, shipbuilding, one of the most important expressions of the technical culture of the eastern Mediterranean, became over time a high-level technique for the Greek data of the time and was systematically taught. There were even special informative manuals for apprentice shipbuilders. Life on the ship was simple, simple, hierarchical. The center and undisputed authority of the ship is the captain or "reizis".
"Soul and mother" of the ship, however, was the pilot or "nauvleros" or "navcleros", the second rank officer, a kind of general supervisor of the work on the ship and a substitute for the captain in his absence. Next in hierarchy was the ship's scholar, the grammarian or "scribe", responsible for everything related to the ship's official papers. And finally the caterer or "despeggeros" responsible for everything that had to do with the catering, the food warehouse and generally the housekeeping on the ship.
Finally, there was a number of first-ship youths up to 16 years old, usually relatives of the crew, the "jovens" or "mutsas", as they are referred to, who were in charge of cleaning the ship and all the auxiliary work on board. The composition of the crew was made according to the capacity of the ship and the number of its cannons as well as the journey it would make. Thus a ship equipped with 8 cannons usually had a crew of around 35 people, while a ship with 20 cannons had a crew of around 70.
The Greek crews were famous for their dexterity in handling the sails, their constant vigilance, their well-trained, well-fed and tireless character. Greek shipping activity showed a steady upward trend until about 1813: these are the years when the Greek merchant fleet as a whole was the key factor in shaping not only the economic but also the social reality of Greece.
The records of Hydra undoubtedly testify that the "golden age" for Greek commercial shipping in general was the first decade of the 19th century (1800-1810). The progressive decline of the Greek naval boom began immediately after. The lively activity of the Greek merchant fleet had already increased to levels dramatically dangerous for the interests of the major European countries. Therefore, this upward Greek course had to be stopped or at least curtailed in every way so that it does not develop over time into an intractable, for the Western Europeans, competitive force.
The conditions for Greek things worsened even more, especially in the years between 1815-1818, when the restoration of peace in Europe began and trade again passed into the hands of European competitors and especially the English. This trade decline was mainly due to the suppression of high demand for agricultural products from Western European countries and, in part, to the fall in grain prices.
Undeniable proof of this change, which is detrimental to Greek affairs, is the huge reduction in the profits of the Hydra ships which, while during the first decade of the 19th century they exceeded 100% many times, reached the lowest limit of 18% on the eve of the Greek Revolution and 13% or even on passive trips. And while this was happening in the international commercial arena, things and circumstances in Greece were heading full speed towards the Revolution.
How did the simple sailor of the wheat barge finally transform into the fearless nautilus of the 21st century? There is a clear and documented answer to the question! The particular diligence and exceptional skills acquired by the Greek sailors of the time in matters of war tactics were the result of two main factors. The first - and most important - was undoubtedly endemic at that time in the Mediterranean piracy: the terrible activity of the pirates who were then ravaging the Mediterranean seas, clashing in many cases with the crews of Greek commercial grain ships.
Moreover, the international circumstances created for the shipowners of the Aegean the need to constantly acquire larger ships, fully equipped and ready for war (armamenta), with which, not infrequently, they engaged in real naval battles against enemy ships, mainly Algerian and Tunisian pirates.
In other cases, the main reason for the creation of an experienced, ready-to-war fleet was the action of the islanders themselves as commandos or pirates who operated with various flags for the account of a foreign power, even provided in many cases by rulers of European states with the so-called "red letters" ( lettres de marque) or, later, with the special "raiding diplomas".
It is known, for example, the participation of Hydra crews in the pirate fleets of the knights of the Order of Saint John, especially when the latter settled in Malta after 1530 and engaged in terrible raids, having it as a base. The pirate races of the 18th century were anyway a legitimate - by the standards of the time - way of acquiring commercial capital, especially when times were bad for Greek trade.
So the participation in these of the Greek ships and their crews, apart from the expected profits, transmitted as it was natural, year after year, the secrets of the art of war to the ordinary Greek sailors. What should be emphasized at this point is the fact that the Greeks, when they transformed into pirates and commandos, avoided as much as possible their involvement in the slave trade, which was created by the abduction and subsequent sale of men and women and children in the slave markets of Africa and Asia.
Regarding this important factor of the Greek practice of seamanship, the participation in the pirate races, I would like to inform you that already in 1770 the Venetian consul of Thessaloniki De la Rocca complained that a large number of corsairs were ravaging the Archipelago "...most of them were Sfakians, Hydraians and Speciotai.," as he mentions, while as characteristically proves relevant testimony from the Archives of Hydra "...the Hydraians went to the course born Sudites (nationals) English with the bairaki (flag) of this Nationa (nation) ...".
It seems that the English, pioneers of the genre, had succeeded among others in securing the cooperation of the Hydra, in order to use them in their continuous struggle against the French and their trade, especially during the period of the Seven Years' War. In fact, the pirate operations with the participation of the Greeks were so well organized that the English created in 1745 a colony of Greek corsairs in Port Mahon, Spanish Minorca, which was maintained beyond 1770.
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Ottoman sailors were nothing more than simple land soldiers, useful - at best - for close combat (resalta) from ship to ship. This was also the reason that forced the Port to resort annually to compulsory conscription of experienced Greek sailors. In fact, from 1749 onwards, the institutionalized enlistment of young Greek islanders in the Ottoman fleet as mercenaries, mainly specialized in the rigging of sails (gemitzides) or in the art of war itself (mellahs or seferlis), ensured, for them, preliminary training in matters of naval warfare tactics, and in the Ottoman fleet a body fully capable and manned with effective human resources.
From 1797 until the eve of the Revolution we know e.g. that Hydra gave annually to the Ottoman fleet from 100 to 500 men depending on the needs of the armada, additionally providing the required sums of money for their maintenance. Usually the conscripts served there for 6 months or a year unless Kapudan Pasha deemed it necessary to extend their term.
The performance and abilities of the Hydrean sailors in particular who served compulsorily in the Ottoman fleet were such that from the end of the 18th century the leader of the Greek sailors of the flagship was always a Hydrean (he had the title of bass-reize) who rightfully ruled the bow part of the ship and was "enthroned" with a special official ceremony during which the Kapudan Pasha wore his deep blue "kaftan" - a symbol of Ottoman power. Basreizis was a powerful and respected person who represented the Hydraians in Constantinople and regulated - usually positively - many of their affairs with the Gate.
Circumstances, as we see in this case as well, foretold the transformation of these simple sailors into experienced, war-ready sailors, with a constant and intense presence throughout the period of the naval Race. Due to the unfavorable commercial conditions that had prevailed for the Greeks, as we have seen data, the ships in the ports of the maritime islands of the Aegean, mostly tied up and idle, had meanwhile multiplied.
After all, Greek commercial activities being on a downward scale, due to the formation of a new order of things in Europe, it was only natural that the naval potential would be dragged along in their almost vertical decline. There was therefore a strongly shaken bourgeoisie and a society of the unemployed in all the Greek seas, whose members involuntarily offered themselves as a cheap labor force.
The revolution thus, apart from the moral-patriotic reasons that imposed it, undoubtedly also became an imperative necessity, a kind of relaxation of the threatened, almost complete, economic and social upheaval and an essential way out of the problem of unemployment, both for the Hydraiospetsians and the Psarians shipwrights as well as for the economically impoverished crews that the misery of the circumstances pushed them to constant riots and rebellions.
In 1821 we indeed find that the Hydra fleet had a capacity of 186 small and large ships with a total capacity of 27,736 tons, a force that was to be used in the majority as a warship in the subsequent struggles of the enslaved Hellenism. Neighboring Spetses had a force of 64 ships of 15,907 tons, Psara 40 or 35 ships and Kasos 15. The contribution of the head of the Greek naval force Trinisios fleet to the Battle is known. After all, the Revolution of 1821 coincided with the peak of the era of sailing fleets, such as that possessed by the three great naval islands.
On the contrary, the Ottoman navy, which in essence had been in a long period of inactivity and abandonment, at the critical moment of the beginning of the naval struggle was found to be greatly weakened by capable officers and crews, by the Greek, i.e. its main element, either because of the persecution of the Greek sailors, to which the Gate resorted vengefully from time to time, either because of the desertions of these crews and their corresponding inclusion in the Greek military force.
The outbreak of the Revolution therefore found the islanders fully prepared. Spetses was the first to rebel when on April 2 to 3 they rose up and occupied the Chancellery, the command post of the island at the instigation of the candidate G. Panos and the Botasaians. At the same time or immediately after the Spetses Revolution, the neighboring islands of Poros, Aegina and Salamina (known at the time as Koulouri) also raised a revolutionary flag. A few days later, on Easter, on April 10, Psara also rebelled at the instigation of the envoy Gikas Tsoupas from Spetses and with a decision that entailed great risks since the Psarians knew that as a naval advanced base in the NE Aegean they would be one of the first targets of Ottoman fleet.
Filikos, Papaflessas sent to Hydra already in December 1820 with a letter from Alexandros Ypsilantis, ignited with his rhetorical skill the souls of the Hydraians who, despite the hesitations and reservations of their superiors who waited first to weigh the seriousness of his movement, considering the proclamation of the Revolution untimely, obeying the historical situation and with the initiative and encouragement of the ardent patriot Antonis Economos "captain of the second class", on March 27 (according to others April 16) of 1821 they raised the revolutionary flag and gave their fleet by the pioneers in the naval Race and their money as a determining factor in its conduct.
Finally, the candidates of all three islands, whose person was a combination of commercial wealth, naval power and defensive security, also joined the war game, soul and body. Their ships with mostly ancient Greek names - a favorite habit of the ship owners of the time, indicative of their respect for antiquity and their pride for their ancient ancestors - plowed the seas at the head of the "Trinisian Fleet" in most of the naval conflicts with the Ottoman fleet.
Ares of Tsamados, Themistocles of the Tombazis, Miltiades of Sahini, Agamemnon of Bouboulina, Epaminondas of Hatzigianni Mexis, Achilles of the Botasians, Herakles of the Koutsis.
The structure of the Greek fleet was similar to that of the land ships: that is, there was no supreme commander, fleet commander. Each island elected an admiral and a vice-admiral for a particular operation. In March 1822, the Ministry of Marines was established and its management was entrusted to a three-member Commission from representatives of all three large islands. Although the Greek fleet lagged materially and organizationally behind the Ottoman one, without an essentially permanent naval command.
However, with the general leadership of the unique in martial mastery Andreas Miaoulis, who had been tacitly recognized "as first among equals", and with the unattainable regular and effective use of the terrible weapon of the pyrotechnics (which in essence turned the enemy's power into weight and which the Hydraeospetsians and Psarians almost perfected by sacrificing many of their previously commercially profitable ships) repeatedly defeated the Turkish armada.
At the same time, the admirals of the three islands, Andreas Miaoulis for Hydra, Georgios Androutsos for Spetses and Nikolis Apostolis for Psara, are constantly organizing naval battles, testifying their knowledge and strategic mind and continue to recognize, as we mentioned above, in the person of Miaoulis the primum inter pairs.
The Hydrian sailors Tombazides, the Sachinides, the Kriezides, the Tsamados, the Speciotes Mexides, the Orlofs, the Botasaios, the Hatzianargyri, the Androutsos, the Psarians, the Kanarides, the Apostolides, the Giannitsides, the Nikodimos, the Diakogiannis, and so many others , they parade spectacularly in the chorus of naval protagonists suddenly transformed from merchant family heads to managers of a peculiar Race... And they lead this Race by creating incredible feats, full of heroism and glory.
They give themselves wholeheartedly to the Struggle with whatever means they have and the Greek sea warriors manage, despite whatever difficulties they encountered, mainly due to the lack of funding for their naval campaigns, to overturn to a large extent the plans (especially of supplying fortresses and strategic positions) and the actions of the Ottoman fleet and to make it difficult, if not to cut off completely, the communication of the Turks and later also of their Egyptian allies, with the Morea or with other critical, strategic points of the country, as well as to incite neutral islands in the Revolution or to defend the already revolted. The prevalence and stabilization of the Revolution was for them a one-way and final goal.
The Course of the Struggle and its Tragic Economic Consequences
The naval Race continues victoriously to the end. Naval battles and burnings follow one another: Naval battle of Patras, burning of Turkish flagship in Chios from Kanari, Naval battle of Dar, Bogaz, burning of Turkish corvette in Tenedos, naval battle of Samos, Naval battle of Kos-Halicarnassus, naval battle of Gerontas, naval battle of Methoni. However, such a match, and indeed with unequal, most often, conditions, certainly entailed inevitable losses. However, any catastrophic losses were created to highlight the holocaust, the glory of the Hellenic Naval Race. The properties that were actually saved were minimal.
After the end of the Battle, Hydra had fatally lost approximately 78% of its ships, i.e. it had a total of only 100 ships with a total capacity of 10,240 tons. For the neighboring Spetses, things were much worse: at the end of the Battle, they had only 50 ships, while around 1830 the remaining Spetsian ships were only 16!!
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The Beginning of the Revolution in the Peloponnese
According to the plans of the Friendly Society, the Peloponnese would be the center of the revolution. The reasons that led to this choice were many. Its peculiar geography (peninsula) made it difficult to reinforce it militarily, as it was far from the strong military centers and recruiting areas of the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire.
The mountainous morphology of the terrain prevented the generalized use of cavalry, while the narrow passes made the movement of large military units difficult and facilitated their obstruction by numerically inferior armed groups (stealth warfare). The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the region favored the rapid spread of the revolution.
The Muslim-Christian ratio that exceeded the ratio of 1 to 10 and the strengthened, compared to other regions (e.g. Pumeli) administrative and financial presence of the former who had their own armed forces (the so-called kakus) constituted favorable conditions for the places where the revolution prevailed in the Peloponnese.
To these factors we will add the privileged status of Mani, a region that did not belong to Mora valesi (commander of the Peloponnese) but was administered by Christiano bey who was directly subordinate to Kapudan-Pasha (the head of the Ottoman fleet). For these reasons, Morias was from the beginning an area in which the interest of the Friends was directed, and on the eve of the revolution, the majority of the local leading actors had been introduced to the Society.
The action of the Friends in the Peloponnese and the information about an impending rebellion had worried the High Gate, which reacted by appointing the famous Hursit-Pasha, a former grand vizier and experienced in dealing with rebellions, as Mora valesi in the fall of 1820. The fact worried the initiated but hesitant about the manifestation of the revolution. But soon, at the beginning of January 1821, Xursit with the bulk of his military forces left for Epirus with the aim of suppressing Ali Pasha's rebellion.
At the same time, Papaflessas arrived in the area with the aim of speeding up the revolution. Thus, a series of meetings were held in Bostitsa (Agios) at the end of January, but despite the efforts of Papaflessas and the decision taken to start the revolution at the end of March, the prominent ones remained hesitant. In the meantime, Kolokotronis was secretly returning to the Peloponnese and specifically to the area of Mani, while intense mobility was observed in the ranks of the thieves.
Tension in Christian-Muslim relations continued to escalate until mid-March. Since that time, sporadic attacks by thieves against Muslims began to occur in many provinces, while the tension was fueled by the looting of homes that Muslim families were abandoning.
The dynamic of the ever-escalating tension, the fear of reprisals and the pressure of thieves and Friends led even the most reluctant of the Peloponnesian leadership groups to declare revolution in their regions and put themselves in charge. Thus, in the last ten days of March most provinces declared the revolution, following and leading each other.
On the 1st of March, a ship loaded with proclamations of rebellion set off from Constantinople bound for the Peloponnese, following the actions of Philikos Xanthos. With this ship, the news of the rebellion in Moldova reached Mani at the end of March. Some disturbances of the Christians in the City related to the rebellion, when the revolution broke out in Morea, gave rise to massacres. Fotakos mentions that the Greeks who arrived in Greece from Russia and Constantinople propagated March 25 as the starting day of the revolution.
The Porte considered dealing with Ali Pasha's rebellion a priority, but was seriously worried by the rumors and complaints of the English about a rebellion in the Morea. Shortly after the rebellion in the Rumanian dominions, but not because of it, the Turks of Tripolitsa summoned the provosts of the Morea under pretense of the usual joint annual meeting, but with the aim of holding them hostage. Most of the provosts were hesitant and did not go. Those who went were executed later, some with the outbreak of the revolution, others a few days before the Fall of Tripolitsa and others died from the hardships in the prisons.
In mid-March 1821, Papaflessas had completed his cycle of tours in the Peloponnese and was together with Anagnostaras in Messinia, an area for which he had been made responsible by the Filiki Etairia. Kolokotronis was also in his area of responsibility, Mani. Odysseas Androutsos was hiding in Patras, ready to take action. Other Friends were each in various areas of responsibility. Despite the doubts of the provosts, the climate in the Peloponnese was strongly revolutionary and a spark was missing for the great explosion.
In 1821, March 25 was set as the starting day of the revolution by Alexander Ypsilantis. It was even chosen precisely because it is the day of the Annunciation. Although for various reasons the revolution had already begun in Moldowallachia and broke out earlier in various regions of the Peloponnese, in some regions it began exactly on the predetermined date with the sieges of castles, with rebellion or rituals.
The first was Nikolaos Christodoulou or Soliotis, ignoring the endless meetings of the provosts in Agia Lavra, together with Reader Kordis and other thieves, on March 14, 1821, they set up an ambush and knocked on the site "Portes" near the village of Agridi three plasterers and three postmen who were transporting letters of the Kaimakami of Tripolitsa, Mehmet Salih, to Khursit Pasha in Ioannina, at the urging of Sotiris Charalambis.
This was followed on March 16, 1821 by the attack of Chondrogiannis in the location "Helonospilia" of Lykouria, against the tax collector Lalaios Tourkalvanos Seidis, who together with the native of Vytina "Sarafi" Nikolaos Tabakopoulos, was transporting debt securities from Kerpini Kalavryton to Tripolitsa. In the afternoon of the same day, there was an attack against the Turkish commander (voivode) of Kalavryta Ibrahim Pasha Arnautoglou, who, worried because of the events that preceded him, set out with his entire garrison for Tripolitsa.
Arnautoglou, when he was informed of what had happened, was terrified and hurried to shut himself up with the rest of the Turks in the three fortified towers of Kalavryta. On March 21, 1821, 650 armed fighters led by Sotiris Charalambis, A. Fotilas, Sotiris Theocharopoulos, Ioannis Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Soliotis and the Petimezai attacked the Turks who had taken refuge in the towers and forced them to surrender. This was the first military success of the revolution.
At the same time, Patras rose up from the Friendly Panagiotis Karatzas, Vangelis Livadas and N. Gerakaris, forcing the Muslims to shut themselves in its fortress. At the beginning of the struggle the whole of the armed forces came from the thieves and charioteers of the pre-revolutionary period; they would form the main part of the revolutionary forces throughout the revolution.
The first revolutionary camp was formed in Verbaina on March 25, by the Reader Kontakis with warriors from Agios Petros, Doliana, ambitious Tripolitsiotes, and by the late Bresthenis Theodoritos and P. Varvitsiotis. There gradually gathered chieftains and warriors from various places and there the first supply unit was organized ("tutorship" according to Photakos).
The scene of the ceremonial proclamation of the revolution in Agia Lavra remained legendary. This is mentioned by several sources of the time, while it was considered unreal by younger historians. The legend acquired an important place in the official Greek national narrative, as it associated religion with the revolution and equated national and religious identity. The German himself does not mention the scene in his unfinished memoirs of that day.
Some historians argue that the core of the legend preserves some historical truth, relying on personal records of fighters and hierarchs from 1821, who claim that the Old Patronus Germanos performed a doxology on March 17 in Agia Lavra and swore in some kojabasides and bishops of Moria, who were there for the celebration of Saint Alexios.
Most historians, as mentioned by Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, are of the opinion mentioned in the memoirs of Old Patras Germanos, that is, "the [...] congregants decided not to give cause, but as they were afraid, to move aside to safe places". The only thing that is certain is that those gathered left Agia Lavra on March 17 knowing of the imminent start of a revolution. The proclamation of the Revolution in Agia Lavra is mentioned in the autobiographies of fighters from 1821 and in the London Times newspaper of 11-6-1821.
In Mani the revolution was mobilized by Kolokotroni, Papaflessa, Nikitaras and Kefala. There 2,000 Maniatians and Messenians were armed with munitions that had been sent by the Friends of Smyrna and had arrived there in ships. On March 23, Kalamata was liberated. On March 24, around 5,000 Greeks gathered in the outskirts of Kalamata to receive the blessing of the Church and on the same day, Phocis rose up in Roumeli.
