During World War II, the Eastern Front became the theater of the greatest tank battles in history. When Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941, his generals believed that German armored forces would crush the Red Army in the same way they had crushed Poland and France. But they met with surprising resistance. Soviet manufacturers had already developed a new type of medium tank before the war that combined the speed of the BT light tanks with the protection and firepower required for breakthrough warfare. The result was the T34. A machine that became an icon of victory and a symbol of terror in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. In this video you will learn how the T34 was born from pre-war experiments. and what strategic and technical challenges led to its construction. We will explain why its closed armor withstood German anti-tank guns and in specific battles we will see how it surprised the German tank commanders. We will take a look at the secret factory buildings in the Urals where thousands of these machines were born during an unprecedented renovation and we will explain why the Soviet leadership bet on quantity. We will also understand that the T34 was not perfect. We will examine its weak points, shortcomings in training and accounting and show how the Soviets gradually improved production and tactics.
As we gradually progress on this journey, we will also reveal the human dimension of tank warfare. We will travel inside the tank, where four men shared a small space, fought in extreme temperatures and faced the fear of death. We will soon reveal that despite its legendary reputation, the T34 had a long way to go to become the real nightmare of the Wehrmacht. Prepare yourself for a fascinating narrative that will connect technical analysis with stories from the battlefield and show how myth is born from reality. When we look deeper into the context, we will find that the T34 grew up at the intersection of different military doctrines. The First World War taught armies that the stalemate of the trenches could only be broken by a combination of artillery preparation and mobile armored behemoths. Between the wars, the idea of blitzkrieg developed worldwide, the core of which was speed, coordination and surprise. Western generals disagreed whether tanks were primarily infantry support or an independent offensive tool. The Soviet theory of deep offensive operations assumed the extension of the front and the advancement into the enemy's depths. This required a machine that could withstand a long march, be able to overcome rivers and trenches and at the same time have sufficient firepower to destroy enemy positions. The T34 was the answer to precisely this need. In this video you will learn that the path to it led through a series of dead ends and daring trials that are less talked about today. The introductory chapter also allows us to understand the broader geopolitical conditions.
The Soviet Union in the late 1930s found itself gripped by fears of German expansionism and Japanese militarism. The Spanish Civil War, where the Soviets sent T 26 and BT tanks, showed that a vehicle without armor protection quickly succumbed to anti-tank guns. The Finnish Winter War revealed that light tanks get stuck in the snow and their engines overheat, succumbing. Each of these conflicts left its mark on the design offices. In the following chapters you will discover how these lessons resulted in the combination of closed armor, diesel engine and wide tracks. Elements thanks to which the T34 survived what other tanks would not have survived. The development of the T34 did not begin after the outbreak of war, but in the second half of the 1930s, when Soviet engineers were looking for a successor to the BT light tanks. These fast tanks were built under license from the American manufacturer J. Walter Christ. They used a gasoline engine and had excellent speed on and off-road.
The battles in Spain, however, revealed that lightly armored tanks have low endurance. Discussions within the military industry revolved around the question of whether to retain the ability to move on wheels like the BT or to bet on a fully tracked suspension. In this video you will learn how in the process the Soviet-Japanese conflict at Khalkhin and the Finnish War emphasized the need for thicker armor and greater firepower. The manufacturers at the Kharkov plant number 183 designed the A20 and A32 prototypes. The first continued the idea of the BT and had a drive system that allowed movement on wheels and tracks. The second prototype A32 was already fully tracked. It had a 76.2 mm gun and 30 mm armor closed at an angle of 405°. The AA34 soon emerged, which received stronger armor, a 45 mm gun mounted in a sharp angle, and a powerful V2 diesel engine.
In the spring of 1940, the manufacturer Mikhail Koskin with two prototypes began a daring march from Kharkov to Moscow. The march of more than 2,000 kilometers through steppes, rivers and bad roads was to convince the leadership that the new tank would withstand the terrain. According to the legend, Koskin caught a cold on the march and died of pneumonia after returning. The task was therefore taken over by his deputy Alexander Morozov. The demonstration in the Kremlin in front of Stalin and members of the Politburo was a success. The tank passed through obstacles. crossed trenches and fired impressively. Stalin is said to have later stated that he wanted Syrian production and so in 1940 production began under the name T34. The first series numbered 119 pieces, but by June 1940, over 1,200 machines had been built. In this video, you will learn how the production lines of the Kharkov plant had to be hastily dismantled and transported to the Urals in September 1940 due to the German invasion. Only 10% of the experienced workers managed to make it to the modernization, and their places were taken by women, the elderly and children. Nevertheless, new tanks soon began to be born in Tagl. The development team knew that the new tank had to withstand 37 mm caliber guns and have sufficient mobility for maneuverable warfare. Experiences from the French campaign showed that German tanks with a high rate of fire and radio network were able to react flexibly. The Soviets initially tried to incorporate radios into the design, but limited production and encryption meant that most of the early T34s were only equipped with important flags. Realistic training also proved to be a problem. Many young tank crews boasted that at the outbreak of war they had never fired live ammunition and were encountering a real tank for the first time at the front. This would later prove to be a critical weakness, but more on that in a moment. The T34, however, did not stand in a vacuum; it grew on the foundations of earlier designs.