The Messinian senate was established in Kalamata and Petrobeis Mavromichalis was placed at its head. The first act of the new power was to send a document to the Christian nations asking for their help, and this document was also the first act of international law of the revolution. The Achaean directorate was founded in Patras, by the provosts Andreas Londo and Charalambis, Papadiamantopoulos and the despot of Old Patras Germanos, who on March 26 delivered a revolutionary declaration to the foreign diplomats who were in Patras.
From the Proclamation of the Revolution to the Fall of Tripolitsa
The escalating tension observed since the beginning of January 1821 culminated in the last ten days of March. In those days, the revolution was declared in Gortynia, Kalavryta, Patras, Mani, Kalamata, Gastouni, Bostitsa (Aigio) and from there the revolutionary effervescence spread to almost all corners of the Moria peninsula. The incidents developed more or less in a similar way. The dignitaries and hierarchs of these provinces overcame any hesitations, often pressured by their local rivals (eg the Mavromichalians from the Tzanetakis), put themselves in charge of armed forces and declared the revolution in their region.
Flags were made in which the symbol of the cross and not the palm tree, the symbol of the Friendly Society, dominated, eulogies were held where weapons were blessed, proclamations were issued, while the first attempts were made for a rudimentary local organization with the aim of directing the revolution (Achaic Directory , Messinian Senate). From the events of the first days, let's single out the occupation of Kalamata by the Maniates and the proclamation issued there on March 23 by Petrobeis Mavromichalis.
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2Thus, in the forays carried out by the Ottomans to find supplies, the besiegers would flee and their camp would break up. It took time for them to become warrior farmers who until then had not known armed conflicts and sieges. The war with Ali Pasha of Ioannina, which occupied a large part of the Ottoman forces, offered the Peloponnesians the opportunity to form a fighting army.
At that time, only the Maniates, the Kapi and the old thieves such as the Kolokotronians and the Plaputians had experienced armed men. The famous phrase of Kolokotronis "fire and ax to the pilgrims" proved in several cases to be an effective antidote to overcome the fear caused by the Ottomans and to regroup the rebel camp. The fear was gradually overcome and the first victories on the battlefield, in Baltetsi and Doliana in mid-May 1821, more than the result proved to everyone that the Ottomans were not invincible.
Since the summer, the efforts of the revolutionaries have been focused on the siege of Tripolitsa. The capture of the administrative and military center of the Ottomans that dominated the center of the peninsula was more than necessary for the consolidation of the revolution in the Peloponnese. The siege of Tripolitsa, in which more than twenty thousand Muslim civilians and several thousand armed men had gathered, lasted several months, until the last days of September.
Especially in the last month, when the cordon had now become suffocating and the city's supplies had been exhausted, a large number of Christians had gathered in the Greek camp in anticipation of the spoils that would be obtained from the capture of the city. The fall of Tripolitsa was followed by scenes of blind violence. Thousands of Ottomans, mostly civilians, but also the Jews of the city became victims of an indescribable massacre that lasted three days. These events showed that there was no longer ground for reconciliation with the Ottoman power. The central slogan of the revolution Freedom or Death now acquired a different dynamic, a stronger base.
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The Revolution in the Aegean Islands
The reinforcement with troops and supplies of the besieged Ottomans in the fortresses of Moria could be carried out both by land and by sea. Dealing with the second eventuality presupposed the mobilization of numerous water-based, spetsian and mainly fish-based ships. The fleet of the three islands numbered a few hundred lightly armed small merchant ships, which, however, often engaged in piracy just as effectively.
Exceptions were Cycladic islands such as Syros, Tinos and Naxos, where the majority of the inhabitants were Catholic. Spetses, Psara, Samos and especially Hydra were the center of the revolutionary struggle in the Aegean, although the local leadership groups seemed hesitant at first - something that had also happened in the Peloponnese. In fact, in Hydra, the strongest naval center where the Kountouriotis family dominated, the revolution was declared thanks to the persistence of a smaller local factor.
This is Filiko Antonis Oikonomou, who initially led the revolution but was soon neutralized. Samos was dominated by the personality of Lykourgos Logothetis, an old local ruler and Philikos, who imposed his authority over the other local actors. In the first months of the revolution, Greek ships had relative freedom of movement in the Aegean. A part of the Ottoman fleet remained in the port of Polis, as there was the fear of a new Russo-Ottoman war, while another part was on the coast of Epirus taking part in the war with Ali Pasha.
Thus, the Greek fleet attempted almost undisturbed attacks on individual Ottoman ships, several of which were captured, while participating in the sieges of the fortresses in Nafplio (led by the famous Laskarina Bouboulina), in Monemvasia, in Nafpaktos and elsewhere. There were also acts of piracy against neutral merchant ships as well as raids on the coasts of Asia Minor. In fact, at that time there was no organized Greek fleet following any organized plan, but a partnership of crews in view of some operation.
Thus, when parts of the Ottoman fleet attempted to leave the Dardanelles with the aim of resupplying the besieged fortresses of the Peloponnese and transporting troops, it seemed difficult for the Greek ships to successfully oppose the Ottomans. Of course, there was no lack of individual successes that were based on the heroism of people but also on a war tactic that was adopted and was to characterize to a large extent the war actions in the maritime space.
We are referring to the incendiary, specially designed ships loaded with flammable materials and explosives, which attached themselves to the Ottoman ships, ignited and sank with them. The fear of the Ottomans from the action of the arsonists limited the movements of their fleet. In the first period, it seems that both sides tried to avoid conflicts, a development that certainly favored the spread of the revolution both in the continental and insular areas.
The Spread of the Revolution in Central Greece
Filiki Etairia had a small presence among the charioteers of central Greece. However, the position of the charioteers in the territories controlled by Ali Pasha was uncertain after his expected defeat by the Sultan's forces. After the outbreak of rebellion in the Peloponnese, the spread of revolutionary activity risked depriving them of power in their territories, as well as exposing them to the Ottoman authorities. Thus the Mainland charioteers overcame their reservations and placed themselves at the head of the rebel forces in their chariots.
In Central Greece, the start of the revolution was officially announced on March 27, at the monastery of Osios Loukas near Livadia, with the chieftains Athanasios Diakos and Vassilis Bousgos and prefects of the area present. At the council of chieftains in Messinia, Kolokotronis proposed Tripoli, which was the military and administrative center of the Peloponnese, as the main target, and after the disagreement of Mavromichalis, who had been appointed commander-in-chief, he began a recruitment campaign in Arcadia.
Similar marches were made by other chieftains in various regions. On March 29, Kolokotronis had gathered 6,000 men and tried to besiege Karytaina, but at the first exit of the Turks, the army was dispersed. He was not disappointed and methodically installed garrisons at relevant points around Tripoli (Levidi, Piana, Chrysovici, Verbaina, Valtetsi, Trikorfa), so that the roads leading there could be controlled.
The revolution quickly spread throughout the Peloponnese and Eastern Continent and was very successful as they came under the control of the revolutionaries very soon, Kalavryta (March 21), Kalamata (March 23), Aegio (March 23), Galaxidi (March 26), Argos, Karytaina, Methoni, Neokastro, Fanari, Gastouni, Nafplion in the Peloponnese and Salona (Panourgias, March 27), Lidoriki (Skaltzas, March 28), Malandrino (Skaltzas, March 30), Livadeia (Diakos, March 31), Thebes (Bousgos, April 3), Atalanti in Central Greece.
The Ottomans were confined to the castles where sieges had begun. The most important of these castles were the castles at Rio and Antirrio, Patras, Acrocorinthos above Corinth, the two castles of Nafplion, Palamidi and Bourtzi, Monemvasia, Methoni, Koroni, Neokastro and Palaiocastle of Navarino (Pylos) and the castle of Tripolitsa. No Ottomans were imprisoned in the neglected castle of Argos.
The castles were mostly built along the coast in inaccessible places and had the advantage of being able to be supplied by the Ottoman fleet, except for the castle of Tripoli. By the end of March the Peloponnesian Muslims, apart from the Lalaean Albanians, had been driven back or left the Peloponnese lowlands and were confined to castles, some of which (if they could withstand a siege) were considered capable of retaking the whole of the Peloponnese. Most of them had gathered in Tripoli.
The castles were besieged by groups of miscreants under the command of local captains, provosts or hierarchs who had revolted. The number of besiegers was not constant but fluctuated according to circumstances. The most organized siege was of Tripoli by Kolokotronis and Nikitaras, which was not suffocating but staffed with possession and fortification of key heights around the city, which controlled access to it. The Ottoman cavalry, however, controlled the plateau of the city, allowing it to be supplied with the necessary supplies.
At the beginning of April, the islands also started to move. Even though the Friendly Society had infiltrated them, there is a relative delay in the uprising, which is due to local organizational and social peculiarities, and in some of them popular uprisings precede and accelerate the declaration of the revolution. On March 27, a movement was held in Hydra by captain Antonis Oikonomou, with the aim of pressuring the prefects of the island to support the revolution.
The householders (ship owners) were hesitant and the Economou established on March 31 the Administration, in opposition to the existing Chancellery. Under the pressure of the Economos movement, but also due to the decision of the neighboring Spetses to participate in the revolution, the Hydrian candidates changed their stance and stood in favor of the revolution, which was officially declared on the island on April 15.
As early as April 3, Spetses had been revolted by local friends, followed by Poros, Salamina and Aegina, and on April 10, Psara. On the same day the charioteer Yiannis Diovouniotis entered Boudunitsa (Mendenitsa) in Roumeli. In Attica the Friendly Meletis Vassiliou and other local petty captains after recruiting farmers and villagers for several days, entered Athens by surprise on April 15, confining the local Muslims to the Acropolis castle and on the same day Hydra officially declared the revolution.
On the 18th of April the Roumeliot charioteers Diakos, Diovouniotis and Panourgias entered Patratziki (Ypati) and on the same day Samos revolted with captain Constantis Lachanas raising the flag of the revolution in Vathi. From May 8, Filikos Lykourgos Logothetis took over the leadership of the revolution on the island.
The Revolution in the Eastern Continent
The Revolution in the Eastern Continent broke out at the same time as the Peloponnese, that is, during the last ten days of March. This is an area with a strong chariot tradition. Especially in the mountainous provinces, there were several families of charioteers who had economic power, strong local bases, networks of protection and mutual assistance based on kinship ties and a sufficient number of armed men.
All this made them powerful actors in local societies and allowed them to act independently and sometimes in competition with the community leadership, the pre-priests. In fact, the hesitancy and often the opposition shown by the candidates to the declaration of the revolution gave several armed men the opportunity to take advantage of the occasion and, parallel to the declaration of the revolution, to impose their own sovereignty at the local level.
Gero-Panourgias in the area of Salona (Amfissa), Athanasios Diakos in Livadeia, Kontogiannis in Patratziki (Ypati) occupied these cities until the middle of April, assisted by other armed men such as Giannis Gouras, Andritsos Safakas, Skaltsodimos and Busgos. At the same time, Galaxidi, a naval center in the area of the Corinthian Gulf, revolted, while soon the residents of Athens began a siege of the Acropolis where the Ottoman garrison was located, while attempts to capture fortresses were also made in Evia.
A remarkable end was the return of Odysseus Androutsos from the Eptan Islands where he had taken refuge in 1818. Androutsos was in the past the strongest charioteer who had emerged in the region of the Eastern Continent, he was a famous armed man whose skills caused admiration and at the same time fear Christians and Muslims.
In the middle of April, the first reinforcements were sent by Hursit Pasha, the commander of the Peloponnese who was campaigning against Ali Pasha of Ioannina, to suppress the rebellion in the Peloponnese. The plan of Omer Bryonis, who actually led the campaign, was to suppress the revolution in the Eastern Continent and cross the Isthmus to the Peloponnese.
Indeed, Patratziki was abandoned by the revolutionaries, while the battle fought in the Alamana region on April 23 was disastrous despite the strong resistance of Ath Diakos who was captured and martyred. A second attempt by the rebels in the area of Gravia yielded better results. There, at the beginning of May, Androutsos caused significant losses to the army of Omer Vryonis, thus confirming the reputation that followed him as well as his dominance in the armed forces of An. You're solid.
A few days later Gouras repeated the venture in the area of Giona, forcing the Ottomans to abandon their plans to descend on the Peloponnese. The most important battle was fought at the end of August in Vasilika, when Gouras and Diovouniotis faced Beyran-Pasha's army. The latter had suppressed the revolutionary movements in Macedonia, crossed Thessaly and passed into the Eastern Continent. His march, however, stopped in Boeotia, in Vasilika, where hundreds of Ottomans were killed and his army was disbanded.
A month later, in the days when Tripolitsa was occupied in the Peloponnese, Omer Vryonis left the Eastern Continent. The spoiler for the opponent stealth warfare tactic proved to be effective. The next Ottoman campaign was not expected until the spring of 1822.
The Revolution in the Western Continent and Epirus
The beginning and development of the Revolution in the Western Continent and in the southern regions of Epirus are largely connected with the Ottoman war against Ali Pasha. The families of the charioteers in the mountainous provinces of Arta, like the Souliotes, had allied themselves with Albanian armed men and carried out operations against the Sultanate troops in Epirus.
The expectation of the Souliots from the alliance with their old enemy concerned their resettlement in Souli and indeed with the favorable conditions that applied to them until their expulsion to the Ionian Islands in 1803 and 1804. At the same time, at the beginning of 1821, the Friends were trying to organize the revolution in Central Greece by mobilizing the many and powerful Rumeliote charioteers.
In a meeting held in Agia Mavra (Lefkada), in which the most important charioteers and commanders of Roumeli participated, it was decided that Varnakiotis would lead the revolution in the West and Androutsos in the Eastern Continent. These were men-at-arms who were placed at the head of the rest because of the power they possessed, the prestige they enjoyed, the fame that followed them, and the position they held in the charioteer networks of the wider region.
Similar marches were made by other chieftains in various regions. On March 29, Kolokotronis had gathered 6,000 men and tried to besiege Karytaina, but at the first exit of the Turks, the army was dispersed. He was not disappointed and methodically installed garrisons at relevant points around Tripoli (Levidi, Piana, Chrysovici, Verbaina, Valtetsi, Trikorfa), so that the roads leading there could be controlled.
The revolution quickly spread throughout the Peloponnese and Eastern Continent and was very successful as they came under the control of the revolutionaries very soon, Kalavryta (March 21), Kalamata (March 23), Aegio (March 23), Galaxidi (March 26), Argos, Karytaina, Methoni, Neokastro, Fanari, Gastouni, Nafplion in the Peloponnese and Salona (Panourgias, March 27), Lidoriki (Skaltzas, March 28), Malandrino (Skaltzas, March 30), Livadeia (Diakos, March 31), Thebes (Bousgos, April 3), Atalanti in Central Greece.
The Ottomans were confined to the castles where sieges had begun. The most important of these castles were the castles at Rio and Antirrio, Patras, Acrocorinthos above Corinth, the two castles of Nafplion, Palamidi and Bourtzi, Monemvasia, Methoni, Koroni, Neokastro and Palaiocastle of Navarino (Pylos) and the castle of Tripolitsa. No Ottomans were imprisoned in the neglected castle of Argos.
The castles were mostly built along the coast in inaccessible places and had the advantage of being able to be supplied by the Ottoman fleet, except for the castle of Tripoli. By the end of March the Peloponnesian Muslims, apart from the Lalaean Albanians, had been driven back or left the Peloponnese lowlands and were confined to castles, some of which (if they could withstand a siege) were considered capable of retaking the whole of the Peloponnese. Most of them had gathered in Tripoli.
The castles were besieged by groups of miscreants under the command of local captains, provosts or hierarchs who had revolted. The number of besiegers was not constant but fluctuated according to circumstances. The most organized siege was of Tripoli by Kolokotronis and Nikitaras, which was not suffocating but staffed with possession and fortification of key heights around the city, which controlled access to it. The Ottoman cavalry, however, controlled the plateau of the city, allowing it to be supplied with the necessary supplies.
At the beginning of April, the islands also started to move. Even though the Friendly Society had infiltrated them, there is a relative delay in the uprising, which is due to local organizational and social peculiarities, and in some of them popular uprisings precede and accelerate the declaration of the revolution. On March 27, a movement was held in Hydra by captain Antonis Oikonomou, with the aim of pressuring the prefects of the island to support the revolution.
As early as April 3, Spetses had been revolted by local friends, followed by Poros, Salamina and Aegina, and on April 10, Psara. On the same day the charioteer Yiannis Diovouniotis entered Boudunitsa (Mendenitsa) in Roumeli. In Attica the Friendly Meletis Vassiliou and other local petty captains after recruiting farmers and villagers for several days, entered Athens by surprise on April 15, confining the local Muslims to the Acropolis castle and on the same day Hydra officially declared the revolution.
On the 18th of April the Roumeliot charioteers Diakos, Diovouniotis and Panourgias entered Patratziki (Ypati) and on the same day Samos revolted with captain Constantis Lachanas raising the flag of the revolution in Vathi. From May 8, Filikos Lykourgos Logothetis took over the leadership of the revolution on the island.
The Revolution in the Eastern Continent
The Revolution in the Eastern Continent broke out at the same time as the Peloponnese, that is, during the last ten days of March. This is an area with a strong chariot tradition. Especially in the mountainous provinces, there were several families of charioteers who had economic power, strong local bases, networks of protection and mutual assistance based on kinship ties and a sufficient number of armed men.
All this made them powerful actors in local societies and allowed them to act independently and sometimes in competition with the community leadership, the pre-priests. In fact, the hesitancy and often the opposition shown by the candidates to the declaration of the revolution gave several armed men the opportunity to take advantage of the occasion and, parallel to the declaration of the revolution, to impose their own sovereignty at the local level.
Gero-Panourgias in the area of Salona (Amfissa), Athanasios Diakos in Livadeia, Kontogiannis in Patratziki (Ypati) occupied these cities until the middle of April, assisted by other armed men such as Giannis Gouras, Andritsos Safakas, Skaltsodimos and Busgos. At the same time, Galaxidi, a naval center in the area of the Corinthian Gulf, revolted, while soon the residents of Athens began a siege of the Acropolis where the Ottoman garrison was located, while attempts to capture fortresses were also made in Evia.
A remarkable end was the return of Odysseus Androutsos from the Eptan Islands where he had taken refuge in 1818. Androutsos was in the past the strongest charioteer who had emerged in the region of the Eastern Continent, he was a famous armed man whose skills caused admiration and at the same time fear Christians and Muslims.
Indeed, Patratziki was abandoned by the revolutionaries, while the battle fought in the Alamana region on April 23 was disastrous despite the strong resistance of Ath Diakos who was captured and martyred. A second attempt by the rebels in the area of Gravia yielded better results. There, at the beginning of May, Androutsos caused significant losses to the army of Omer Vryonis, thus confirming the reputation that followed him as well as his dominance in the armed forces of An. You're solid.
A few days later Gouras repeated the venture in the area of Giona, forcing the Ottomans to abandon their plans to descend on the Peloponnese. The most important battle was fought at the end of August in Vasilika, when Gouras and Diovouniotis faced Beyran-Pasha's army. The latter had suppressed the revolutionary movements in Macedonia, crossed Thessaly and passed into the Eastern Continent. His march, however, stopped in Boeotia, in Vasilika, where hundreds of Ottomans were killed and his army was disbanded.
A month later, in the days when Tripolitsa was occupied in the Peloponnese, Omer Vryonis left the Eastern Continent. The spoiler for the opponent stealth warfare tactic proved to be effective. The next Ottoman campaign was not expected until the spring of 1822.
The Revolution in the Western Continent and Epirus
The beginning and development of the Revolution in the Western Continent and in the southern regions of Epirus are largely connected with the Ottoman war against Ali Pasha. The families of the charioteers in the mountainous provinces of Arta, like the Souliotes, had allied themselves with Albanian armed men and carried out operations against the Sultanate troops in Epirus.
The expectation of the Souliots from the alliance with their old enemy concerned their resettlement in Souli and indeed with the favorable conditions that applied to them until their expulsion to the Ionian Islands in 1803 and 1804. At the same time, at the beginning of 1821, the Friends were trying to organize the revolution in Central Greece by mobilizing the many and powerful Rumeliote charioteers.
In a meeting held in Agia Mavra (Lefkada), in which the most important charioteers and commanders of Roumeli participated, it was decided that Varnakiotis would lead the revolution in the West and Androutsos in the Eastern Continent. These were men-at-arms who were placed at the head of the rest because of the power they possessed, the prestige they enjoyed, the fame that followed them, and the position they held in the charioteer networks of the wider region.
The armed men of An. Sterea moved almost simultaneously with the Peloponnese, the warlike situation in Epirus, however, seems to have influenced the movements of the chieftains in Western Sterea. Finally, on May 25, 1821, the charioteer of Xiromeros Georgakis Nikolos or Varnakiotis issued a proclamation to the residents of his area, announcing the revolution. In the previous days, the charioteer Zygos D. Makris had taken the lead in the occupation of Messolongion and the East (Aitoliko).
Soon the siege of Nafpaktos and Vrahori (Agrinio), which was the administrative and military center of the Western Continent, began. The siege lasted until the beginning of June, when the city surrendered to the rebels. At the same time, the first campaign of the Ottomans to suppress the revolution was being organized and Omer Bryonis was already active in the Eastern Continent. In the west, Ismail-Pasha Pliassa was ordered to campaign from Arta.
Adopting a war tactic they knew well, that of ambush and stealth warfare, the armed men of the mountainous provinces neighboring Arta (Valtos, Radovici, Tzoumerka) occupied the straits in Makrynoros, an area that connected Epirus with Western Sterea. There, Andreas Iskos, Gogos Bakolas, Giannakis Ragos, Georgios Karaiskakis and others fought several battles with Ismail-Pasha's armed forces causing losses to his army and forcing him to return to Arta.
At the same time, the Souliotes and their Albanian allies were achieving success in Epirus. In fact, the alliance was expanded in September with the participation of the armed forces of Arta and Aitoloakarnania. It was decided to coordinate the action and the capture of Arta was attempted, although without success. However, towards the end of the year the Albanian armed forces broke the alliance, abandoned Ali Pasha and joined the Sultanate camp, which had meanwhile been strengthened by the arrival in the region of the infamous Mehmet Resit Pasha, better known as Kutachi.
The massacre of the Muslims of Tripolitsa also contributed to this development. Besides, Omer Vryonis who had returned from A. Sterea managed to join the Albanian beys, but not the Etoloakarnani, the Artin and the Souliot chieftains. These chieftains withdrew from the region of Arta. However, they kept the positions in Makrynoros for the possibility of an Ottoman attack, which, however, did not take place before the end of winter. After all, the fall of Ali Pasha was still a priority for the High Gate.
The Revolution in the Rest of Greece
The conditions that favored the manifestation and initial prevalence of the Revolution in the Peloponnese and the Mainland, i.e. the initiation of important local actors into the Friendly Society, the geographical distance from the strong military centers of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of the Ottoman forces with the suppression of the rebellion of Ali Pasha did not apply in areas such as Macedonia and Thessaly.
Nevertheless, Pelion in southeastern Thessaly, the peninsula of Athos and Kassandra in Chalkidiki, the region of Olympus and Naoussa in W. Macedonia were centers of rebellion. These uprisings, however, in no case evolved into anything more than local movements. The pioneer of the rebellion in the twenty-four villages of Pelion was the priest and scholar Anthimos Gazis, who had been initiated into the Philiki Etairia from an early age.
Despite the reluctance and denial he faced regarding the manifestation of the revolution, he took with him the powerful charioteer family of Pelion, the Basdecides, and proclaimed the revolution in early May. He even attempted a siege of Volos initially and Velestinos afterwards. However, with the appearance in the area of the army of Mahmut Dramalis, pasha of Larissa, the sieges were lifted and the revolution died down.
Only small groups remained on the eastern side of Pelion, led by Karatassos who had taken refuge there in 1822, after the suppression of the revolution in Western Macedonia. Finally, accepting the pressure of Mehmet Resit Pasha (Kyutachi) they capitulated in July 1823.
The revolutionary movement in Halkidiki was largely the work of the merchant and banker Emmanuel Pappa. Pappas had been settled in Constantinople since 1817 and there he was initiated into the Philiki Etairia. With the outbreak of the revolution in the Danubian dominions and in the Peloponnese, he hastened to Halkidiki and began to prepare the revolution that took place in May 1821. Pappas found support from several monasteries on Mount Athos, while the Kassandra peninsula was also an important revolutionary hotbed.
Despite this, the powerful Ottoman forces that rushed to Halkidiki succeeded in suppressing the revolution, at the same time showing excessive cruelty to the inhabitants of the region. A similar attitude was demonstrated by the Ottoman forces in Western Macedonia, especially in Berea and Naoussa. The revolution took place there led by Karatassos at the end of February, but did not prevail. The same fate had the uprising of the armed men of Olympus in which the Lazaios and N. Kasomoulis took the lead.
The armed men who took the lead in the uprisings of these regions eventually fled to the Peloponnese and Central Greece, where the revolution seemed to prevail, and served under the orders of the Administration.
On the 7th of May, Milies, the Eikositessera (the villages of Pelion) of Thessaly rebelled first, where the responsible for the area, Filikos Anthimos Gazis, had prepared the ground early on with an important patriot action and contacts with the local Basdeki charioteers (Kyriakos and Panagiotis ). The powerful governors (kotzabasides) were very negative to the idea of revolution, but when three ships of the Greek fleet appeared from Trikeri, the people could no longer contain themselves.
On May 9, the rebels from all the villages gathered outside Volos and besieged the Ottomans who were locked in the fortress of the city. Greek ships and crews also helped in the siege. On May 11, the revolutionaries entered Velestino (the Ottomans closed in on the 4 strongest towers) and there gathered on the same day representatives from the revolted villages, the revolution was officially declared and the Parliament of Thettalomagnesia was established, with Anthimos Gazi as president and Filippos Ioannou as secretary .
The rebels in Thessaly were overwhelmingly unruly peasants, without any kind of military experience, but also without the necessary weapons and munitions, and when a few days later a large Ottoman army appeared from Larissa under the command of Mahmut Pasha Dramali (from Drama) , they immediately dispersed to their villages. Dramalis burned Kapourna and Kanalia, went up to Makrynitsa and asked all the villages to pay large fines.
Most of the rebels surrendered in fear and the Kotzabasi prostrated themselves, bringing rich gifts to Dramalis. He advanced towards Lafkos seeking to enter Milies, which was the headquarters of the revolution, but on May 25 he met resistance in Lechonia and did not advance. In Milies, the situation was contradictory, with the Kojabasides wanting to bow down and the revolutionaries with Gazi wanting to resist. Finally, Gazis was forced to flee to Skiathos and the Milies worshiped Dramalis in mid-June who reached as far as Milina and did not go any further.
Those rebels who remained were pushed towards Trikeri and many women and children passed to Skiathos and Skopelos. When Dramalis left, the revolution remained alive in Lafkos, Argalasti, Prommyri and Trikeri. On the same day that the battle was fought in Gravia (May 8) and one day after the start of the revolution in Thessaly, the neighboring Xerochori (Istiaea) in northern Evia also rebelled.
From there the revolution spread to Limni and Kymi of Evia, which belonged to the powerful palace of Egripos (Euripos) with its capital in Chalkida and which had important Ottoman military forces. At the end of May the rebels tried twice to besiege Chalkida but without success and were then chased by the Ottoman cavalry, which caused them great losses.
On March 23, Philikos Emmanuel Pappas, after loading a ship with weapons and ammunition, which he had bought with his own money, left Constantinople for Mount Athos, with orders to organize the revolution in Macedonia. Many monks rose up ready to follow him and contacts were made with Macedonian chieftains in an attempt to prepare a coordinated rebellion.
After the failure of the persistent efforts to coordinate a simultaneous explosion of the revolution in Olympus and Halkidiki, Emmanuel Papas at the end of May declared on Mount Athos the revolution in Macedonia. The revolutionaries managed in a short period of time to liberate the whole of Halkidiki, the Royal Palaces of Thessaloniki, as well as the region of Volvi. The Ottoman response here was immediate with the capture of hostages and the capture of cities. Thessaloniki was particularly affected, where thousands of Greeks were exterminated and their properties confiscated or destroyed.
It took at least fifty years for the Hellenism of the city to return to its pre-1821 levels and to recover from this crushing blow. Uprisings took place almost simultaneously (but without coordination), in Stromnitsa (with Diakopoulos and Diamantis), in Gevgeli, Tikfes, North Pindos (Grevena region), Lagadas, as well as in Thassos. In fact, the Thasians, with the help of Psarians, tried unsuccessfully to liberate Kavala.
The chieftains of Olympus and Vermium were hesitant and waited for reinforcements in fighters and munitions from southern Greece. Only Diamantis Nikolaou offered to revolt immediately and crossed with his military corps to Halkidiki in June. In Thrace, Sozopolis revolted in March, Gallipoli in May, and then Didymoteicho, as well as Samothraki. The revolts in Thrace were suppressed within the time with the defeat of the rebels at the Battle of Saltiki and the Holocaust of Samothrace.
On May 21, provosts from all the provinces and local chieftains gathered in Loutro of Sfakion, established a Chancellery and proclaimed the revolution in Crete as well. There was a strong and war-experienced Turkish element on the island and the revolution was quickly suppressed with the occupation of its cradle in Sfakia. The charioteers of the region of Etoloakarnania initially avoided getting involved in the rebellion.
On May 20, Messolonghi revolted with the charioteer of Zygos, Dimitris Makris, and the next day, Makris also revolted in Anatoliko (Aitoliko). On May 25, Giorgos Varnakiotis proclaimed the revolution in Xiromeros and on June 4 Karpenissime the Yoldassides also rebelled. The delay in the declaration of the revolution in Western Greece seems to be due to the existence of strong Ottoman forces in Epirus, due to the military confrontation of Pyli with Ali Pasha, but also to the reluctance of powerful armatoli (Georgos Varnakiotis, Andreas Iskos) of the region to get involved, perhaps due to fears of losing their privileges.
In May ships of the Greek fleet under the command of Giakoumakis Topazis approached Chios, in an attempt to convince the people of Chios to join the revolution. There was no response from either the nobles or the villagers and the fleet set sail. The Ottomans took hostages among prominent Greeks and a body of miscreants crossed from the Turkish coast to the island to "maintain order".
On its first exit from the Dardanelles, the Ottoman fleet found in front of it the Greek warships. On May 27, Topazis chased the Ottoman squadron and managed to blockade the largest ship (a ship of the line with 76 guns) in the bay of Eressos, which was finally blown up by Papanikolis with a fireball made in Psara, with significant Ottoman losses.
The Revolution in Crete
The explosion of the Revolution in the Peloponnese, Roumeli and the Aegean islands in the spring of 1821 triggered a series of revolts in other areas as well, such as Thessaly, Macedonia and Crete, where neither preparations had been made for this purpose nor the conditions favorable to the prevailing of the revolutionary movement. In these regions the revolutionaries found footholds in certain provinces (eg Pelion in Thessaly, Halkidiki in Macedonia), but sooner or later the Ottoman forces managed to impose themselves.
The case of Crete was different. The strong administrative and military presence of the Ottoman Empire, the numerous Muslim community that constituted almost half of the total population and the absence of preparations on the part of the Friendly Society did not leave much scope for the successful manifestation of the revolution. Nevertheless, from the end of spring, a revolutionary climate began to take shape, especially in hard-to-reach areas of Chania (Sfakia) and Rethymno (Anogeia).
These movements soon became known to the Ottoman authorities who carried out acts of violence against the Christians with the obvious purpose of intimidation and preventing the manifestation of revolution. These actions had the opposite effect and soon armed conflicts took place in various parts of the island. Sfakia, Anogeia and other mountainous areas were the main revolutionary centers and despite the fact that the Ottoman forces continued to control all the fortresses and strong strategic points of Crete, the tension continued until the first months of 1824.
However, since the summer of the previous year (1823), Egyptian troops had landed in Crete and in the following months they managed to put down all resistance by dealing with the Christian population with exemplary violence. Since then, the ports of Crete were used by Ibrahim Pasha as a naval base for operations in the Peloponnese.
More than three years later, immediately after the destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino (October 1827), the Greek Administration initially and the Governor Ioannis Kapodistrias then favored the creation of revolutionary foci in various areas with the aim of being included in the -under negotiation- borders of Greek state. Thus, the revolution in Crete was rekindled and by the end of 1828 certain successes had been achieved which, although they did not create a prospect for military dominance, legitimized the Greek claims to the island. Two years later, Egyptian forces had once again suppressed the revolution in Crete.
The Great Greek Revolution of the Greek nation that led to the liberation from Turkish rule and the establishment of the new Greek state began before March 25 as it had been planned and prepared by the Friendly Society. The preludes of the revolution in the Peloponnese began on March 16, when the thieves Chondrogiannis and Petiotis shot the spay Seidi Laliotis and other armed men, the voivode of the Kalavritas, Ivraim Arnautoglou, who were moving to Tripoli.
The prolific modern Greek historian Georgios P. Kremos in his General History (1890) writes: "Having learned this, the nobles of the Achaeans came to enter Patras (March 22), and among the first were Papadiamantopoulos, Londos, Patron Germanos, Zaimis , Kernitsis and others leading each hoplite. Gernanos was then the first to raise the flag of freedom in the square of Agios Georgios and a cross in front of it.
Crete was unable to follow the Peloponnese calendar-wise and was about eighty days behind. The leaders of the Company did not plan or were unable to systematically organize revolutionary evangelism on the Megalonisos because of the unfavorable local conditions and the great distance. The eruption of the revolution in Crete immediately after the Peloponnese revolt was seemingly impossible. The obstacles were too great.
It is characteristic that in Crete there were three Pasades, while in the Peloponnese, an area with many times the area and population, there was only one Pasha. The Cretan slave lived an indescribable life, in miserable conditions, which were described by all the European travelers of the pre-revolutionary period. There was a complete lack of weapons and supplies. There was a disproportion of Turkish population compared to other Greek regions. Such profane and horrible administration had not been presented in any other part of Greece by the Turks, the barbarians as the historian John Philemon calls them.
Soon the siege of Nafpaktos and Vrahori (Agrinio), which was the administrative and military center of the Western Continent, began. The siege lasted until the beginning of June, when the city surrendered to the rebels. At the same time, the first campaign of the Ottomans to suppress the revolution was being organized and Omer Bryonis was already active in the Eastern Continent. In the west, Ismail-Pasha Pliassa was ordered to campaign from Arta.
Adopting a war tactic they knew well, that of ambush and stealth warfare, the armed men of the mountainous provinces neighboring Arta (Valtos, Radovici, Tzoumerka) occupied the straits in Makrynoros, an area that connected Epirus with Western Sterea. There, Andreas Iskos, Gogos Bakolas, Giannakis Ragos, Georgios Karaiskakis and others fought several battles with Ismail-Pasha's armed forces causing losses to his army and forcing him to return to Arta.
At the same time, the Souliotes and their Albanian allies were achieving success in Epirus. In fact, the alliance was expanded in September with the participation of the armed forces of Arta and Aitoloakarnania. It was decided to coordinate the action and the capture of Arta was attempted, although without success. However, towards the end of the year the Albanian armed forces broke the alliance, abandoned Ali Pasha and joined the Sultanate camp, which had meanwhile been strengthened by the arrival in the region of the infamous Mehmet Resit Pasha, better known as Kutachi.
The massacre of the Muslims of Tripolitsa also contributed to this development. Besides, Omer Vryonis who had returned from A. Sterea managed to join the Albanian beys, but not the Etoloakarnani, the Artin and the Souliot chieftains. These chieftains withdrew from the region of Arta. However, they kept the positions in Makrynoros for the possibility of an Ottoman attack, which, however, did not take place before the end of winter. After all, the fall of Ali Pasha was still a priority for the High Gate.
The Revolution in the Rest of Greece
The conditions that favored the manifestation and initial prevalence of the Revolution in the Peloponnese and the Mainland, i.e. the initiation of important local actors into the Friendly Society, the geographical distance from the strong military centers of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of the Ottoman forces with the suppression of the rebellion of Ali Pasha did not apply in areas such as Macedonia and Thessaly.
Nevertheless, Pelion in southeastern Thessaly, the peninsula of Athos and Kassandra in Chalkidiki, the region of Olympus and Naoussa in W. Macedonia were centers of rebellion. These uprisings, however, in no case evolved into anything more than local movements. The pioneer of the rebellion in the twenty-four villages of Pelion was the priest and scholar Anthimos Gazis, who had been initiated into the Philiki Etairia from an early age.
Only small groups remained on the eastern side of Pelion, led by Karatassos who had taken refuge there in 1822, after the suppression of the revolution in Western Macedonia. Finally, accepting the pressure of Mehmet Resit Pasha (Kyutachi) they capitulated in July 1823.
The revolutionary movement in Halkidiki was largely the work of the merchant and banker Emmanuel Pappa. Pappas had been settled in Constantinople since 1817 and there he was initiated into the Philiki Etairia. With the outbreak of the revolution in the Danubian dominions and in the Peloponnese, he hastened to Halkidiki and began to prepare the revolution that took place in May 1821. Pappas found support from several monasteries on Mount Athos, while the Kassandra peninsula was also an important revolutionary hotbed.
Despite this, the powerful Ottoman forces that rushed to Halkidiki succeeded in suppressing the revolution, at the same time showing excessive cruelty to the inhabitants of the region. A similar attitude was demonstrated by the Ottoman forces in Western Macedonia, especially in Berea and Naoussa. The revolution took place there led by Karatassos at the end of February, but did not prevail. The same fate had the uprising of the armed men of Olympus in which the Lazaios and N. Kasomoulis took the lead.
The armed men who took the lead in the uprisings of these regions eventually fled to the Peloponnese and Central Greece, where the revolution seemed to prevail, and served under the orders of the Administration.
On the 7th of May, Milies, the Eikositessera (the villages of Pelion) of Thessaly rebelled first, where the responsible for the area, Filikos Anthimos Gazis, had prepared the ground early on with an important patriot action and contacts with the local Basdeki charioteers (Kyriakos and Panagiotis ). The powerful governors (kotzabasides) were very negative to the idea of revolution, but when three ships of the Greek fleet appeared from Trikeri, the people could no longer contain themselves.
On May 9, the rebels from all the villages gathered outside Volos and besieged the Ottomans who were locked in the fortress of the city. Greek ships and crews also helped in the siege. On May 11, the revolutionaries entered Velestino (the Ottomans closed in on the 4 strongest towers) and there gathered on the same day representatives from the revolted villages, the revolution was officially declared and the Parliament of Thettalomagnesia was established, with Anthimos Gazi as president and Filippos Ioannou as secretary .
Most of the rebels surrendered in fear and the Kotzabasi prostrated themselves, bringing rich gifts to Dramalis. He advanced towards Lafkos seeking to enter Milies, which was the headquarters of the revolution, but on May 25 he met resistance in Lechonia and did not advance. In Milies, the situation was contradictory, with the Kojabasides wanting to bow down and the revolutionaries with Gazi wanting to resist. Finally, Gazis was forced to flee to Skiathos and the Milies worshiped Dramalis in mid-June who reached as far as Milina and did not go any further.
Those rebels who remained were pushed towards Trikeri and many women and children passed to Skiathos and Skopelos. When Dramalis left, the revolution remained alive in Lafkos, Argalasti, Prommyri and Trikeri. On the same day that the battle was fought in Gravia (May 8) and one day after the start of the revolution in Thessaly, the neighboring Xerochori (Istiaea) in northern Evia also rebelled.
From there the revolution spread to Limni and Kymi of Evia, which belonged to the powerful palace of Egripos (Euripos) with its capital in Chalkida and which had important Ottoman military forces. At the end of May the rebels tried twice to besiege Chalkida but without success and were then chased by the Ottoman cavalry, which caused them great losses.
On March 23, Philikos Emmanuel Pappas, after loading a ship with weapons and ammunition, which he had bought with his own money, left Constantinople for Mount Athos, with orders to organize the revolution in Macedonia. Many monks rose up ready to follow him and contacts were made with Macedonian chieftains in an attempt to prepare a coordinated rebellion.
After the failure of the persistent efforts to coordinate a simultaneous explosion of the revolution in Olympus and Halkidiki, Emmanuel Papas at the end of May declared on Mount Athos the revolution in Macedonia. The revolutionaries managed in a short period of time to liberate the whole of Halkidiki, the Royal Palaces of Thessaloniki, as well as the region of Volvi. The Ottoman response here was immediate with the capture of hostages and the capture of cities. Thessaloniki was particularly affected, where thousands of Greeks were exterminated and their properties confiscated or destroyed.