The BT Bistrohni Tang series of tanks were a light version of the Krass tanks. They could change tracks to wheels and reach speeds of over 70 km/h. This idea was proven in the steppes, but in combat conditions it turned out that the light armor was a weakness. The Arma T26 produced by the British Vickers had better protection, but it was slow. When the Soviet T26s met the German Panzers at the beginning of the Spanish War, they managed to destroy them. But soon German anti-tank guns appeared on the battlefield and the light turrets were broken. These experiences led the manufacturers to the belief that the future belonged to the medium tank. Heavy enough to survive a hit and at the same time fast enough to penetrate deep into the depths. In addition to the A32 and A34, the AN43 prototype, later called the T34M, appeared. This had torsion bars instead of leaf springs, a three-man turret with a command port, and a rear-mounted gearbox. This development would have probably eliminated many of the T34's childhood ailments, but due to the war and the need for accelerated production, it was not introduced into Syrian production.
Manufacturers had to improvise with existing parts. It is not without interest that some of these elements later appeared in the T34 p85 and the post-war T54 and T55 tanks. The story of pre-war construction is also a story of courage and personal sacrifice. When Kkin set out with the A32 and A34 prototypes on the Anokhiy test route in Moscow, he faced not only technical challenges but also political risk. He had to prove that the new tank would overcome the conservative views of some military figures who preferred multi-turreted T35-type behemoths or light tanks suitable for infantry support. The route led through Ryazan, Vladimir and Yersinia, and the tanks had to cross rivers on frozen bridges. In Moscow, the test committee then conducted extreme tests. He fired at the prototypes and let them jump trenches. This demonstration was not only a technical but also a political victory. Stalin wanted proof that the Soviet Union could produce a modern tank that would be on par with the world's top. To understand why the T34 impressed the Germans so much, we need to look in detail at its construction. The key parameter was the closing armor. The 45-thick metopic plate was a closed hypotenuse of 60°π, resulting in its effective thickness being doubled. The German anti-tank guns of 37 and 50 mm caliber, thus often only ricocheted shells that left grooves and sparks on the surface of the tank. It was precisely thanks to the closing armor that the T34 acquired the reputation of being impenetrable. At the same time, the tank had a low profile and sloping sides that made it difficult to aim. Firepower was provided by the 76.2 mm caliber F34 cannon. This fired high-velocity armor-piercing shells capable of penetrating the armor of medium tanks at a distance exceeding a kilometer and fragmentation shells that destroyed infantry. Later versions of the T3485 were equipped with an 85 caliber gun that could compete with even heavy German tanks. However, the internal layout had a significant disadvantage. In the two-seat turret, the commander sat as both a gunner and a loader. The overloaded commander had to search for targets, aim, load and also take care of communication, which reduced the speed of reaction. Another pillar of success was the V2500 diesel engine. Thanks to this, the tank reached speeds of up to 35 km/h on the ground and 50 km/h on the road, which at the time of its birth surpassed most German vehicles. The engine had lower fuel consumption than gasoline engines and was less prone to fire. On the other hand, it was complicated to manufacture and in the early series it suffered from childhood diseases, oil leaks, cooling problems and a short lifespan.These shortcomings were gradually eliminated during intensive tests lasting 100 hours of marching, averaging 25 km. The suspension system was derived from the American-made Krestis, but Soviet engineers removed the wheel drive and improved the suspension. Six large wheels with coil springs gave the T34 excellent cross-country ability, especially on flooded Ukrainian black earth or in deep snow.