It took at least fifty years for the Hellenism of the city to return to its pre-1821 levels and to recover from this crushing blow. Uprisings took place almost simultaneously (but without coordination), in Stromnitsa (with Diakopoulos and Diamantis), in Gevgeli, Tikfes, North Pindos (Grevena region), Lagadas, as well as in Thassos. In fact, the Thasians, with the help of Psarians, tried unsuccessfully to liberate Kavala.
On May 21, provosts from all the provinces and local chieftains gathered in Loutro of Sfakion, established a Chancellery and proclaimed the revolution in Crete as well. There was a strong and war-experienced Turkish element on the island and the revolution was quickly suppressed with the occupation of its cradle in Sfakia. The charioteers of the region of Etoloakarnania initially avoided getting involved in the rebellion.
On May 20, Messolonghi revolted with the charioteer of Zygos, Dimitris Makris, and the next day, Makris also revolted in Anatoliko (Aitoliko). On May 25, Giorgos Varnakiotis proclaimed the revolution in Xiromeros and on June 4 Karpenissime the Yoldassides also rebelled. The delay in the declaration of the revolution in Western Greece seems to be due to the existence of strong Ottoman forces in Epirus, due to the military confrontation of Pyli with Ali Pasha, but also to the reluctance of powerful armatoli (Georgos Varnakiotis, Andreas Iskos) of the region to get involved, perhaps due to fears of losing their privileges.
In May ships of the Greek fleet under the command of Giakoumakis Topazis approached Chios, in an attempt to convince the people of Chios to join the revolution. There was no response from either the nobles or the villagers and the fleet set sail. The Ottomans took hostages among prominent Greeks and a body of miscreants crossed from the Turkish coast to the island to "maintain order".
On its first exit from the Dardanelles, the Ottoman fleet found in front of it the Greek warships. On May 27, Topazis chased the Ottoman squadron and managed to blockade the largest ship (a ship of the line with 76 guns) in the bay of Eressos, which was finally blown up by Papanikolis with a fireball made in Psara, with significant Ottoman losses.
The Revolution in Crete
The explosion of the Revolution in the Peloponnese, Roumeli and the Aegean islands in the spring of 1821 triggered a series of revolts in other areas as well, such as Thessaly, Macedonia and Crete, where neither preparations had been made for this purpose nor the conditions favorable to the prevailing of the revolutionary movement. In these regions the revolutionaries found footholds in certain provinces (eg Pelion in Thessaly, Halkidiki in Macedonia), but sooner or later the Ottoman forces managed to impose themselves.
The case of Crete was different. The strong administrative and military presence of the Ottoman Empire, the numerous Muslim community that constituted almost half of the total population and the absence of preparations on the part of the Friendly Society did not leave much scope for the successful manifestation of the revolution. Nevertheless, from the end of spring, a revolutionary climate began to take shape, especially in hard-to-reach areas of Chania (Sfakia) and Rethymno (Anogeia).
However, since the summer of the previous year (1823), Egyptian troops had landed in Crete and in the following months they managed to put down all resistance by dealing with the Christian population with exemplary violence. Since then, the ports of Crete were used by Ibrahim Pasha as a naval base for operations in the Peloponnese.
More than three years later, immediately after the destruction of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino (October 1827), the Greek Administration initially and the Governor Ioannis Kapodistrias then favored the creation of revolutionary foci in various areas with the aim of being included in the -under negotiation- borders of Greek state. Thus, the revolution in Crete was rekindled and by the end of 1828 certain successes had been achieved which, although they did not create a prospect for military dominance, legitimized the Greek claims to the island. Two years later, Egyptian forces had once again suppressed the revolution in Crete.
The Great Greek Revolution of the Greek nation that led to the liberation from Turkish rule and the establishment of the new Greek state began before March 25 as it had been planned and prepared by the Friendly Society. The preludes of the revolution in the Peloponnese began on March 16, when the thieves Chondrogiannis and Petiotis shot the spay Seidi Laliotis and other armed men, the voivode of the Kalavritas, Ivraim Arnautoglou, who were moving to Tripoli.
The prolific modern Greek historian Georgios P. Kremos in his General History (1890) writes: "Having learned this, the nobles of the Achaeans came to enter Patras (March 22), and among the first were Papadiamantopoulos, Londos, Patron Germanos, Zaimis , Kernitsis and others leading each hoplite. Gernanos was then the first to raise the flag of freedom in the square of Agios Georgios and a cross in front of it.
Crete was unable to follow the Peloponnese calendar-wise and was about eighty days behind. The leaders of the Company did not plan or were unable to systematically organize revolutionary evangelism on the Megalonisos because of the unfavorable local conditions and the great distance. The eruption of the revolution in Crete immediately after the Peloponnese revolt was seemingly impossible. The obstacles were too great.
It is characteristic that in Crete there were three Pasades, while in the Peloponnese, an area with many times the area and population, there was only one Pasha. The Cretan slave lived an indescribable life, in miserable conditions, which were described by all the European travelers of the pre-revolutionary period. There was a complete lack of weapons and supplies. There was a disproportion of Turkish population compared to other Greek regions. Such profane and horrible administration had not been presented in any other part of Greece by the Turks, the barbarians as the historian John Philemon calls them.
The historian of the Greek Revolution Sp. Trikoupis was unfair and exaggerated in his criticism of the delay in starting the revolution in Crete. The Cleric-combatant-historian Kallinikos Kritoboulidis writes: "In order for the Greeks of Crete to engage in such an unequal struggle, they needed to have the things for war that were inevitably necessary. But where were these? The Turks, in advance, took away from the Greeks in the provinces with horrible violence whatever weapons they might have, either as shepherds for their own use, or for hunting, or for some other purpose.
I hastened to take these also from the mountainous Sfakians, whom I rather suspected, but they, on various justifiable pretexts, avoided handing them over. The Cretans, finding themselves in a difficult position, consulted the naval islands of Hydra and Spetses many times before, requesting the assistance of the necessary naval forces for the time being; hence Mr. Trikoupis is wrong, saying that the Cretans remained indifferent".
The revolution officially started on June 14, 1821. The revolutionary movements started in Sfakia from the beginning of April. On April 7, a meeting of the Safakians was held at Glyka Nera, to examine the general situation in Crete and the possibility of many provinces collaborating in a potential revolution. The assembly was repeated on April 15 in Panagia Thymiani. This is where the revolution was decided, which officially began on June 14th and was actually victorious with the battle in Loulos Chania.
The Turks responded savagely to the Cretan uprising. They hanged Bishop Kissamos Melchizedek and killed 400 Christians in Chania. In Rethymnon they imprisoned the bishop, who they hanged after a year and slaughtered many Christians. In the Great Castle things were even wilder. The Turks killed Metropolitan Gerasimos and five bishops. They burned the metropolis, looted the city and went out into the countryside. They killed monastery abbots, unarmed passers-by and farmers.
The dead are estimated at 800. The bishop of Petra Joachim was slaughtered by the Turks of Humeriakos in the monastery of Aretiou. In Sitia, 300 Christians were massacred, while the Monastery of Toplou was looted and many monks were massacred. After a bloody ten-year struggle and countless sacrifices, the revolution in Crete ended without justification. The Protocol of January 22, 1830 left Crete outside the boundaries of the new Greek state under the absolute jurisdiction of the Sultan.
This solution was imposed by English diplomacy, which was consistently hostile to the question of Cretan freedom. The period of Egyptian rule (1830-1840) and the movement of 1841 will follow as a continuation of the similar liberation movements of Thessaly and Macedonia. The period 1841-1866 is characterized as a period of peace. The great Cretan Revolution of 1866-1869 was the peak expression of the Cretans' desire for freedom and union with Greece that would eventually lead to a series of revolutionary movements, culminating in the revolution of 1897-1898 when the Megalonis gained its autonomy.
Military Operations
From 1822 onwards it appeared that the Revolution was prevailing in the Peloponnese, the Western and Eastern Mainland as well as the Aegean islands. These are the areas that roughly ten years later would generally constitute the territory of the independent Greek state. The Peloponnese was undoubtedly the center of the revolution. Very quickly most of it came under the control of the rebels, especially after the important successes against Dramali in the summer of 1822.
This control was maintained until 1825, when the disembarkation of Ibrahim's military forces posed significant risks to the survival of the revolution in Morea. The Peloponnesians managed to maintain some pockets of resistance until 1827, while the intervention of the Great Powers in the summer of 1827 (naval battle of Navarino) validated the fact that the Peloponnese would form the territorial base of the future Greek state.
The Aegean islands and especially Hydra, Spetses, Psara and Samos were important revolutionary hotbeds offering ships, money and experienced crews. Although the Ottoman operations were focused on suppressing the revolution in the Peloponnese and Roumeli, the islands were often the target of the Ottoman fleet, with sometimes disastrous results for the islands (Chios 1822, Kasos and Psara 1824).
Finally, Roumeli became a field of fierce conflicts. In the first years (1821-24) the provinces of Eastern and Western Roumeli were successively controlled sometimes by the Ottomans and sometimes by the revolutionaries. Gradually, however, the revolution was limited to the fortified city of Messolongion in the west and the castle of Athens (Acropolis) in the east. The fall of Messolonghi (1826) and the Acropolis (1827) after months-long sieges resulted in the imposition of Ottoman rule over the whole of Roumeli.
However, after the naval battle in Navarino, operations were carried out to recapture the provinces of W. and E. Sterea (1828-29). These operations were successfully concluded, thus strengthening the negotiation capacity of the Greek side in the issue of the borders of the Greek state.
THE GREATEST EVENTS IN THE REVOLUTION
THE EVENTS OF 1821
It is known and historically proven that the revolutionary events of 1821 were shaken by the assembly of Aigi (Vostitsa) from January 26th to the 30th of the same month (old calendar). There, from Papaflessa, the prefects and the priests heard that the most likely dates for the beginning of the revolution were, either March 25, (the day of the Annunciation), or April 23, (Saint George's), or May 29, (the day of the sacking of the City), but as it turned out in hindsight, events caught up with them and the revolution started earlier.
Thus, on March 14, 1821, the Turkish tax collectors were beaten in the Agridi Klukinon Kalavryton by Nikolaos Soliotis, and on March 16, 1821, in the turtle cave of Lykouria, Kalavryton, by the Chondrogiannai, in Froxylia, on the bridge of Ampibaga and elsewhere, while the climax of the events was the liberation of the city of Kalavryta on March 21, 1821, continued with the battle of Patras on March 21 and 22, 1821, as well as the liberation of Kalamata on March 23, 1821 by Kolokotronis, Papaflessa and the Maniates of Petrobei who had also started with an oath from Areopolis on March 17, 1821.
As mentioned above, after the meeting of Aegius (Vostitsas), the Moraites (Moralides) Turks, who had long since begun to suspect separatist revolutionary movements of the Greeks in the Peloponnese, wanted to trap the leading heads of the Greeks in Tripoli, so that they they are left without leaders. From the Greek "counter-espionage" means of the time, the above was learned and the Kalavryti prerogatives, although they initially showed an intention to depart for Tripoli, on March 9, 1821, halfway through, feigning illness, they turned back to Kalavryta.
Their action exposed them to the Ottoman authorities and they were forced to make shorter decisions regarding the start of the match. The place of return of the pre-qualified ones, who suspended their arrival in Tripolitsa, was A. Kleitoria (Karnesi) and Agia Lavra where they arrived on the night of March 11-12, 1821.
The next day Charalambis, Londos, Fotilas, Zaimis, Paleon Patras Germanos and the bishop of Kernitsis Kalavryton Prokopios, held a meeting regarding their actions which should be very careful so that on the one hand the plan of the revolution would not be perceived, on the other hand protect the lives of the candidates who were already in Tripoli and of course their lives themselves. On the eve of the revolution, the province of Kalavryta could command approximately 5,000 fighters and 70 war-experienced captains. It took many meetings among the candidates to reach a decision, which ultimately did not occur, mainly due to the reservations of the priests.
In the meantime and while the candidates were meeting in Agia Lavra, the commander Nikolaos Soliotis, apparently following a secret order from Charalambis - who wanted the revolution to start immediately - on March 14, 1821 in the village of Agridi in Nonakrid Kalavryton and in the Portes location, killed some Turks tax collectors and couriers of Mehmet Salih who were going to Ioannina to Hursit Pasha coming from Tripoli, asking him for reinforcements.
Also on the 16th of March 1821, in the location of the Turtle Cave of Lykouria in Kalavryton, the chieftains Chondrogiannis, Lambroulias, Asimakis, Giannis Dolkas and G. Dimopoulos with the consent of the strong Asimakis Zaimis, beat Lalaios Seidis Sipahis and the banker Tabakopoulos from Vytina, this also happened in the location of Froxylia Tourladas.
At the same time, in the villages of Leivartzio, on the orders of Panagiotakis Fotila, Kalavrytinopoulos, they murdered 2 Sipahis from Tripoli, whose corpses were seen by the side of the road by the then student at the school of Sopot and later secretary of Panos Kolokotronis and lawyer, Theod. Rigopoulos, from Filia. At the same time, Nikolaos Soliotis also beat the Tsipoglai tax collectors near Arfara, while on March 18 again Soliotis beat 60 Turkalvans in Versova Anat. Aegialia.
On March 17, Selim Agas, a Nafplion locksmith from Patras, was arrested at the Ampibaga bridge. Finally, the Ottoman governor Fellois Moula Yakup was also killed. From the above, it can be concluded that the candidates, although apparently during the meeting they seemed hesitant about the start of the revolution, in fact they wanted it as soon as possible and to this end they had informed their protopalikaras to start the revolutionary movements, which was done.
Following the above completed events and given that the other "heads" of the Peloponnese were either trapped or under close surveillance, on the evening of March 16 in the early hours of the 17th, the feast of Agios Alexios who is celebrated in Agia Lavra as the patron saint (there he is his Kara following a donation by Emmanuel Palaiologos in 1414) and to whose "grace" he would gather a large number of Kalavrytins from all over the province, Asimakis Fotilas during the third meeting of the pre-eminents, in a fit of rage, revealed his true intentions saying that they had to revolt immediately.
I hastened to take these also from the mountainous Sfakians, whom I rather suspected, but they, on various justifiable pretexts, avoided handing them over. The Cretans, finding themselves in a difficult position, consulted the naval islands of Hydra and Spetses many times before, requesting the assistance of the necessary naval forces for the time being; hence Mr. Trikoupis is wrong, saying that the Cretans remained indifferent".
The revolution officially started on June 14, 1821. The revolutionary movements started in Sfakia from the beginning of April. On April 7, a meeting of the Safakians was held at Glyka Nera, to examine the general situation in Crete and the possibility of many provinces collaborating in a potential revolution. The assembly was repeated on April 15 in Panagia Thymiani. This is where the revolution was decided, which officially began on June 14th and was actually victorious with the battle in Loulos Chania.
The Turks responded savagely to the Cretan uprising. They hanged Bishop Kissamos Melchizedek and killed 400 Christians in Chania. In Rethymnon they imprisoned the bishop, who they hanged after a year and slaughtered many Christians. In the Great Castle things were even wilder. The Turks killed Metropolitan Gerasimos and five bishops. They burned the metropolis, looted the city and went out into the countryside. They killed monastery abbots, unarmed passers-by and farmers.
The dead are estimated at 800. The bishop of Petra Joachim was slaughtered by the Turks of Humeriakos in the monastery of Aretiou. In Sitia, 300 Christians were massacred, while the Monastery of Toplou was looted and many monks were massacred. After a bloody ten-year struggle and countless sacrifices, the revolution in Crete ended without justification. The Protocol of January 22, 1830 left Crete outside the boundaries of the new Greek state under the absolute jurisdiction of the Sultan.
This solution was imposed by English diplomacy, which was consistently hostile to the question of Cretan freedom. The period of Egyptian rule (1830-1840) and the movement of 1841 will follow as a continuation of the similar liberation movements of Thessaly and Macedonia. The period 1841-1866 is characterized as a period of peace. The great Cretan Revolution of 1866-1869 was the peak expression of the Cretans' desire for freedom and union with Greece that would eventually lead to a series of revolutionary movements, culminating in the revolution of 1897-1898 when the Megalonis gained its autonomy.
Military Operations
From 1822 onwards it appeared that the Revolution was prevailing in the Peloponnese, the Western and Eastern Mainland as well as the Aegean islands. These are the areas that roughly ten years later would generally constitute the territory of the independent Greek state. The Peloponnese was undoubtedly the center of the revolution. Very quickly most of it came under the control of the rebels, especially after the important successes against Dramali in the summer of 1822.
The Aegean islands and especially Hydra, Spetses, Psara and Samos were important revolutionary hotbeds offering ships, money and experienced crews. Although the Ottoman operations were focused on suppressing the revolution in the Peloponnese and Roumeli, the islands were often the target of the Ottoman fleet, with sometimes disastrous results for the islands (Chios 1822, Kasos and Psara 1824).
Finally, Roumeli became a field of fierce conflicts. In the first years (1821-24) the provinces of Eastern and Western Roumeli were successively controlled sometimes by the Ottomans and sometimes by the revolutionaries. Gradually, however, the revolution was limited to the fortified city of Messolongion in the west and the castle of Athens (Acropolis) in the east. The fall of Messolonghi (1826) and the Acropolis (1827) after months-long sieges resulted in the imposition of Ottoman rule over the whole of Roumeli.
However, after the naval battle in Navarino, operations were carried out to recapture the provinces of W. and E. Sterea (1828-29). These operations were successfully concluded, thus strengthening the negotiation capacity of the Greek side in the issue of the borders of the Greek state.
THE GREATEST EVENTS IN THE REVOLUTION
THE EVENTS OF 1821
It is known and historically proven that the revolutionary events of 1821 were shaken by the assembly of Aigi (Vostitsa) from January 26th to the 30th of the same month (old calendar). There, from Papaflessa, the prefects and the priests heard that the most likely dates for the beginning of the revolution were, either March 25, (the day of the Annunciation), or April 23, (Saint George's), or May 29, (the day of the sacking of the City), but as it turned out in hindsight, events caught up with them and the revolution started earlier.
Thus, on March 14, 1821, the Turkish tax collectors were beaten in the Agridi Klukinon Kalavryton by Nikolaos Soliotis, and on March 16, 1821, in the turtle cave of Lykouria, Kalavryton, by the Chondrogiannai, in Froxylia, on the bridge of Ampibaga and elsewhere, while the climax of the events was the liberation of the city of Kalavryta on March 21, 1821, continued with the battle of Patras on March 21 and 22, 1821, as well as the liberation of Kalamata on March 23, 1821 by Kolokotronis, Papaflessa and the Maniates of Petrobei who had also started with an oath from Areopolis on March 17, 1821.
As mentioned above, after the meeting of Aegius (Vostitsas), the Moraites (Moralides) Turks, who had long since begun to suspect separatist revolutionary movements of the Greeks in the Peloponnese, wanted to trap the leading heads of the Greeks in Tripoli, so that they they are left without leaders. From the Greek "counter-espionage" means of the time, the above was learned and the Kalavryti prerogatives, although they initially showed an intention to depart for Tripoli, on March 9, 1821, halfway through, feigning illness, they turned back to Kalavryta.
The next day Charalambis, Londos, Fotilas, Zaimis, Paleon Patras Germanos and the bishop of Kernitsis Kalavryton Prokopios, held a meeting regarding their actions which should be very careful so that on the one hand the plan of the revolution would not be perceived, on the other hand protect the lives of the candidates who were already in Tripoli and of course their lives themselves. On the eve of the revolution, the province of Kalavryta could command approximately 5,000 fighters and 70 war-experienced captains. It took many meetings among the candidates to reach a decision, which ultimately did not occur, mainly due to the reservations of the priests.
In the meantime and while the candidates were meeting in Agia Lavra, the commander Nikolaos Soliotis, apparently following a secret order from Charalambis - who wanted the revolution to start immediately - on March 14, 1821 in the village of Agridi in Nonakrid Kalavryton and in the Portes location, killed some Turks tax collectors and couriers of Mehmet Salih who were going to Ioannina to Hursit Pasha coming from Tripoli, asking him for reinforcements.
Also on the 16th of March 1821, in the location of the Turtle Cave of Lykouria in Kalavryton, the chieftains Chondrogiannis, Lambroulias, Asimakis, Giannis Dolkas and G. Dimopoulos with the consent of the strong Asimakis Zaimis, beat Lalaios Seidis Sipahis and the banker Tabakopoulos from Vytina, this also happened in the location of Froxylia Tourladas.
At the same time, in the villages of Leivartzio, on the orders of Panagiotakis Fotila, Kalavrytinopoulos, they murdered 2 Sipahis from Tripoli, whose corpses were seen by the side of the road by the then student at the school of Sopot and later secretary of Panos Kolokotronis and lawyer, Theod. Rigopoulos, from Filia. At the same time, Nikolaos Soliotis also beat the Tsipoglai tax collectors near Arfara, while on March 18 again Soliotis beat 60 Turkalvans in Versova Anat. Aegialia.
On March 17, Selim Agas, a Nafplion locksmith from Patras, was arrested at the Ampibaga bridge. Finally, the Ottoman governor Fellois Moula Yakup was also killed. From the above, it can be concluded that the candidates, although apparently during the meeting they seemed hesitant about the start of the revolution, in fact they wanted it as soon as possible and to this end they had informed their protopalikaras to start the revolutionary movements, which was done.
Following the above completed events and given that the other "heads" of the Peloponnese were either trapped or under close surveillance, on the evening of March 16 in the early hours of the 17th, the feast of Agios Alexios who is celebrated in Agia Lavra as the patron saint (there he is his Kara following a donation by Emmanuel Palaiologos in 1414) and to whose "grace" he would gather a large number of Kalavrytins from all over the province, Asimakis Fotilas during the third meeting of the pre-eminents, in a fit of rage, revealed his true intentions saying that they had to revolt immediately.
The opinion that the revolution had to start immediately, that is on March 17, 1821 (old calendar), was strengthened by the fact that already due to the feast of Agios Alexios - as predicted - they would gather at the Monastery of Ag. Lavras all the local chieftains, as well as a large number of people, and this gathering would not have troubled the Turks since it would have been in the context of the annual religious festival, but it would have helped the Greeks so that they would all meet together under the "nose" of the Ottomans and make immediate collective decisions for the start of the race in the Peloponnese, which everyone has been waiting for from moment to moment.
Also, another fact which ultimately weighed on the decision to start the fight despite any consequences, was Zaimis' knowledge of the decision of Kanellos Deligiannis, Spiliotopoulos and Papaflessas that the movement should not be postponed even if the heads of the proests fell and despots in Tripoli. On March 17, 1821, the day of Agios Alexios, after the liturgy, and the legendary swearing-in, military orders began to be given by the pre-priests to their protopalikaras, which were completed on March 18, 1821.
Date on which they left for their positions throughout the province of Kalavryton (Panagy. Fotilas for Aroania, Paos, Psofida), Patras (P. Patron left together with Andreas Zaimis and Prokopio for Nezera Patron and thus found in Patras on March 21, 1821), Aigio (Andr. Lovtos) and other places, and on the above date the messengers of the message of the decision to start the revolution also left, especially towards Kalamata where the Mavromichalians were waiting with Kolokotronis , having coincidentally started from Areopolis on March 17, 1821.
Following the above situation and the departure of the chiefs for their positions, in Ag. The Sots remained Lavra. Charalambis, Sot. Theocharopoulos, Nik. Soliotis, Mourtogiannis and the Petmezades after more than 600 recruited men from the province of Kalavryta. The 19th of March 1821 was the same as the 18th, i.e. with departures and organizations of the Greeks, and the Turkish garrison of Kalavryta with the Muslim Bektasi of Arvanite origin as the commander of Arnautoglou "tamboured" inside the city of Kalavryta because they understood that it was not a celebration, but for an organized military/revolutionary movement of the Greeks.
On March 20, 1821, the warriors remaining in Agia Lavra, after taking a small canon of the monastery and instead of a flag (bairaki), the cover of the beautiful gate of the church of Ag. Alexiou, (the well-known banner, a gift to the women's monastery of Smyrna, Asia Minor), with the standard-bearer, the Agiolaurite hierodeacon Grigorios Dokos "... they arrived at the area around Kalavryta...".
And in the early hours of March 21, 1821, hostilities began with the city's guard, which they defeated the same day after a battle and not simple celebratory "shootings", as some modern historians erroneously write, thus liberating the city of Kalavryta, which was strong and very important for the administration of the Turks in the Northern Peloponnese, noting that in the year 1816 he paid an annual tribute ten times that of Pyrgos Ilias, twice that of Aegius, three times that of Patras and almost twice that of Gastouni.
In conclusion and according to what we have presented so far, it clearly emerges that before March 17, 1821, the decision was made by the Kalavrytian qualifiers to dare to start the race in the Peloponnese. On March 17, 1821, what we call the swearing-in ceremony took place in Agia Lavra, while a liturgy followed in memory of St. Alexiou, although the Old Patronus Germanos does not explicitly refer to such an incident in his memoirs, nevertheless the event is preserved in the family oral traditions of the Kalavrytines, in their folk songs, as well as in writing in the certificates of the Kalavrytine fighters that are archived in the fighters' archive in National Library.
On the same day, the battle plan must have been drawn up and therefore the matters concerning Ag. Lavras, they may not have happened exactly as depicted in the paintings, or recorded by the popular muse, but it is not a myth, they simply happened one (1) week earlier than March 25, 1821. Then, on March 19, 1821, the start of the race was announced in Kalamata. On March 21, 1821, the attack against Kalavryta took place, their capture and liberation after a battle, as well as the capture of the garrison and the Commander of Arnautoglou.
Also on March 21, 1821, 100 Turks entered Patras from Rio under Yusuf – Selim to limit the rebel Greeks. Hostilities began in Aigio and Agia Triada of Patras, while an attack was made against the house of Papadiamantopoulos, with a counterattack by the Greeks, the clash in Tassi and the murder of V. Orkulatos from the Heptani. On the 22nd of March 1821 the revolution of Patras was declared, the entry into the city of Papadiamantopoulos was made with the Koumaniotai and Andreas Londo after 300 men under a red flag with a black cross.
Similarly, the entry of P, Patron Germanos, Procopius, Ann, Zaimis and Ven. Roufos in the square of Ag. Georgiou, where the flag of A. Londos was raised. On March 23 and 24, 1821, the Achaean Directorate was established in Patras, and in Kalamata the Greek bodies with Kolokotronis, Papaflessa and Mavromichalaios, who had started from the Areopolis of Mani coincidentally and they on March 17, 1821 as aforesaid.
Then the Messinian Senate was also established. On March 24 and 26, 1821, respectively, the declaration of the revolution was communicated to the Consulates of the Christian European powers located in Kalamata and Patras, with the most important being the one communicated to the Consul of England Green ), where the National character of the revolution is clearly clarified (self determination). Finally, one of these declarations was also published in the French newspaper Le Costitutionnel on June 6, 1821, when the uprising took on an international political character.
So this date of March 25th (a religious day due to the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary, but also a symbolic one that brings together all the previous incidents), with the consent of the fighters and protagonists of the revolution, in 1838 became a Royal Decree of Otto and was established as a national anniversary (note: as a national holiday it was only established at the end of the 19th century, by a royal decree of George I) thus remaining as a landmark of the Greek pan-national renaissance.
The Siege and Fall of Tripolitsa
At the beginning of the Revolution, Tripolitsa was the most important administrative, military and economic center of the Peloponnese and of southern Greece in general. The city was of great strategic importance, since its position allowed the control of the roads to the great cities of the Peloponnese. As early as 1786, Tripoli was the seat of the vilayet of Morea with the commander of the "Pasha of Moreos", the so-called Mora Valesi. At the outbreak of the revolution Mora Valesi was Hursit Pasha.
In 1820 the city had a population of more than 20,000 inhabitants, of which 13,000 were Greeks, 7,000 Turks, and 400 Jews. The city had a strong fortification for the time. Its wall was 5-6 meters high, 2 meters thick and 3,500 meters long. In total there were 7 gates with double battlements and tapias (towers) equipped with large cannons and cannons. At the northern end of the walls, on a hill (in the place of today's Reservoir) there was a large bastion, the great Tapia.
Shortly before the explosion of the revolution, the Turks had launched a persecution against the Greek element, fearing the start of Greek operations against the city. Heroic was the attitude of many prefects and high priests who offered themselves as hostages to the Turkish authorities, so that the city would not be attacked by the rebels. They were then treacherously captured by Hursit Pasha, locked up in the city's prisons, and many were tortured and put to death.
Immediately after the explosion of the revolution, the Old Man of Morea, contrary to the different opinions of the other military leaders who were in favor of the siege and the exhumation of the small Messinian castles first, had understood that the capture of Tripolitsa would be of primary importance for the revolution , since it would allow the Greek forces to control Moria and occupy the rest of the regions more easily. He firmly believed that they should not be divided, but should be concentrated in the siege of one great goal, Tripolitsa.
Besides, the Turkish army could, with Tripoli as its base, break up the sieges of other castles and suppress the Struggle. Finally his opinion prevailed and thus the occupation of Tripoli was the first goal of the revolutionaries. Before the outbreak of the revolution, the commander of Moria, Hursit Pasha, had campaigned by order of the Gate in Epirus to suppress the rebellion of Ali Pasha. In his place, Hursit left Mehmet Salih Pasha. With the outbreak of the revolution, Hursit Pasha sent to Moria a force of 4000 Turkalvans under Mustafa Pasha (Mustafabey) to reinforce the besieged city.
Mustafabeis, during his descent to Tripoli, swept away any revolutionary hearth he found on his way, set fire to Vostitsa (Aigio), lifted the siege of Argos and Akrocorinthos and finally entered the besieged city on May 6, 1821. Kolokotronis, however, allowed Mustafa to pass without a fight, because he preferred to have the Turks concentrated in the city. Thus the city was defended by a total of 10,000 Turkalvans led by Mustafabei.
For the effective siege of the city, Kolokotronis with the other military leaders established camps around Tripoli (in Karytaina, Valtetsi, Verbaina, Piana, etc.), gathering forces, organizing the fighters as well as their supplies and coordinating the military operations around the city. Continuous attempts by the besieged to break the cordon failed after being repulsed by the rebels who were well organized and fortified in the surrounding mountainous areas of Mainalus and had blocked the critical passes.
The Greek forces taking part in the siege included approximately 10,000 men. After July 20, 1821, the besieged Turks had reached 15,000. In the meantime, several Turkish residents who arrived from various areas (Zourtsa, Andritsaina, Karytaina, etc.) were added to the above population to find protection. Thus together with Mustafabei's 4,000 men, the number of the besieged exceeded 30,000 inhabitants and according to others 35,000. To deal with the lack of food, the Turks began to evict Greek families from the city.
Of decisive importance for the outcome of the siege of Tripolitsa was the victory at Valtetsi (12-13 May 1821) against a strong Turkish force led by Mustafabei. Mustafa, at the head of a strong body of 4000 men, attempted to surprise the encamped Greeks at Valtetsi. The few defenders of the camp defended themselves heroically. Then other Greek bodies arrived for reinforcements and the Greeks with Kolokotroni, Plaputa, Anagnostara and others counterattacked and defeated the Turks who suffered great defeat and significant losses.
Also, another fact which ultimately weighed on the decision to start the fight despite any consequences, was Zaimis' knowledge of the decision of Kanellos Deligiannis, Spiliotopoulos and Papaflessas that the movement should not be postponed even if the heads of the proests fell and despots in Tripoli. On March 17, 1821, the day of Agios Alexios, after the liturgy, and the legendary swearing-in, military orders began to be given by the pre-priests to their protopalikaras, which were completed on March 18, 1821.
Date on which they left for their positions throughout the province of Kalavryton (Panagy. Fotilas for Aroania, Paos, Psofida), Patras (P. Patron left together with Andreas Zaimis and Prokopio for Nezera Patron and thus found in Patras on March 21, 1821), Aigio (Andr. Lovtos) and other places, and on the above date the messengers of the message of the decision to start the revolution also left, especially towards Kalamata where the Mavromichalians were waiting with Kolokotronis , having coincidentally started from Areopolis on March 17, 1821.
Following the above situation and the departure of the chiefs for their positions, in Ag. The Sots remained Lavra. Charalambis, Sot. Theocharopoulos, Nik. Soliotis, Mourtogiannis and the Petmezades after more than 600 recruited men from the province of Kalavryta. The 19th of March 1821 was the same as the 18th, i.e. with departures and organizations of the Greeks, and the Turkish garrison of Kalavryta with the Muslim Bektasi of Arvanite origin as the commander of Arnautoglou "tamboured" inside the city of Kalavryta because they understood that it was not a celebration, but for an organized military/revolutionary movement of the Greeks.
On March 20, 1821, the warriors remaining in Agia Lavra, after taking a small canon of the monastery and instead of a flag (bairaki), the cover of the beautiful gate of the church of Ag. Alexiou, (the well-known banner, a gift to the women's monastery of Smyrna, Asia Minor), with the standard-bearer, the Agiolaurite hierodeacon Grigorios Dokos "... they arrived at the area around Kalavryta...".
And in the early hours of March 21, 1821, hostilities began with the city's guard, which they defeated the same day after a battle and not simple celebratory "shootings", as some modern historians erroneously write, thus liberating the city of Kalavryta, which was strong and very important for the administration of the Turks in the Northern Peloponnese, noting that in the year 1816 he paid an annual tribute ten times that of Pyrgos Ilias, twice that of Aegius, three times that of Patras and almost twice that of Gastouni.
In conclusion and according to what we have presented so far, it clearly emerges that before March 17, 1821, the decision was made by the Kalavrytian qualifiers to dare to start the race in the Peloponnese. On March 17, 1821, what we call the swearing-in ceremony took place in Agia Lavra, while a liturgy followed in memory of St. Alexiou, although the Old Patronus Germanos does not explicitly refer to such an incident in his memoirs, nevertheless the event is preserved in the family oral traditions of the Kalavrytines, in their folk songs, as well as in writing in the certificates of the Kalavrytine fighters that are archived in the fighters' archive in National Library.
Also on March 21, 1821, 100 Turks entered Patras from Rio under Yusuf – Selim to limit the rebel Greeks. Hostilities began in Aigio and Agia Triada of Patras, while an attack was made against the house of Papadiamantopoulos, with a counterattack by the Greeks, the clash in Tassi and the murder of V. Orkulatos from the Heptani. On the 22nd of March 1821 the revolution of Patras was declared, the entry into the city of Papadiamantopoulos was made with the Koumaniotai and Andreas Londo after 300 men under a red flag with a black cross.
Similarly, the entry of P, Patron Germanos, Procopius, Ann, Zaimis and Ven. Roufos in the square of Ag. Georgiou, where the flag of A. Londos was raised. On March 23 and 24, 1821, the Achaean Directorate was established in Patras, and in Kalamata the Greek bodies with Kolokotronis, Papaflessa and Mavromichalaios, who had started from the Areopolis of Mani coincidentally and they on March 17, 1821 as aforesaid.
Then the Messinian Senate was also established. On March 24 and 26, 1821, respectively, the declaration of the revolution was communicated to the Consulates of the Christian European powers located in Kalamata and Patras, with the most important being the one communicated to the Consul of England Green ), where the National character of the revolution is clearly clarified (self determination). Finally, one of these declarations was also published in the French newspaper Le Costitutionnel on June 6, 1821, when the uprising took on an international political character.
So this date of March 25th (a religious day due to the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary, but also a symbolic one that brings together all the previous incidents), with the consent of the fighters and protagonists of the revolution, in 1838 became a Royal Decree of Otto and was established as a national anniversary (note: as a national holiday it was only established at the end of the 19th century, by a royal decree of George I) thus remaining as a landmark of the Greek pan-national renaissance.
The Siege and Fall of Tripolitsa
At the beginning of the Revolution, Tripolitsa was the most important administrative, military and economic center of the Peloponnese and of southern Greece in general. The city was of great strategic importance, since its position allowed the control of the roads to the great cities of the Peloponnese. As early as 1786, Tripoli was the seat of the vilayet of Morea with the commander of the "Pasha of Moreos", the so-called Mora Valesi. At the outbreak of the revolution Mora Valesi was Hursit Pasha.
In 1820 the city had a population of more than 20,000 inhabitants, of which 13,000 were Greeks, 7,000 Turks, and 400 Jews. The city had a strong fortification for the time. Its wall was 5-6 meters high, 2 meters thick and 3,500 meters long. In total there were 7 gates with double battlements and tapias (towers) equipped with large cannons and cannons. At the northern end of the walls, on a hill (in the place of today's Reservoir) there was a large bastion, the great Tapia.
Immediately after the explosion of the revolution, the Old Man of Morea, contrary to the different opinions of the other military leaders who were in favor of the siege and the exhumation of the small Messinian castles first, had understood that the capture of Tripolitsa would be of primary importance for the revolution , since it would allow the Greek forces to control Moria and occupy the rest of the regions more easily. He firmly believed that they should not be divided, but should be concentrated in the siege of one great goal, Tripolitsa.
Besides, the Turkish army could, with Tripoli as its base, break up the sieges of other castles and suppress the Struggle. Finally his opinion prevailed and thus the occupation of Tripoli was the first goal of the revolutionaries. Before the outbreak of the revolution, the commander of Moria, Hursit Pasha, had campaigned by order of the Gate in Epirus to suppress the rebellion of Ali Pasha. In his place, Hursit left Mehmet Salih Pasha. With the outbreak of the revolution, Hursit Pasha sent to Moria a force of 4000 Turkalvans under Mustafa Pasha (Mustafabey) to reinforce the besieged city.
Mustafabeis, during his descent to Tripoli, swept away any revolutionary hearth he found on his way, set fire to Vostitsa (Aigio), lifted the siege of Argos and Akrocorinthos and finally entered the besieged city on May 6, 1821. Kolokotronis, however, allowed Mustafa to pass without a fight, because he preferred to have the Turks concentrated in the city. Thus the city was defended by a total of 10,000 Turkalvans led by Mustafabei.
For the effective siege of the city, Kolokotronis with the other military leaders established camps around Tripoli (in Karytaina, Valtetsi, Verbaina, Piana, etc.), gathering forces, organizing the fighters as well as their supplies and coordinating the military operations around the city. Continuous attempts by the besieged to break the cordon failed after being repulsed by the rebels who were well organized and fortified in the surrounding mountainous areas of Mainalus and had blocked the critical passes.
The Greek forces taking part in the siege included approximately 10,000 men. After July 20, 1821, the besieged Turks had reached 15,000. In the meantime, several Turkish residents who arrived from various areas (Zourtsa, Andritsaina, Karytaina, etc.) were added to the above population to find protection. Thus together with Mustafabei's 4,000 men, the number of the besieged exceeded 30,000 inhabitants and according to others 35,000. To deal with the lack of food, the Turks began to evict Greek families from the city.
Of decisive importance for the outcome of the siege of Tripolitsa was the victory at Valtetsi (12-13 May 1821) against a strong Turkish force led by Mustafabei. Mustafa, at the head of a strong body of 4000 men, attempted to surprise the encamped Greeks at Valtetsi. The few defenders of the camp defended themselves heroically. Then other Greek bodies arrived for reinforcements and the Greeks with Kolokotroni, Plaputa, Anagnostara and others counterattacked and defeated the Turks who suffered great defeat and significant losses.
After this important victory, as well as the victories at Doliana (May 18, 1821), Verbaina, Grana and Caparelli, the cordon began to tighten around the city. The revolutionary corps led by T. Kolokotronis, D. Ypsilanti, D. Plaputa, Anagnostara, Giatrakos and others advanced and occupied positions around Tripolitsa, taking all the heights and blocking all the crossings. The position of the besieged had now become dramatic as the city suffered from disease and lack of food and water.
Then the Albanians came to a negotiation with Kolokotronis and after an agreement they left under the protection of Dim. Plaputa and passed to Roumeli. And while the fall of the city was looming, with the besiegers beginning to negotiate its surrender, finally, on September 23, 1821, after a five-month siege, a fortuitous incident came to hasten its final outcome. On that day, the Turks held a meeting in the serai to decide on the surrender of the city.
A Tsakonian fighter from Prastos, Manolis Dounias, who had a friendship with a Turkish operator and secretly visited him in the tapia of Nafplio, exchanging food for Turkish weapons, managed, together with two other Tsakonians, to neutralize the guards and take over the telephone station. He immediately turned it against the city and charged against the saragi. The historian Nikolaos Spiliadis, one of the greatest historians of the Battle, who lived through the events, writes in his "Memoirs" about this incident:
"Manolis Dounias from Praston... It was Friday, the twenty-third of September 1821... and Dounias was climbing the wall with the aim of extracting Turkon... After this, others set foot and climbed in the same way. After these and others, the brother of Kephalas and Dionysios Vassiliou, and they rushed in the twinkling of an eye to the artillery station on the gate (of Nafplio), to point the guns towards the city...".