The wide tracks reduced the specific ground pressure and allowed the tank to go where the German Panzer Ths and Carvos got stuck. Also modern was the use of a welded hull and cast-iron turret, which shortened production time. However, the closing armor reduced the interior space. The crew suffered from cramped conditions, poor ergonomics, and the absence of a turret basket made it difficult to handle the ammunition. The communication equipment was the Achilles' Heel. Most early T34s did not have a radio station. The crews were assisted by important flags and agreed gestures. This made coordination in battle difficult and led to confusion. The optics also lagged behind German standards. The primitive periscopes had low magnification and were often blurred, which led to situations where German anti-tank guns fired dozens of rounds before the blind tankman even noticed them. It took Soviet commanders time to recognize this weakness and gradually introduced command scopes and better telescopes. Let's take a closer look at the firepower. The F34 gun was designed by the manufacturer Grigory Grabin. The main advantage was the high muzzle velocity of around 680 to 790 m/s and the stable ballistics that allowed it to penetrate 60 mm of armor at an angle of 30° at a distance of 500 m. Thanks to its simple construction, the gun could be produced in large numbers. In addition to standard armor-piercing shells, the Soviet army also used subcaliber shells with a tungsten core, the so-called BR350π, which increased the penetration at close range. However, the disadvantage was the absence of a stabilizer and the low rate of fire, because the commander had to manually load and simultaneously aim. This led to a lower rate of fire. Compared to German tanks with a three-man crew in the turret, the Vta2 engine mounted in the rear of the tank was technically advanced. It was a two-cylinder diesel engine with an aluminum block, water cooling and direct fuel injection. The construction was complex. The light alloy reduced the weight of the engine. The high compression ratio of 14:1 increased efficiency and reduced the risk of fire in the event of a hit. At full load, however, the engine produced significant vibrations and its lifespan in the first series was around 100 hours.
The crews often had to improvise. In the Russian frost, they heated the oil with fire, and in the summer they saved on filters that were clogged with dust. Soviet industry gradually improved the quality of the engine; in 1940, a cyclone-type filtering device was introduced that cleaned the air better. Another key element was the tracked suspension. The width of the tracks, 50 cm, and the large diameter of the wheels with torsion springs allowed them to overcome ditches and river fords. However, the absence of shock absorbers caused the tank to jump at speed and aiming was difficult, especially on the ground. One veteran complained that when firing, it jumped like a child on a trampoline. For an accurate shot, it was necessary to stop. Interestingly, this very flaw forced the crews to use a tactic of rapid attacks in which they fired a few shots and the tank immediately moved. The interior of the tank was narrow and spartan. The four-man crew had to fit into a space of only 1.5 m in height. The driver sat on the left side of the stern. Next to him was the machine gunner who operated the 7.62 mm DCT machine gun. Between them was the transmission tunnel, over which a narrow passage led to the tower. The ammunition for the cannon was stored in boxes under the floor and on the sides of the tank, which increased the risk of explosion in the event of a puncture. The loader stood on the floor without a rotating basket. He had to move during the rotation of the tower so that his feet would not be caught. Poor ventilation meant that after a few shots the air in the cabin was saturated with steam and the crew suffocated. In winter, on the contrary, there was no heating and the quarters suffered from the cold. In summer, the temperature inside rose to 40° C. In these details we realize that the famous tank was a demanding environment for the crew. The armor of the T34 was a combination of rolled and cast parts. The front plate 45 was welded from high-carbon steel. The sides were around 40 mm thick and the rear 40 to 47 mm. The turret of the first versions was cast iron and had 52 to 60 mm of local armor with a protrusion for the gun turret. The roof and bottom were thin, around 15 mm, which increased the vulnerability to mine explosions and shells falling from above. Casting the turret in a single mold, however, accelerated production, which was more important than the aesthetic quality of the welds. Critics later found that the Russian armor sometimes had substandard hardness, leading to cracks and detachment of oxide fragments inside the hull. In addition to the main gun, the T342 carried up to three DT machine guns. in the hull and later two in the commander's cabin. These guns provided defense against infantry.
However, Soviet crews often mounted an anti-aircraft machine gun in the turret, if available, to keep out low-flying aircraft. The total weight of the tank was around 26° for the 76 version and 32° for the 85 version. With such a weight, the ground pressure was low. This allowed the tank to cross marshy areas and frozen rivers, where heavier vehicles would fall. In terms of maintenance, the T34 had its pros and cons. Access to the engine was ensured by a large rear cover that could be opened even in field conditions. Changing an engine took engineers a few hours, while on German tanks it took days. On the other hand, many screws and nuts were welded without precise tolerances. So the crews had to use improvised tools. The welders in the factories did not have time to clean the joints, which led to poor quality welds and subsequent cracks. This contrasting combination of robustness and improvisation makes the T34 a unique phenomenon in armored engineering. In the summer of 1940, the first clashes with the T34 took place in a mixture of chaos and improvisation. The German army was advancing deep into the Soviet Union and to the Tina River near Riga. 4 T34s clashed with PAC 36 anti-tank guns. The 37 mm guns fired one shell after another, but the bullets bounced off the closing armor like peas off a wall. One tank even ran over a German gun and continued on its way until it was stopped by a mortar strike from close range. In another case, he hit 34 more than 23 rounds of 37 and 50 mm caliber without penetrating. The German gunners began to mockingly describe their 37 mm guns as a "reporter's hammer" and many soldiers panicked. This moment of psychological shock is often described as tank terror. According to reports by Lieutenant General Menendin, the German commanders realized that we had nothing comparable.
Hitler later stated that if he had known about the T34, he would have postponed the invasion. In this video you will learn how these first encounters became legendary for both armies. The Germans had to quickly adapt their tactics. They aimed anti-tank guns at the sides of the T34s or trapped them in traps so that they could hit them at close range. When Field Marshal von Kist first saw the T34, he called it the best tank in the world. However, the Soviet side failed to systematically exploit these successes. The crews, surprised by the speed of the German attack, were poorly trained and often went into battle without infantry support. According to the war diaries of several tank units, many T34s lost their orientation. They were unable to fire properly and consumed ammunition inefficiently. A German officer later wrote that the Russian tankmen rode like wild bulls, fired without aim, and that his regiment destroyed hundreds of 34s with minimal losses. The fact remains that by the end of 1940 the Red Army had lost most of its pre-war tanks, including most of the T4s. Nevertheless, these early engagements left a deep impression on the Wehrmacht.
The German command quickly analyzed the captured T34s and reported that their armor was with a durable but poorly processed that led to cracks. Two crew members in the Tower were missing command hole and that the overexposed commander was blind and deaf. This finding became an impetus for the development of new German tanks. At the same time, German units learned to exploit the terrain. attacks from the side and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns to destroy the T34s. As we will soon see, this adaptation led to a whole tank development. The first months of fighting, however, also brought a harsh lesson for the Red Army. In many places, the mechanized corps disintegrated even before they even reached contact with the enemy. Thousands of tanks were abandoned due to lack of fuel, oil or spare parts. Because the logistical units were not able to follow the rapid advance of the front. According to Soviet reports from the fall of 1940, 1% of the lost T34s were not even touched by enemy fire. They were simply left standing with empty tanks or broken gearboxes. The crews then often left on horseback or on foot to join infantry units. This sad statistic shows that even the best tank is nothing without supporting support. German tank corps soon learned how to deal with T34s. Gunners aimed at the sides and rear, where the armor was thinner and the use of tactical groups allowed for encirclement. Soldiers prepared with magnetic mines and bottles filled with gasoline, cocktails, Molotov cocktails that stuck to the air vents and ignited the engine. Anti-aircraft 88 mm guns were brought to the front and used in direct fire.
German General Heinz Gerian described in his memoirs how in the autumn of 1940 one of the ENK and a few T34s held up the advance of the 4th Panzer Division until 88 mm flak guns were brought in to destroy them. "I realized that the Russian medium tank has such superiority that we must radically improve our armored forces," he said. This experience led to a groundbreaking program to develop new weapons. The psychological impact on the soldiers was enormous. The German infantryman Schft recalled that when the smoky silhouettes of the Ts appeared on the horizon, many of them had a tight throat. German officers had to convince their men that the tanks were not reversible. On the other hand, mixed feelings prevailed in the Soviet units. Some crews were proud of their efficient machinery, others feared mechanical breakdowns and lack of fuel. After a while, the practice of carrying honey pots and tool boxes in the armor spread among the tankmen. Improvisation was a necessity. In our narrative, it remains important to remember that these chaotic beginnings did not mean final defeat.