Then other Greeks who were nearby climbed the walls with a rope and opened the gates of Nafplion and Mystras. From these bodies poured out from the nearby heights of Volima and Agios Sostis under Kefala, Zafeiropoulos, Papapanastasis and others who soon opened all the castle gates from where the rest of the Greek forces entered. The Turks put up a furious resistance and there was a terrible hand-to-hand fight in the streets of the city.
But the revolutionaries were now unrestrained and passionate and quickly managed to neutralize all resistance. Many Turks barricaded themselves in the houses from which they desperately defended themselves, but the rebels set fire to them and burned them or forced them out. In the end, the great Tapia, the last point of resistance of the Turks, also fell. There followed a merciless massacre of the Turks, soldiers and civilians, by the revenge-hungry Greeks - despite the efforts of several chieftains to rescue the captives -, and Tripolitsa was given over to the flames.
However, Kolokotronis kept his promise to the leader of the Albanians, Ahmet Bey, not to disturb those Albanians who remained in the city, whom he allowed to leave for Epirus. Some Greek residents who had opposed the Revolution, as well as the Jews of the city, also passed away from the vengeful fury of the Greeks, since the revolutionaries had not forgotten the participation of the Jews in the recent burial of the body of Gregory V in the City. Gennaios, son of Theodoros Kolokotronis, writes in "Memoirs" (1821-1827) about the capture of Tripolitsa:
Then the Albanians came to a negotiation with Kolokotronis and after an agreement they left under the protection of Dim. Plaputa and passed to Roumeli. And while the fall of the city was looming, with the besiegers beginning to negotiate its surrender, finally, on September 23, 1821, after a five-month siege, a fortuitous incident came to hasten its final outcome. On that day, the Turks held a meeting in the serai to decide on the surrender of the city.
A Tsakonian fighter from Prastos, Manolis Dounias, who had a friendship with a Turkish operator and secretly visited him in the tapia of Nafplio, exchanging food for Turkish weapons, managed, together with two other Tsakonians, to neutralize the guards and take over the telephone station. He immediately turned it against the city and charged against the saragi. The historian Nikolaos Spiliadis, one of the greatest historians of the Battle, who lived through the events, writes in his "Memoirs" about this incident:
"Manolis Dounias from Praston... It was Friday, the twenty-third of September 1821... and Dounias was climbing the wall with the aim of extracting Turkon... After this, others set foot and climbed in the same way. After these and others, the brother of Kephalas and Dionysios Vassiliou, and they rushed in the twinkling of an eye to the artillery station on the gate (of Nafplio), to point the guns towards the city...".
Then other Greeks who were nearby climbed the walls with a rope and opened the gates of Nafplion and Mystras. From these bodies poured out from the nearby heights of Volima and Agios Sostis under Kefala, Zafeiropoulos, Papapanastasis and others who soon opened all the castle gates from where the rest of the Greek forces entered. The Turks put up a furious resistance and there was a terrible hand-to-hand fight in the streets of the city.
But the revolutionaries were now unrestrained and passionate and quickly managed to neutralize all resistance. Many Turks barricaded themselves in the houses from which they desperately defended themselves, but the rebels set fire to them and burned them or forced them out. In the end, the great Tapia, the last point of resistance of the Turks, also fell. There followed a merciless massacre of the Turks, soldiers and civilians, by the revenge-hungry Greeks - despite the efforts of several chieftains to rescue the captives -, and Tripolitsa was given over to the flames.
However, Kolokotronis kept his promise to the leader of the Albanians, Ahmet Bey, not to disturb those Albanians who remained in the city, whom he allowed to leave for Epirus. Some Greek residents who had opposed the Revolution, as well as the Jews of the city, also passed away from the vengeful fury of the Greeks, since the revolutionaries had not forgotten the participation of the Jews in the recent burial of the body of Gregory V in the City. Gennaios, son of Theodoros Kolokotronis, writes in "Memoirs" (1821-1827) about the capture of Tripolitsa:
"The Greeks, in the space of three days, killed 5,000 fighters and captured 7,300 of all genders and ages, and out of 13,000 locals and foreigners who were in Tripoli, only 1,500 Albanians, at the mercy of Kolokotronis, escaped, who were escorted by Plaputas until of Vostitsa, they certainly disembarked at Roumelin. About 150 Greeks were killed on this occasion".
The fall of Tripolitsa was of decisive importance for the consolidation and development of the Revolution, while it significantly boosted the morale of the insurgent Greeks. The most important focus of Turkish resistance in southern Greece was now eliminated, while the rebel forces could now turn to other Turkish-held fortresses and cities. Thousands of weapons and large quantities of munitions fell into the hands of the Greeks who would use them to strengthen the fight in other operations, such as in the sieges of Methoni, Patras and Nafplio.
The Battle of Valtetsi
One of the most famous and decisive battles of the liberation struggle of 21 was the battle in Valtetsi (April 24 and May 12-13, 1821) against the Turkish forces defending Tripolitsa. This battle played a decisive role in the outcome of the siege of the city. While the Greeks besiege the Turks at Acrocorinth and Tripoli, Khursit Pasha, who is fighting Ali at Ioannina, worries about the outcome of the rebellion, as well as his harems and treasures in Tripoli.
That's why he sends a strong army with Gose Mehmet to suppress the revolutionary movement. Gose Mehmet divides his army into two divisions. One with him and Omer Brionis marches for Eastern Greece and the other with Kehayabei Mustafa (or Mustafa Bey) and 3,500 Albanians for Western Greece. to crush the revolution in Morea and reinforce the besieged Tripoli.
Kehayabeis starts from Ioannina, and during his descent towards Tripolitsa he swept any revolutionary hearth he found on his way. It passes through the dangerous passages without loss, reaches Antirrio and from there flows into the Morea. He passes to Patras, sets fire to Vostitsa, bypasses Kalavryta, reaches Corinth, breaking the siege of Acrocorinth and strengthening its garrison, and quickly passes to Dervenakia. From there it rushes into the knot of Argos, defeats the Greeks at Xeria, dissolves the siege of Argos, leaving the region to slaughter and desolation.
Finally he triumphantly enters the besieged Tripolitsa on May 6, 1821, where the Turks welcome him as a savior. Kolokotronis deliberately let Mustafa pass without a fight because he preferred to have the Turks concentrated in the city. From Tripoli, Kehayabeis immediately starts spreading promises, orders and amnesty, to deceive the rebels and suppress the movement. The only thing he manages to do is buy off with money the postman who takes Kolokotronis' letters to Bouboulina and other chieftains who have encircled Anapli.
The postman gives Kolokotronis' letters to Kehayabeis, who reads them, and then takes them to Bouboulina in Anapli. From there he gets other letters from Bouboulina for Kolokotronis, who also gives them on the way back to Kehayabeis, who reads them too, and then hands them to Kolokotronis. Fortunately the numbers of men and arms are exaggerated in the letters, and the treachery lasts only a short time. The traitor will then be caught and executed.
Kolokotronis, as commander of the chariots of Gortynia, organizes the strategic plan for the siege of Tripolitsa. He divides the body of the Gortynians into two sections. He sends one with Plapoutas to Piana and the other with Andreas Papadiamantopoulos to Chrysovitsi. He also reinforces Levidio's camp. In order to tighten the cordon around the besieged city, on April 16, 1821, he established a camp in Valtetsi, realizing the strategic importance of the area.
He orders that his four strategic points on the surrounding hills be fortified with closed and strong tambourines and that a guard be installed.. There, most of the organized revolutionary forces of the Peloponnese begin to gather, under Th. Kolokotroni, Kyr. and Il. Mavromichalis, Anagnostara, Kefala , Mourtzinos, Yatrakos, Nikitaras and other chieftains. On April 24, Kehayabeis, intending to neutralize the camp and surprise the assembled fighters, attacked Valtetsi at the head of a strong body of 4000 men.
The few defenders of the camp defended themselves heroically. The Turks, however, occupied the village, achieving the partial dissolution of the camp, and even seized some supply animals as well as provisions of the Greek corps. While the battle was continuing on the north side of the village, where Mr. Mavromichalis had been put in a difficult position, Plaputas arrived with a strong body and struck the Turks from the rear, causing them to retreat. Kolokotronis then chased the Turkish corps as far as Makri.
Immediately the camp is quickly reorganized under the direct supervision of Th. Kolokotronis, who reinforces and organizes the sentries, logistics and drums and places a guard of 1000 men led by Kyriakoulis Mavromichalis. He also puts a guard on the upper Chrepa with Giannis and Panagiotis Pournaras, captains from Piana, and Panagiotis Pertheriotis, to warn with fires if the Turks leave Tripoli.
The motto is: three fires, go to Verbaina, two fires, to Valtetsi and one, to Levidi. Thus with the fires and rifles from ridge to ridge all the camps of Moria will be alerted and they will run to help. In Valtetsi, the defense is now being carefully organized since other Greek bodies from the surrounding areas have arrived to be reinforced. In the first drum, Ilias and Kyriakoulis Mavromichalis are fortified with all the Maniates.
In the second, Mitropetrovas, Papatsonis, Kefalas, seventeen-year-old Yiannis Mavromichalis, Pan. Katrivanos from Isari Megalopolis and Thanasis Dagres from Vromovrysi Kalamata, with their lads. In the third Ilias and Nikitas Flessas, Sioris, Tourkolekas and old Liondarites and other Gortynians. In the church, the Buraoi, Tsalafatinos, Kyriakos, many Tripolitsiotes etc. are fortified.
On the night of May 12, Kehayabeis sets out from Tripoli at the head of a powerful force of 12,000 Turkalvans to strike again at the Greeks at Valtetsi. His plan is to march to Valtetsi and scatter the Greeks, from there to Messinia and subjugate Mani, thus imposing his rule over the whole of the Morea. He divided his forces into five divisions.
The fall of Tripolitsa was of decisive importance for the consolidation and development of the Revolution, while it significantly boosted the morale of the insurgent Greeks. The most important focus of Turkish resistance in southern Greece was now eliminated, while the rebel forces could now turn to other Turkish-held fortresses and cities. Thousands of weapons and large quantities of munitions fell into the hands of the Greeks who would use them to strengthen the fight in other operations, such as in the sieges of Methoni, Patras and Nafplio.
The Battle of Valtetsi
One of the most famous and decisive battles of the liberation struggle of 21 was the battle in Valtetsi (April 24 and May 12-13, 1821) against the Turkish forces defending Tripolitsa. This battle played a decisive role in the outcome of the siege of the city. While the Greeks besiege the Turks at Acrocorinth and Tripoli, Khursit Pasha, who is fighting Ali at Ioannina, worries about the outcome of the rebellion, as well as his harems and treasures in Tripoli.
That's why he sends a strong army with Gose Mehmet to suppress the revolutionary movement. Gose Mehmet divides his army into two divisions. One with him and Omer Brionis marches for Eastern Greece and the other with Kehayabei Mustafa (or Mustafa Bey) and 3,500 Albanians for Western Greece. to crush the revolution in Morea and reinforce the besieged Tripoli.
Kehayabeis starts from Ioannina, and during his descent towards Tripolitsa he swept any revolutionary hearth he found on his way. It passes through the dangerous passages without loss, reaches Antirrio and from there flows into the Morea. He passes to Patras, sets fire to Vostitsa, bypasses Kalavryta, reaches Corinth, breaking the siege of Acrocorinth and strengthening its garrison, and quickly passes to Dervenakia. From there it rushes into the knot of Argos, defeats the Greeks at Xeria, dissolves the siege of Argos, leaving the region to slaughter and desolation.
Finally he triumphantly enters the besieged Tripolitsa on May 6, 1821, where the Turks welcome him as a savior. Kolokotronis deliberately let Mustafa pass without a fight because he preferred to have the Turks concentrated in the city. From Tripoli, Kehayabeis immediately starts spreading promises, orders and amnesty, to deceive the rebels and suppress the movement. The only thing he manages to do is buy off with money the postman who takes Kolokotronis' letters to Bouboulina and other chieftains who have encircled Anapli.
The postman gives Kolokotronis' letters to Kehayabeis, who reads them, and then takes them to Bouboulina in Anapli. From there he gets other letters from Bouboulina for Kolokotronis, who also gives them on the way back to Kehayabeis, who reads them too, and then hands them to Kolokotronis. Fortunately the numbers of men and arms are exaggerated in the letters, and the treachery lasts only a short time. The traitor will then be caught and executed.
He orders that his four strategic points on the surrounding hills be fortified with closed and strong tambourines and that a guard be installed.. There, most of the organized revolutionary forces of the Peloponnese begin to gather, under Th. Kolokotroni, Kyr. and Il. Mavromichalis, Anagnostara, Kefala , Mourtzinos, Yatrakos, Nikitaras and other chieftains. On April 24, Kehayabeis, intending to neutralize the camp and surprise the assembled fighters, attacked Valtetsi at the head of a strong body of 4000 men.
The few defenders of the camp defended themselves heroically. The Turks, however, occupied the village, achieving the partial dissolution of the camp, and even seized some supply animals as well as provisions of the Greek corps. While the battle was continuing on the north side of the village, where Mr. Mavromichalis had been put in a difficult position, Plaputas arrived with a strong body and struck the Turks from the rear, causing them to retreat. Kolokotronis then chased the Turkish corps as far as Makri.
Immediately the camp is quickly reorganized under the direct supervision of Th. Kolokotronis, who reinforces and organizes the sentries, logistics and drums and places a guard of 1000 men led by Kyriakoulis Mavromichalis. He also puts a guard on the upper Chrepa with Giannis and Panagiotis Pournaras, captains from Piana, and Panagiotis Pertheriotis, to warn with fires if the Turks leave Tripoli.
The motto is: three fires, go to Verbaina, two fires, to Valtetsi and one, to Levidi. Thus with the fires and rifles from ridge to ridge all the camps of Moria will be alerted and they will run to help. In Valtetsi, the defense is now being carefully organized since other Greek bodies from the surrounding areas have arrived to be reinforced. In the first drum, Ilias and Kyriakoulis Mavromichalis are fortified with all the Maniates.
In the second, Mitropetrovas, Papatsonis, Kefalas, seventeen-year-old Yiannis Mavromichalis, Pan. Katrivanos from Isari Megalopolis and Thanasis Dagres from Vromovrysi Kalamata, with their lads. In the third Ilias and Nikitas Flessas, Sioris, Tourkolekas and old Liondarites and other Gortynians. In the church, the Buraoi, Tsalafatinos, Kyriakos, many Tripolitsiotes etc. are fortified.
On the night of May 12, Kehayabeis sets out from Tripoli at the head of a powerful force of 12,000 Turkalvans to strike again at the Greeks at Valtetsi. His plan is to march to Valtetsi and scatter the Greeks, from there to Messinia and subjugate Mani, thus imposing his rule over the whole of the Morea. He divided his forces into five divisions.
Three of them started from Tripoli, Kalogerovouni (in the position of Kalogeriko) and the Arahamites, one remained as a reserve at Frangovryssus to prevent any reinforcements arriving from the camp of the Bervaines, and a rear guard equipped with 4 cannons which moved slowly towards the area of Valtetsiou. The Greek guards of Apano Hrepa see the enemy troops and immediately with two fires they notify Kolokotronis that the Turks are marching towards Valtetsi.
The main Turkish body under Roumpis consists of Vourdunites and Phanariotes and moves hastily to strike the Greeks, before help arrives from Piana and Chrysovitsi. Kehayabeis watches the battle from the plain at the head of 3,000 horsemen. In Valtetsi there are 2,300 Greeks waiting in their seats. The general leader, Kyriakoulis Mavromichalis holds the rampart of Chomatovouni with his nephew. The other bastions are Mitropetrovas, Ill. Mavromichalis, Kefalas, N. Flessas and others.
Kolokotronis from Chrysovitsi, sees the fires of Apano Hrepa and immediately sounds the alarm. He sends postmen to all the camps and villages and horsemen to Valteci giving notice that the Turks are marching to Valteci. He notifies Plaputas in Piana and other chieftains to march to Valtetsi. And he himself with 800 men is heading there. He also sends the horseman Thodoris Kardaras with a flag to go out into the agnadia, so that those shut up in the ramparts may see him and be encouraged.
The Turkish corps under Roupi approaches the Greek positions at Valtetsi and asks them to surrender in vain. Then Roubis attacks the drum of Mitropetrova and the Messinians and the battle begins. Roubis will send 14 of his standard-bearers to nail the flags to the drums of the Greeks, but without success, since they are all killed by the rifles of the Greeks. Roubis dilutes his body and circles the drums of the Greeks, taking over the village's tap and wells.
The Greeks are resisting with determination and fortitude. Roubis then throws all his forces into the battle and cuts off communication between the Greek tambourines. However, the Greeks hold on and Roubis, finding himself in a difficult position, asks for reinforcements from Kehayabeis. At that moment Kolokotronis arrives from Chrysovitsi with 700 men and successfully flanks the Turks. Roubis finds himself between two fires and is ready to retreat, but at the last moment help arrives from Kehayabeis.
Kolokotronis realizes this and divides his men in two. Half hit the reinforcements and the other half him. The battle is fierce, and both fight stubbornly. In the afternoon, Plaputas arrives with 800 men, who due to a persuasive move by the Turks had headed towards Levidi but was notified in time, Deligiannis and St. Dimitrakopoulos from Piana and Diaselo and enter the battle pounding the Turks from the front, from behind and from the sides.
Those imprisoned in the drums greet the arrival of their fellow warriors with unison. Kehayabeis also sends new reinforcements to Roumpis and the Turks make a new attack on the tambourias, but the Greeks resist bravely. Stubbornly the Turks fire with the cannons, but many shells fall into Rumpi's body either from irregularities of the ground or from mishandling.
Kolokotronis, from the highest ridge (which has since been called "Kolokotronis the mountain") revives the morale of the Greeks by shouting with his thunderous voice, "Barba - Mitro, stand strong, Kolokotronis is coming with 10,000. Petrobeis is also coming with "all the Maniates. Kanellos is also coming. Stand firm and we will bring you everything". At dusk, the battle continues stubbornly on both sides, without anyone leaving their positions. At night Kolokotronis with some spirited men will arrive at the drums to reinforce the fighters with food and munitions and cheer them up. After giving the supplies he leaves again at night.
At dawn the next day, other Greek forces arrive and the battle begins again. The Turks rush furiously against the tambourines, but the Greeks resist bravely and repel all Turkish attacks. Roubis is in danger. The Greeks who are on the drums beat him from the front, Kolokotronis, Plaputas and other chieftains pound him from behind and from the sides. The Turks again use their artillery, but fail.
This battle lasted 23 hours. Kehaiyabeis, seeing that Roubis will be surrounded and being informed that Greek forces are arriving from the camp of the Bervaines, gives the signal for a general retreat. Kolokotronis perceives the retreat of the Turks and orders a general counter-attack, shouting: "Greeks, the Turks will flee, fall upon them". With the attack of the Greek fighters, the initial retreat of the Turkish forces turned into a disorderly flight.
Pursued by the Greeks, the Turks headed for Tripoli, descending the ravine in panic, throwing their weapons to delay the Greeks and hasten their flight. Kolokotronis, watching the Turks' pursuit, sees that they are approaching the plain where the Greeks are in danger from the enemy's cavalry, and shouts loudly: "Greeks, turn back, leave Turks so that we can kill another day". The Greeks are disciplined and stop the attack.
After 23 hours of fighting, the victory of the Greeks was a proud one. The Turks suffered heavy losses, 514 dead and many wounded. The Greeks had few - only 7 dead and a few wounded - while they captured many rifles left behind by the Turks in their flight. 4,000 Greeks are armed with these rifles. The Turks still left behind 4 field cannons, many munitions, many tents, plenty of clothing and 18 flags.
This battle, combined with the other victorious battles fought in the area (Grana, Verbaina, Doliani and Levidius), strengthened the morale of the rebels and was supposed to prepare the fall of Tripoli after forcing the Turks not to leave the besieged city. K. Deligiannis, who lived through the smoke of the battle, writes: "This glorious victory was the crisis of the Greek Revolution and the independence of the homeland is owed to it as it encouraged and enlivened the Greeks".
Battle of Alamanna
In the third ten days of March 1821 there were many indications and scattered rumors that the Greeks would revolt with the main focus in the Peloponnese. In Eastern Central Greece, in the region of Livadeia, the captain of the chariot of the region was Athanasios Diakos, born in Mousounitsa, Fokidos, and initiated into the Philiki Etairia as early as 1818, when he was Odysseus Androutsou's first boy.
When Vassilis Bousgou, the messenger and deputy leader of the charioteer, learned of the general rebellion in the Peloponnese, Diakos decided to raise the flag of the Revolution, overcoming any hesitations of the pre-eminents of the region (Logothetis, Lambros Nakos, Filon). Soon the news of the revolt of the Greeks and the siege of the Turks in Salona reached the area, scaring the local Turks that something like this was going to happen in their province as well.
With a ruse, Diakos convinced the Turkish voivode that he would fight the insurgents and thus managed, with Turkish official written approval, to recruit and equip 5,000 villagers. On March 27, the sporadic hostilities and individual murders of Turks began, while most of them took refuge in the castle of Livadeia. On the night of March 28-29, the rebels under Diakos occupied the hill of Prophet Elias in front of the city of Livadeia and from there he sent groups of gunners and blocked the roads leading to the city.
On March 30 and 31, the rebels under the banner of Diakos (Saint George with the inscription "Freedom and Death") advanced boldly and captured the main city, crushing the little Turkish resistance they encountered. The inhabitants of the city were about 10,000 and having a separate flag from each district (Panagia, Agios Nikolaos, Agios Dimitrios) of the city, they joined the revolutionaries. The Turks were confined to the castle of the city called "Hour" or "clock".
After negotiations with Diakos, the Arvanites surrendered the outer gate of the castle they were defending and left unharmed, keeping their weapons. After this development the Turks found themselves in a difficult position and surrendered on April 1st. The Greeks treated the Turks with magnanimity, whom they simply disarmed and allowed to move about the city freely, while their gold and valuables remained in their possession. In fact, the Turkish officials were accommodated in Greek homes for their safety.
On that Historic day, in a solemn eulogy at the church of Agia Paraskevi Livadeia, the bishops of Salona, Talanti and Athens blessed the revolutionary flag of Diakos. Diakos, at that critical moment for the revolution, showed patriotism by setting aside all material personal interests. He collected all the weapons surrendered by the Turks as well as all the booty and handed them over to the governors to be used to buy food and supplies for the newly formed revolutionary army.
Afterwards, Diakos cooperating with Diovouniotis easily liberated Talanti and Thebes while they intended to occupy Lamia (Zitouni), which was the administrative center of the region, as well as Hypati. All the revolutionaries gathered in Kobotades asking for the collaboration of the powerful charioteer Mitsos Kontogiannis of the Patratsiki region to attack Zitouni (Lamia). But Kontogiannis was hesitant to defect and did not respond to the dramatic appeals for help.
After eight crucial days dragged by his relatives, Kontogiannis joined the rebels and together they attacked the province of Patratsiki. However, the Greeks did not have time to capture the city as at night they saw thousands of Turks coming from Lianokladi holding lighted torches and so they retreated in order not to be trapped inside the city.
Khursit Pasha, who was besieging Ali Pasha in Ioannina, sent Kiose Mehmet and Omer Bryonis with 8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry to suppress the revolution in Central Greece and then advance to the Peloponnese, to frustrate Kolokotronis' plans for Tripolitsa . The danger to the revolution was great.
Diakos and his detachment, reinforced by the warlords Panourgias and Diovouniotis, decided to cut off the Turkish advance to Roumeli by taking defensive positions near the straits of Thermopylae where the Turks would not have the opportunity to deploy their cavalry and their numerical superiority.
After a meeting in the village of Kompotades, on April 20, 1821, the Greek force of 1,500 men was divided into three divisions: Diovouniotis would defend the Gorgopotamos bridge with 600 men, Panourgias the Mustafabei with 500 men, and Diakos the Alamana bridge with 500 men. Encamping at Lianokladi, near Lamia, the Turks quickly divided their force, attacking by surprise on the morning of April 23, without allowing the Greeks to organize.
The main Turkish force under the able general Omer Bryonis attacked Diakos. Another division of Turks under Hasan Tomaritsa attacked Dyovouniotis, whose detachment was quickly driven back by the enemy's numerical superiority, while another force fiercely attacked the positions of Panourgias, whose men gave a fierce battle but retreated when he was seriously wounded their leader who was fighting on the front lines.
In this battle the bishop of Salona Isaias, as well as his brother, died a heroic death. After these two very important victories that stripped the edges of the Greek defensive arrangement, Omer Bryonis gathered all his offensive power against the position of Diakos on the bridge of Alamanas. Diakos had arranged 200 men under the commanders Bakoyannis and Kalyvas on the bridge of Alamana, while he himself with 300 men held the position of Poria from where he relieved his fellow warriors on the bridge with counterattacks.
But when the forces of Panourgias and Diovouniotis collapsed, the Turks began to tighten the cordon around the defenders. While the situation was becoming more critical according to the historian Spyridon Trikoupis, they suggested to Diakos to escape, while his psycho son, brought him his horse urging him to save himself while there was still time. But he replied "the Diakos is not leaving" and did not leave his position. The unequal battle continues and one of the first dead to fall in front of him is his brother Konstantinos Massavetas, whom Diakos now uses as a shield in the attacks he receives.
With only 10 fighters left to him, he goes to the naturally fortified place of Mandrostamata of the monastery of Damastas, where he entrenches himself and fights there for about an hour. But the ammunition is limited, one after the other most of his companions are killed and Diakos himself is captured alive. and is brought before Omer Vryonis. The final tally of that day's battle was about 300 Greeks and a few Turks dead, while many were wounded.
Omer Bryonis initially respected the hero and did not let them kill him on the spot. On the night of April 23, 1821, after they arrived in Lamia, they interrogated him, in the presence of Khalil Bey, an influential Turk of Lamia, and suggested that he embrace Mohammedanism with the promise that he would be needed as an officer in the Ottoman army. Diakos, however, persistently refused all the tempting proposals made to him to save his life, categorically refusing to renounce Christianity and responding with contempt to the threats of the Turks.
The next day, April 24th, a Sunday, and following Halil Bey's persistent demand, a decision was issued for the death penalty by spitting, as he argued, Diakos had killed many Turks and should be punished in an exemplary manner. The Deacon was forced to carry with his own hands the instrument of his horrible punishment, and he suffered painfully for several hours before expiring.
After his martyrdom (about the description of which there are a variety of chilling versions), the Turks dumped the remains of the deceased in a ditch in the area. The Christians of the area secretly found the dead body of Diakos at night and buried it in a secret place in the city. The grave of Diakos was found by chance by lieutenant colonel Rouvalis in 1881. In 1886, the first memorial service for Athanasios Diakos was held and his bust was placed, which is preserved to this day.
Battle of Hani of Gravia
The Battle of Hani of Gravia was one of the military engagements of the 21st revolution with a victorious outcome for the Greeks. In this battle (05/08/1821), Odysseus Androutsos with 120 men defeated the army of Omer Vryonis. After the defeat of the Greeks in the battle of Alamana (23/04/1821) and the martyrdom of Athanasios Diakos, the Turkish army led by Omer Bryonis, with a force of 9,000 men and artillery, intended from Lamia to attack the Peloponnese.
Their way thither had been opened, since the sacrifice of Diakos had deprived the Greeks of their leader. Fear had overwhelmed the revolutionaries in the centers of the Struggle (Leivadia, Salona (Amfissa) and Attiki. Everyone was expecting the wrath of the 2 fronts. The Revolution was in danger a month after its start. It was saved by Odysseus Androutsos and the bad calculations of Omer Vryonis .
The Albanian Pasha, of Greek origin, instead of advancing towards the degraded regions of Eastern Mainland and proceeding as quickly as possible to the Peloponnese, decided that he had to strengthen his forces before crossing the Isthmus. He considered that by associating with the Greek chieftains, whom he knew from the Court of Ali Pasha, he would cause the paralysis of the Peloponnesian rebels. With this logic, he had also proposed to Athanasios Diakos to join his forces, but he had refused. Omer Vryonis had not realized the extent and meaning of the Greek uprising.
He believed that it was a simple rebellion, which would be easy to suppress, and not the uprising of an entire nation, claiming its freedom and self-determination. At that time Androutsos, an old charioteer of the area, who had fallen out of favor with the Sultan, was in A Sterea at that time, as a man of Ali Pasha, a member (since 1818) of the Philiki Etairia and an ardent supporter of the Struggle. Omer Vryonis found a 1st class opportunity to join him, because he knew very well his military skills.
He wrote him a letter as an old friend and asked him for his cooperation against the Greek rebels, with a lot of promises and baiting the chiefdom of the whole of A Sterea. He suggested to him, in fact, that they meet in Gravia, specifically in a small brick inn. Androutsos accepted the invitation and hurried to the area with another purpose in mind. He immediately convened a war council in Hani of Gravia, with the participation of the chieftains Diovouniotis and Panourgia.
They concluded that Omer Bryonis would land in the Peloponnese, not through the Isthmus, but through the Galaxides. However, they disagreed on the plan to deal with it. Androutsos proposed to fight in Hani, while Dyovouniotis and Panourgias deemed it unsuitable, because it was built of bricks and was in an open field. In the meantime, Omer Vryonis with 9,000 men was approaching Gravia and had been informed of the presence of Androutsos in the inn with a small force. He did not worry, however, believing that Androutsos would accept his proposal.
In a 2nd meeting of the Greek chieftains, who did not have more than 1200 men at their disposal, their disagreement was resolved. They decided that Dyovouniotis and Panourgias would seize the surrounding areas, while Androutsos would strike the enemy from the inn in a decidedly daring action. He was joined by 117 men, who turned the brick building into a fortress with rough works. Omer Bryonis with his army approached (morning of May 8, 1821) within shooting distance of the inn and immediately received a barrage of fire.
He understood that his old friend did not go there for friendly purposes, but to fight him. First he ordered an attack to be made against the men of Diovouniotis and Panourgias, whom he scattered in the surrounding mountains, just as in the Battle of Alamana. He then focused on Hani and Androutsos. He made an attempt to persuade him, sending a dervish as a messenger. The mission of the priest had its reason. Omer Vryonis knew that Androutsos was a Bektaxis Muslim.
The dervish advanced on horseback towards Hani, but suddenly received a bullet in the forehead and fell unconscious. The Ottomans attacked Hani in waves. Androutsos and his men held fast. Omer Vryonis saw the incompetence of his officers and ordered a new attack at noon. And she failed. In the early hours of the evening he ordered a cease-fire, realizing that he had made yet another mistake. Out of overconfidence in his own strength and underestimating the valor of the Greeks, he had campaigned without artillery.
He decided to temporarily withdraw his forces and order cannons to be brought to him from Lamia. He was determined on the morning of the next day to level Hani, with its insolent defenders. Androutsos guessed this move by Omer Vryonis and around 2 in the morning on May 9 he attempted a heroic exit with his 110 men. All 6 had been killed during the day-long battle. They surprised the Turkish garrisons that had surrounded Hani and disappeared among the Spartans.
The Turks surrounded the area and the inn, while Vryonis sent a dervish to tell Androutsos to surrender. Because Androutsos did not accept, the Turks attacked the inn, but were repulsed with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Bryonis, seeing his men falling from the fire of the Greeks, ordered a cannon to be brought in to blow up the building. The Turks halted the attack until the cannon arrived, while the Greeks, realizing their intentions, managed in the meantime to sneak away between the hostile Turkish lines.
The victims of the Turks were numerous. 330 dead and 800 injured in a few hours. The Greeks lost 6 warriors. After this battle Bryonis was so shocked, there was no more morale in his army, that he decided to temporarily stop his campaign and retreat to Evia, to later meet the forces of Kiose Mehmet. Due to this pause in the activities of Bryonis, the battle at the inn of Gravia is considered an important stage for the outcome of the Greek revolution.
The descent of such a powerful army, such as that of Omer Bryonis, had been prevented in the Peloponnese, where the revolution had not yet established itself, while it contributed to the start of the struggle in Western Greece as well. For a while, at least, a serious danger to the Peloponnese disappeared. Odysseas Androutsos was recognized by all as the undisputed leader of A Sterea.
The Battle of the Royal Palace
Omer Bryonis and Kiosse Mehmet Pasha had asked the Divan (government) for reinforcements, in order to deal with the Greeks of Eastern Roumeli. Bryonis did not want to risk a descent to Moria, leaving behind rebel groups, which would interrupt his supply. The Sultan then ordered Beyran Pasha to come down from Macedonia to reinforce the two pashas and then together to cross the Isthmus of Corinth to break the siege of Tripoli.
In fact, Beyran Pasha gathered 8,000 horsemen and with the generals Haji Bekir Pasha, Memis Pasha and Sahin Ali Pasha advanced towards the south. In the middle of August he camped in Lamia (Zitouni) where he collected food for his large army. The Rumeliote chieftains reacted immediately. Androutsos, who was near the Isthmus, wrote to Giannis Gouras and Vassilis Bousgos to move to meet the enemy and he himself boarded ships at Megarida to meet them.
The old man Diovouniotis and his son were waiting for the rest of the leaders in the village of Modi, where Nakos Panourgias, Pope Andreas from Koukouvista, Konstantinos Kalivas, Konstantinos Bitis, Komnas Trakas, Antonis Kontosopoulos (Gerantonos), Giannis Lappas had gathered. and Mitros Triantafyllinas. In the council of war that followed, opinions differed. The younger ones wanted to wait at the narrower passage of Fontanas that led to Turkochori, while old John believed that the pasha would pass through the pass of Vasilikos that led to Drachmani (Elatia).
The road of the Royalists was wide and difficult to fortify, but Dyovouniotis believed that the proud pasha would follow the wide public road to move, defying the ragiades who would not dare to mess with his invincible cavalry. Gouras, on the contrary, insisted that they set up in the narrow passage of Fontana, where they offered themselves for an ambush. Fortunately, the opinion of old Diovouniotis prevailed.
On August 22, 1821, Beyran Pasha with his two generals – Haji Bekir had died in Lamia – crossed the Alamana bridge and camped in the village of Platania. The next day he sent a body of 300 footmen to Fontana and 200 horsemen to Vasilika to scout. The horsemen, not meeting any resistance, advanced into the dense forest of the Vasilikos and then the men of Kontosopoulos and Kalyvas, hidden in the forest, attacked them by surprise and decimated them.
The Turkish infantry at Fontana from Pope Andreas had a similar fate. On the same day, Odysseus' chieftain Yiannis Roukis also arrived. The Turkish pasha, having confidence in his numerical superiority, decided to advance and beat the Chaines. He had not calculated that his cavalry would be useless in the forested valley of the Royals. He left his conveyances and carriages at Platanias and set out for its destruction.
The surrounded Turks were decimated. They asked for mercy and shouted: "Allah, Allah rai captain!" Memis Pasha was killed by Gura himself, while Beyran Pasha's son was also killed. Pasha himself abandoned the battle, running towards Zitouni, while the victors slaughtered the remains of his army. About 1000 Turks were dead, while all the supplies that had been abandoned in Platania, passed into the hands of the victors.
Eight cannons, hundreds of horses, camels, buffaloes, dozens of arabesques, Turkish flags and the famous Buyuk (big) bayraki, the flag of the attack, also fell into their hands. Beyran Pasha was murdered by the Sultan, thus punishing him for this dishonorable defeat. Gouras had got ankylosed fingers from holding his sword and when he asked Balaura for water to drink, the latter could not find clean water in the river, as it was red with the blood of the Turks killed.
Among the two hundred Turkish prisoners was Albanos Frassaris. Frassaris had been captured again by the Greeks and had been exchanged for Giorgos Diovouniotis, who was being held by Hursit. Frassaris had then sworn that he would never fight against the Romans again. For this stupidity of his, the Agorgianites flayed him alive, imitating the barbaric habits of the Passadians.
The battle in Vasilika was the most important fought in Eastern Roumeli since the beginning of the revolution. He crushed a very strong elite Turkish force, which alone was capable of invading and destroying the rebels in the Morea. It is worth noting that due to the competition and anti-jealousy between the Pashas, Omer Bryonis and Kiosse Mehmet did not help Bayran Pasha in his entry into Roumeli, because he could succeed where they had failed.
The two pasades returned idle to Lamia, while the until then timid Greek villagers felt themselves transformed into fearless warriors.
First and Second National Assembly
On December 20, 1821, the First National Assembly began its work in Piada (ancient Epidaurus). It was attended by representatives from most of the rebel regions. In terms of the geographical and social origin of the "performers", as they were called, the vast majority of them consisted of Moraites, Rumeliotes and islanders qualified and clerical.
These are the pre-revolutionary leadership groups to which were added Phanariotes and scholars who had arrived in the revolutionary areas during the first months of the revolution. On the contrary, Dimitrios Ypsilantis and the most prominent Rumeliote and Peloponnesian chieftains were absent. The most important act of the national assembly was the Provisional Government of Epidaurus, i.e. the first constitution of the rebel Greeks, in which the Declaration of Independence was proposed.
The Provisional Government, which is the work of the Italian B. Gallina, exudes the liberal and democratic principles of the French revolutionary constitutions (1793 and 1795), as well as the US constitution. (1787). Regarding the establishment of central administration bodies, a polycentric model was adopted with the establishment of two annual bodies (Parliamentary, Executive), which had not precisely defined and not strictly separated responsibilities.
The official recognition of the three local organizations in the Peloponnese, in the West and in the East of Sterea aggravated the confusion between the organs of the Administration, the fragmentation of the political field and ultimately the impossibility of central control of the rebel regions that made up the territory of the potential Greek state. Notable for the First National Assembly is the absence of any reference to Philiki Etairia.
The organization that had prepared the revolution had been permanently sidelined. Two years after the declaration of the revolution in the Peloponnese, specifically in March 1823, the work of the Second National Assembly began in Astros, Kynouria. In the time that intervened between the first and the Second National Assembly, the military successes went hand in hand with the sharpening of the political confrontations.
The abolition of the regional local government organizations gave power to the Administration bodies, making them the object of political struggle. On the sidelines of political factions, the "representatives" of the national assembly proceeded with a limited constitutional review, which confirmed the basic principles of the Provisional State of Epidaurus.
MAPS
AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIAL
THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STRUGGLE (II) 1821-1827
THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STRUGGLE (III) 1821-1827
PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL
The main Turkish body under Roumpis consists of Vourdunites and Phanariotes and moves hastily to strike the Greeks, before help arrives from Piana and Chrysovitsi. Kehayabeis watches the battle from the plain at the head of 3,000 horsemen. In Valtetsi there are 2,300 Greeks waiting in their seats. The general leader, Kyriakoulis Mavromichalis holds the rampart of Chomatovouni with his nephew. The other bastions are Mitropetrovas, Ill. Mavromichalis, Kefalas, N. Flessas and others.
Kolokotronis from Chrysovitsi, sees the fires of Apano Hrepa and immediately sounds the alarm. He sends postmen to all the camps and villages and horsemen to Valteci giving notice that the Turks are marching to Valteci. He notifies Plaputas in Piana and other chieftains to march to Valtetsi. And he himself with 800 men is heading there. He also sends the horseman Thodoris Kardaras with a flag to go out into the agnadia, so that those shut up in the ramparts may see him and be encouraged.
The Turkish corps under Roupi approaches the Greek positions at Valtetsi and asks them to surrender in vain. Then Roubis attacks the drum of Mitropetrova and the Messinians and the battle begins. Roubis will send 14 of his standard-bearers to nail the flags to the drums of the Greeks, but without success, since they are all killed by the rifles of the Greeks. Roubis dilutes his body and circles the drums of the Greeks, taking over the village's tap and wells.
The Greeks are resisting with determination and fortitude. Roubis then throws all his forces into the battle and cuts off communication between the Greek tambourines. However, the Greeks hold on and Roubis, finding himself in a difficult position, asks for reinforcements from Kehayabeis. At that moment Kolokotronis arrives from Chrysovitsi with 700 men and successfully flanks the Turks. Roubis finds himself between two fires and is ready to retreat, but at the last moment help arrives from Kehayabeis.
Kolokotronis realizes this and divides his men in two. Half hit the reinforcements and the other half him. The battle is fierce, and both fight stubbornly. In the afternoon, Plaputas arrives with 800 men, who due to a persuasive move by the Turks had headed towards Levidi but was notified in time, Deligiannis and St. Dimitrakopoulos from Piana and Diaselo and enter the battle pounding the Turks from the front, from behind and from the sides.