The Soviets quickly analyzed the mistakes and tried to strengthen the accounting, build repair workshops and train new crews. The German shock from the T34 thus gradually faded as they learned to outmaneuver the tank. Nevertheless, in 1941 and early 1942 the slender silhouette of the T34 left the German army with a respect that was reflected in the development of the Panther and Tiger. We will soon look at the factories where thousands of new machines were being born that were supposed to help the Soviets switch from defense to offense. In order for the Soviet Union to replace the losses of 1940 and gain superiority, it had to mobilize industry on an unprecedented scale. Factories in the West were being bombed. Therefore, a gigantic movement began in the Urals and Siberia. Factory No. 183 in Kharkov moved machinery and designs to Isnitang Kill. Of the 40,000 workers, only about 10% arrived. The rest had to be replaced by women, teenagers and the elderly. A factory concentration complex nicknamed Tankograd was built in the city. Here, tanks, engines and ammunition began to be produced in a short time. The Staling Grand Tractor Plant, the Krasnoyarsk Esormovo Plant in Koki, and the Elabink Metallurgical Company were also moved. Mass production of the T34 became a priority.
The Soviets simplified the construction, removed some luxury elements, introduced a cast turret, and stopped soldering welds. Thanks to this, production costs fell from 433,000,000 rubles in 1940 to just 160,200 rubles in 1943 and 136,000 rubles in 1945. The time required to manufacture a tank fell from 200 hours to 36 hours, and assembly now took only two days. A series of tanks from S were sent into battle unpainted, straight from the production line to participate in the battles for Stalingrad. The evacuation was a logistical miracle. Hundreds of trains carried machinery, raw materials, and workers thousands of kilometers eastward. At the same time, the entire industry was reorganized. The production of parts was divided into dozens of smaller factories that then supplied subsystems to the assembly plants. This decentralization made it difficult to bomb. The Soviet government also massively used the labor force of women and children prisoners. Propaganda campaigns urged citizens to donate their savings to the production of tank styles. Many schools, cities and collective farms financed the production of their own T34, which later bore their names. In this way, a strong psychological bond was created between the front and the home base. The history of industrial mobilization deserves a more detailed look. Stonita was created on the basis of the vagonjavond factory, a complex that included not only a tank-welding facility but also a machine shop and a paint shop. A temporary city of wooden houses and shacks grew up around the factory.
Workers worked in three shifts and slept on the production lines. Exhausted women and youth finished night shifts with the knowledge that their work would be converted into armor protecting their families. Chelyabinsk, known as Tcograd, produced not only T34s but also KV and later IS heavy tanks. Stockpiles of turrets were also built. In the red-hot Esormovo in Korki was a marine engine production center converted for tank parts. This diversification helped to maintain production even when one factory was attacked. Mass production also meant that it was necessary to simplify accounting and standardize components. Before the war, 34 were produced in many factories in parallel, which led to the appearance of variants with mutually incompatible parts. Since 1940, because the Soviet Ministry of Tank Industry tried to unify the standards, bolts, nuts, transmission gears and clutches had to be identical regardless of the place of production. This measure facilitated repairs in field workshops. In the Urals, repair brigades emerged that could change gearboxes, repair punctures by welding and send the tank back into battle within a few hours. Thanks to the availability of parts from intact tanks, it was possible to create a functional machine from two damaged parts. This improvisation or cannibalism was a common practice and maintained the functionality of tank corps. The economic reality of T34 production was also reflected in the cost structure. About 2/3 of the price was made up of materials. Steel, aluminum, copper and rubber were also used for labor. Energy and depreciation of machinery were used to a lesser extent. The lower price allowed the Soviet state to order tens of thousands of tanks, even at the cost of enormous financial expenses.
When the losses and producers are added, we find that the Soviets produced approximately as many tanks as they lost. However, this was not perceived as a problem. The goal was to always have superiority on the front and to exhaust the enemy army. At the end of this chapter, it is appropriate to emphasize that the industrial mobilization was not just a set of dry numbers. It was also a moral campaign. Schoolchildren collected scrap metal. Women signed letters: "My dear tank driver, I helped build this T4 with my own hands." Poets composed odes to welders, and songs praising the Urals were heard on the radio. These motifs strengthened the cohesion of society in a time of greater threat. And although the hard work turned into backaches and frostbite, the knowledge that every rivet and welded joint could save a life on the front helped people persevere. The result was a flood of machines. By the end of the war, the Soviet Union had produced over 54,000 T34s of all versions. In 1940 alone. Two left the assembly lines 12,550. Three tanks. Although more than half were lost in battle. In 1943 and 1944, production continued to increase while Germany produced only a few thousand tanks per year. We will see shortly how quantity defeated quality. The T34 became a symbol of the Soviet industrial miracle. Even despite the mistakes, its simple design was suitable for large-scale production and simple maintenance.