Those imprisoned in the drums greet the arrival of their fellow warriors with unison. Kehayabeis also sends new reinforcements to Roumpis and the Turks make a new attack on the tambourias, but the Greeks resist bravely. Stubbornly the Turks fire with the cannons, but many shells fall into Rumpi's body either from irregularities of the ground or from mishandling.
At dawn the next day, other Greek forces arrive and the battle begins again. The Turks rush furiously against the tambourines, but the Greeks resist bravely and repel all Turkish attacks. Roubis is in danger. The Greeks who are on the drums beat him from the front, Kolokotronis, Plaputas and other chieftains pound him from behind and from the sides. The Turks again use their artillery, but fail.
This battle lasted 23 hours. Kehaiyabeis, seeing that Roubis will be surrounded and being informed that Greek forces are arriving from the camp of the Bervaines, gives the signal for a general retreat. Kolokotronis perceives the retreat of the Turks and orders a general counter-attack, shouting: "Greeks, the Turks will flee, fall upon them". With the attack of the Greek fighters, the initial retreat of the Turkish forces turned into a disorderly flight.
Pursued by the Greeks, the Turks headed for Tripoli, descending the ravine in panic, throwing their weapons to delay the Greeks and hasten their flight. Kolokotronis, watching the Turks' pursuit, sees that they are approaching the plain where the Greeks are in danger from the enemy's cavalry, and shouts loudly: "Greeks, turn back, leave Turks so that we can kill another day". The Greeks are disciplined and stop the attack.
After 23 hours of fighting, the victory of the Greeks was a proud one. The Turks suffered heavy losses, 514 dead and many wounded. The Greeks had few - only 7 dead and a few wounded - while they captured many rifles left behind by the Turks in their flight. 4,000 Greeks are armed with these rifles. The Turks still left behind 4 field cannons, many munitions, many tents, plenty of clothing and 18 flags.
This battle, combined with the other victorious battles fought in the area (Grana, Verbaina, Doliani and Levidius), strengthened the morale of the rebels and was supposed to prepare the fall of Tripoli after forcing the Turks not to leave the besieged city. K. Deligiannis, who lived through the smoke of the battle, writes: "This glorious victory was the crisis of the Greek Revolution and the independence of the homeland is owed to it as it encouraged and enlivened the Greeks".
Battle of Alamanna
In the third ten days of March 1821 there were many indications and scattered rumors that the Greeks would revolt with the main focus in the Peloponnese. In Eastern Central Greece, in the region of Livadeia, the captain of the chariot of the region was Athanasios Diakos, born in Mousounitsa, Fokidos, and initiated into the Philiki Etairia as early as 1818, when he was Odysseus Androutsou's first boy.
With a ruse, Diakos convinced the Turkish voivode that he would fight the insurgents and thus managed, with Turkish official written approval, to recruit and equip 5,000 villagers. On March 27, the sporadic hostilities and individual murders of Turks began, while most of them took refuge in the castle of Livadeia. On the night of March 28-29, the rebels under Diakos occupied the hill of Prophet Elias in front of the city of Livadeia and from there he sent groups of gunners and blocked the roads leading to the city.
On March 30 and 31, the rebels under the banner of Diakos (Saint George with the inscription "Freedom and Death") advanced boldly and captured the main city, crushing the little Turkish resistance they encountered. The inhabitants of the city were about 10,000 and having a separate flag from each district (Panagia, Agios Nikolaos, Agios Dimitrios) of the city, they joined the revolutionaries. The Turks were confined to the castle of the city called "Hour" or "clock".
After negotiations with Diakos, the Arvanites surrendered the outer gate of the castle they were defending and left unharmed, keeping their weapons. After this development the Turks found themselves in a difficult position and surrendered on April 1st. The Greeks treated the Turks with magnanimity, whom they simply disarmed and allowed to move about the city freely, while their gold and valuables remained in their possession. In fact, the Turkish officials were accommodated in Greek homes for their safety.
On that Historic day, in a solemn eulogy at the church of Agia Paraskevi Livadeia, the bishops of Salona, Talanti and Athens blessed the revolutionary flag of Diakos. Diakos, at that critical moment for the revolution, showed patriotism by setting aside all material personal interests. He collected all the weapons surrendered by the Turks as well as all the booty and handed them over to the governors to be used to buy food and supplies for the newly formed revolutionary army.
Afterwards, Diakos cooperating with Diovouniotis easily liberated Talanti and Thebes while they intended to occupy Lamia (Zitouni), which was the administrative center of the region, as well as Hypati. All the revolutionaries gathered in Kobotades asking for the collaboration of the powerful charioteer Mitsos Kontogiannis of the Patratsiki region to attack Zitouni (Lamia). But Kontogiannis was hesitant to defect and did not respond to the dramatic appeals for help.
After eight crucial days dragged by his relatives, Kontogiannis joined the rebels and together they attacked the province of Patratsiki. However, the Greeks did not have time to capture the city as at night they saw thousands of Turks coming from Lianokladi holding lighted torches and so they retreated in order not to be trapped inside the city.
Diakos and his detachment, reinforced by the warlords Panourgias and Diovouniotis, decided to cut off the Turkish advance to Roumeli by taking defensive positions near the straits of Thermopylae where the Turks would not have the opportunity to deploy their cavalry and their numerical superiority.
After a meeting in the village of Kompotades, on April 20, 1821, the Greek force of 1,500 men was divided into three divisions: Diovouniotis would defend the Gorgopotamos bridge with 600 men, Panourgias the Mustafabei with 500 men, and Diakos the Alamana bridge with 500 men. Encamping at Lianokladi, near Lamia, the Turks quickly divided their force, attacking by surprise on the morning of April 23, without allowing the Greeks to organize.
The main Turkish force under the able general Omer Bryonis attacked Diakos. Another division of Turks under Hasan Tomaritsa attacked Dyovouniotis, whose detachment was quickly driven back by the enemy's numerical superiority, while another force fiercely attacked the positions of Panourgias, whose men gave a fierce battle but retreated when he was seriously wounded their leader who was fighting on the front lines.
In this battle the bishop of Salona Isaias, as well as his brother, died a heroic death. After these two very important victories that stripped the edges of the Greek defensive arrangement, Omer Bryonis gathered all his offensive power against the position of Diakos on the bridge of Alamanas. Diakos had arranged 200 men under the commanders Bakoyannis and Kalyvas on the bridge of Alamana, while he himself with 300 men held the position of Poria from where he relieved his fellow warriors on the bridge with counterattacks.
But when the forces of Panourgias and Diovouniotis collapsed, the Turks began to tighten the cordon around the defenders. While the situation was becoming more critical according to the historian Spyridon Trikoupis, they suggested to Diakos to escape, while his psycho son, brought him his horse urging him to save himself while there was still time. But he replied "the Diakos is not leaving" and did not leave his position. The unequal battle continues and one of the first dead to fall in front of him is his brother Konstantinos Massavetas, whom Diakos now uses as a shield in the attacks he receives.
With only 10 fighters left to him, he goes to the naturally fortified place of Mandrostamata of the monastery of Damastas, where he entrenches himself and fights there for about an hour. But the ammunition is limited, one after the other most of his companions are killed and Diakos himself is captured alive. and is brought before Omer Vryonis. The final tally of that day's battle was about 300 Greeks and a few Turks dead, while many were wounded.
The next day, April 24th, a Sunday, and following Halil Bey's persistent demand, a decision was issued for the death penalty by spitting, as he argued, Diakos had killed many Turks and should be punished in an exemplary manner. The Deacon was forced to carry with his own hands the instrument of his horrible punishment, and he suffered painfully for several hours before expiring.
After his martyrdom (about the description of which there are a variety of chilling versions), the Turks dumped the remains of the deceased in a ditch in the area. The Christians of the area secretly found the dead body of Diakos at night and buried it in a secret place in the city. The grave of Diakos was found by chance by lieutenant colonel Rouvalis in 1881. In 1886, the first memorial service for Athanasios Diakos was held and his bust was placed, which is preserved to this day.
Battle of Hani of Gravia
The Battle of Hani of Gravia was one of the military engagements of the 21st revolution with a victorious outcome for the Greeks. In this battle (05/08/1821), Odysseus Androutsos with 120 men defeated the army of Omer Vryonis. After the defeat of the Greeks in the battle of Alamana (23/04/1821) and the martyrdom of Athanasios Diakos, the Turkish army led by Omer Bryonis, with a force of 9,000 men and artillery, intended from Lamia to attack the Peloponnese.
Their way thither had been opened, since the sacrifice of Diakos had deprived the Greeks of their leader. Fear had overwhelmed the revolutionaries in the centers of the Struggle (Leivadia, Salona (Amfissa) and Attiki. Everyone was expecting the wrath of the 2 fronts. The Revolution was in danger a month after its start. It was saved by Odysseus Androutsos and the bad calculations of Omer Vryonis .
The Albanian Pasha, of Greek origin, instead of advancing towards the degraded regions of Eastern Mainland and proceeding as quickly as possible to the Peloponnese, decided that he had to strengthen his forces before crossing the Isthmus. He considered that by associating with the Greek chieftains, whom he knew from the Court of Ali Pasha, he would cause the paralysis of the Peloponnesian rebels. With this logic, he had also proposed to Athanasios Diakos to join his forces, but he had refused. Omer Vryonis had not realized the extent and meaning of the Greek uprising.
He believed that it was a simple rebellion, which would be easy to suppress, and not the uprising of an entire nation, claiming its freedom and self-determination. At that time Androutsos, an old charioteer of the area, who had fallen out of favor with the Sultan, was in A Sterea at that time, as a man of Ali Pasha, a member (since 1818) of the Philiki Etairia and an ardent supporter of the Struggle. Omer Vryonis found a 1st class opportunity to join him, because he knew very well his military skills.
They concluded that Omer Bryonis would land in the Peloponnese, not through the Isthmus, but through the Galaxides. However, they disagreed on the plan to deal with it. Androutsos proposed to fight in Hani, while Dyovouniotis and Panourgias deemed it unsuitable, because it was built of bricks and was in an open field. In the meantime, Omer Vryonis with 9,000 men was approaching Gravia and had been informed of the presence of Androutsos in the inn with a small force. He did not worry, however, believing that Androutsos would accept his proposal.
In a 2nd meeting of the Greek chieftains, who did not have more than 1200 men at their disposal, their disagreement was resolved. They decided that Dyovouniotis and Panourgias would seize the surrounding areas, while Androutsos would strike the enemy from the inn in a decidedly daring action. He was joined by 117 men, who turned the brick building into a fortress with rough works. Omer Bryonis with his army approached (morning of May 8, 1821) within shooting distance of the inn and immediately received a barrage of fire.
He understood that his old friend did not go there for friendly purposes, but to fight him. First he ordered an attack to be made against the men of Diovouniotis and Panourgias, whom he scattered in the surrounding mountains, just as in the Battle of Alamana. He then focused on Hani and Androutsos. He made an attempt to persuade him, sending a dervish as a messenger. The mission of the priest had its reason. Omer Vryonis knew that Androutsos was a Bektaxis Muslim.
The dervish advanced on horseback towards Hani, but suddenly received a bullet in the forehead and fell unconscious. The Ottomans attacked Hani in waves. Androutsos and his men held fast. Omer Vryonis saw the incompetence of his officers and ordered a new attack at noon. And she failed. In the early hours of the evening he ordered a cease-fire, realizing that he had made yet another mistake. Out of overconfidence in his own strength and underestimating the valor of the Greeks, he had campaigned without artillery.
He decided to temporarily withdraw his forces and order cannons to be brought to him from Lamia. He was determined on the morning of the next day to level Hani, with its insolent defenders. Androutsos guessed this move by Omer Vryonis and around 2 in the morning on May 9 he attempted a heroic exit with his 110 men. All 6 had been killed during the day-long battle. They surprised the Turkish garrisons that had surrounded Hani and disappeared among the Spartans.
The Turks surrounded the area and the inn, while Vryonis sent a dervish to tell Androutsos to surrender. Because Androutsos did not accept, the Turks attacked the inn, but were repulsed with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Bryonis, seeing his men falling from the fire of the Greeks, ordered a cannon to be brought in to blow up the building. The Turks halted the attack until the cannon arrived, while the Greeks, realizing their intentions, managed in the meantime to sneak away between the hostile Turkish lines.
The descent of such a powerful army, such as that of Omer Bryonis, had been prevented in the Peloponnese, where the revolution had not yet established itself, while it contributed to the start of the struggle in Western Greece as well. For a while, at least, a serious danger to the Peloponnese disappeared. Odysseas Androutsos was recognized by all as the undisputed leader of A Sterea.
The Battle of the Royal Palace
Omer Bryonis and Kiosse Mehmet Pasha had asked the Divan (government) for reinforcements, in order to deal with the Greeks of Eastern Roumeli. Bryonis did not want to risk a descent to Moria, leaving behind rebel groups, which would interrupt his supply. The Sultan then ordered Beyran Pasha to come down from Macedonia to reinforce the two pashas and then together to cross the Isthmus of Corinth to break the siege of Tripoli.
In fact, Beyran Pasha gathered 8,000 horsemen and with the generals Haji Bekir Pasha, Memis Pasha and Sahin Ali Pasha advanced towards the south. In the middle of August he camped in Lamia (Zitouni) where he collected food for his large army. The Rumeliote chieftains reacted immediately. Androutsos, who was near the Isthmus, wrote to Giannis Gouras and Vassilis Bousgos to move to meet the enemy and he himself boarded ships at Megarida to meet them.
The old man Diovouniotis and his son were waiting for the rest of the leaders in the village of Modi, where Nakos Panourgias, Pope Andreas from Koukouvista, Konstantinos Kalivas, Konstantinos Bitis, Komnas Trakas, Antonis Kontosopoulos (Gerantonos), Giannis Lappas had gathered. and Mitros Triantafyllinas. In the council of war that followed, opinions differed. The younger ones wanted to wait at the narrower passage of Fontanas that led to Turkochori, while old John believed that the pasha would pass through the pass of Vasilikos that led to Drachmani (Elatia).
The road of the Royalists was wide and difficult to fortify, but Dyovouniotis believed that the proud pasha would follow the wide public road to move, defying the ragiades who would not dare to mess with his invincible cavalry. Gouras, on the contrary, insisted that they set up in the narrow passage of Fontana, where they offered themselves for an ambush. Fortunately, the opinion of old Diovouniotis prevailed.
On August 22, 1821, Beyran Pasha with his two generals – Haji Bekir had died in Lamia – crossed the Alamana bridge and camped in the village of Platania. The next day he sent a body of 300 footmen to Fontana and 200 horsemen to Vasilika to scout. The horsemen, not meeting any resistance, advanced into the dense forest of the Vasilikos and then the men of Kontosopoulos and Kalyvas, hidden in the forest, attacked them by surprise and decimated them.
The Turkish infantry at Fontana from Pope Andreas had a similar fate. On the same day, Odysseus' chieftain Yiannis Roukis also arrived. The Turkish pasha, having confidence in his numerical superiority, decided to advance and beat the Chaines. He had not calculated that his cavalry would be useless in the forested valley of the Royals. He left his conveyances and carriages at Platanias and set out for its destruction.
The surrounded Turks were decimated. They asked for mercy and shouted: "Allah, Allah rai captain!" Memis Pasha was killed by Gura himself, while Beyran Pasha's son was also killed. Pasha himself abandoned the battle, running towards Zitouni, while the victors slaughtered the remains of his army. About 1000 Turks were dead, while all the supplies that had been abandoned in Platania, passed into the hands of the victors.
Eight cannons, hundreds of horses, camels, buffaloes, dozens of arabesques, Turkish flags and the famous Buyuk (big) bayraki, the flag of the attack, also fell into their hands. Beyran Pasha was murdered by the Sultan, thus punishing him for this dishonorable defeat. Gouras had got ankylosed fingers from holding his sword and when he asked Balaura for water to drink, the latter could not find clean water in the river, as it was red with the blood of the Turks killed.
Among the two hundred Turkish prisoners was Albanos Frassaris. Frassaris had been captured again by the Greeks and had been exchanged for Giorgos Diovouniotis, who was being held by Hursit. Frassaris had then sworn that he would never fight against the Romans again. For this stupidity of his, the Agorgianites flayed him alive, imitating the barbaric habits of the Passadians.
The battle in Vasilika was the most important fought in Eastern Roumeli since the beginning of the revolution. He crushed a very strong elite Turkish force, which alone was capable of invading and destroying the rebels in the Morea. It is worth noting that due to the competition and anti-jealousy between the Pashas, Omer Bryonis and Kiosse Mehmet did not help Bayran Pasha in his entry into Roumeli, because he could succeed where they had failed.
The two pasades returned idle to Lamia, while the until then timid Greek villagers felt themselves transformed into fearless warriors.
On December 20, 1821, the First National Assembly began its work in Piada (ancient Epidaurus). It was attended by representatives from most of the rebel regions. In terms of the geographical and social origin of the "performers", as they were called, the vast majority of them consisted of Moraites, Rumeliotes and islanders qualified and clerical.
These are the pre-revolutionary leadership groups to which were added Phanariotes and scholars who had arrived in the revolutionary areas during the first months of the revolution. On the contrary, Dimitrios Ypsilantis and the most prominent Rumeliote and Peloponnesian chieftains were absent. The most important act of the national assembly was the Provisional Government of Epidaurus, i.e. the first constitution of the rebel Greeks, in which the Declaration of Independence was proposed.
The Provisional Government, which is the work of the Italian B. Gallina, exudes the liberal and democratic principles of the French revolutionary constitutions (1793 and 1795), as well as the US constitution. (1787). Regarding the establishment of central administration bodies, a polycentric model was adopted with the establishment of two annual bodies (Parliamentary, Executive), which had not precisely defined and not strictly separated responsibilities.
The official recognition of the three local organizations in the Peloponnese, in the West and in the East of Sterea aggravated the confusion between the organs of the Administration, the fragmentation of the political field and ultimately the impossibility of central control of the rebel regions that made up the territory of the potential Greek state. Notable for the First National Assembly is the absence of any reference to Philiki Etairia.
The organization that had prepared the revolution had been permanently sidelined. Two years after the declaration of the revolution in the Peloponnese, specifically in March 1823, the work of the Second National Assembly began in Astros, Kynouria. In the time that intervened between the first and the Second National Assembly, the military successes went hand in hand with the sharpening of the political confrontations.
The abolition of the regional local government organizations gave power to the Administration bodies, making them the object of political struggle. On the sidelines of political factions, the "representatives" of the national assembly proceeded with a limited constitutional review, which confirmed the basic principles of the Provisional State of Epidaurus.
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THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STRUGGLE (II) 1821-1827
THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STRUGGLE (III) 1821-1827
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ΜΕΡΟΣ Α' : http://greekworldhistory.blogspot.gr/2014/03/1821.html
ΜΕΡΟΣ Β' : http://greekworldhistory.blogspot.gr/2014/03/2-1821.html
ΜΕΡΟΣ Γ' : http://greekworldhistory.blogspot.gr/2014/03/1821_23.html
http://www.fhw.gr/chronos
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http://www.arnos.gr
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http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki
http://users.uoa.gr/~nectar/history
http://www. historythemes.com
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
http://www.metopo.gr
http://arcadia .ceid.upatras.gr
http://www.alexiptoto.com
http://www.argonafplia.gr
http://www.ce.teiep.gr
http://www.tovima.gr
http://www. tovima.gr
http://el.wikipedia.org
http://kleftouria.blogspot.gr
http://averoph.wordpress.com
http://olympia.gr
http://fourtounis.gr
http://rea.teimes.gr
http://users.uoa.gr
http://anthoulaki.blogspot.gr
http://www.antibaro.gr
http://www.istorikathemata.com
http://olympia.gr
http://www.patriotaki.net
http://www.tovima.gr/relatedarticles
http://www.aya.com.gr/omilies1.htm
http://www.istorikathemata.com
https://averoph.wordpress.com
ΜΕΡΟΣ Α' : http://greekworldhistory.blogspot.gr/2014/03/1821.html
ΜΕΡΟΣ Β' : http://greekworldhistory.blogspot.gr/2014/03/2-1821.html
ΜΕΡΟΣ Γ' : http://greekworldhistory.blogspot.gr/2014/03/1821_23.html
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