Soldiers at the front could quickly repair damaged tanks and return them to battle. Spare parts could be collected from the battlefield. This gave the Red Army a significant logistical advantage. Despite the legends, the T34. It was not perfect. The rapid production and simple design brought a number of compromises. Let's start with ergonomics. In the two-seat turret, the commander, loader and gunner sat together, having to crouch under the protruding roof and handle heavy shells without an auxiliary basket. When firing, fragments of poorly heat-treated armor would peel off from the roof and stick into the skin of the crew. This so-called spalation led to many injuries. The absence of a turret basket meant that when rotating the turret, the crew often tripped over storage boxes and shells. Another problem was mechanical reliability. The gearbox was so harsh that drivers often used hammers to accelerate.
The V-twin engine in the early series suffered from oil leaks, cylinder head cracking, and a short service life. American tests found that some engines could only last 72 hours. Although the diesel engine reduced the risk of fire, the fuel tanks mounted on the sides of the hull made the tank vulnerable to hits from the side. Visibility was disastrous. The T34 lacked a command post and had only small observation slots. The driver could see the light of day only through slits, which were often blocked by mud. The commander had to drive the tank with the telescope down and often fought with the hood open, exposing his head to enemy fire. This led to a paradox. The strong armor protected the machine, but the crew was blind.
The German gunners could thus fire up to 20 shots before their crews noticed. The training of the crews was another pain in the ass. Many beginners received a short training that lasted only a few days. According to the recollections of commander Vasily Krisov, the students practiced shooting by turning the cannon into a machine gun and firing from it. Because real shells were very accurate. During maneuver exercises, they often did not have tanks, so they ran around the field and gave signals with flags. This was tragically reflected on the battlefield. Anarchic attacks, ineffective shooting and high losses. The problems did not go unnoticed. In November 1940, the 221st Tank Regiment submitted a detailed list of defects. Weak turret locks, broken machine gun springs, low ammunition capacity, poor optics and a request for TT pistols for self-defense. They recommended increasing the ammunition supply, strengthening the gearbox and improving the periscopes. The crews' criticism was heard and gradually led to modernization. We will see in a moment how this feedback gave birth to the modernized version of the T 34 p and changed the tactics of the Red Army. Among the shortcomings that appear most often in the memories of veterans was ergonomics and comfort. The crew sat without a pillow on bare steel. In winter it was freezing, in summer on the contrary it was sweating and its uniforms stuck to the hot metal.
The vibrations during the march caused back and head pain. There was no intercom. The commander had to communicate by tapping his shoulder or shouting over the roar of the engine. Soviet tank crews often complained that after hours of marching they could not hear their own words. Another difficulty was that the cannon shots caused vibrations that caused pain in the ears and disorientation. Even these everyday difficulties affected combat effectiveness. There were sharp jokes among engineers and drivers about wooden gearboxes. Because the gearbox had a tendency to stick and the gear teeth broke. The driver had to accompany the transition to a higher gear with precise timing. Sometimes it did not come out and a metallic clank was heard. At such a moment he had to grab the hammer to release the gear. This of course meant an immediate loss of speed and an easy target for the enemy.
Critics of the training argued that many mechanical failures stemmed from inadequate crew training in maintenance. Tank crews often did not know how to properly adjust the clutch, change the filter, or clean the carburetor. Only later did specialized mechanical schools begin to operate, where crews learned the basics of service. The lack of radio stations was related to a lack of tracks and poor production capacity. Less than 30% of T34 tanks had a radio in 1940. Thus, commanders had to broadcast orders by flags or significant pistols. In large attacks, this led to unintentional exposure and chaotic movement that the Germans were able to exploit. Similar problems with optics, low magnification, fogging, and broken lenses made the situation worse in dust and smoke.
Soldiers often cleaned the periscopes with rags or pieces of uniform, and in the rain they wiped them with their sleeves. When the crew wanted to look around, they had to open the cover and expose their heads to sniper fire. The uranium in the armor was extremely hard, but brittle. The explosions of the shells created sharp fragments that peeled off the inside of the bucket and injured the crew. The crews tried to improvise. They filled the interior walls with furs, tire rubber, or even sandbags. But these holy improvisations reduced the space inside and made it difficult to handle the ammunition. Some veterans recalled that when the impact occurred, a sound like thunder could be heard from inside the tank, and after it disappeared, they felt a burning pain in the skin from tiny metal particles. In this video, you will learn how later versions of the TE 3485 received rubber lining and improved heat treatment of the armor to reduce the amount of shrapnel.
Soviet commanders also recognized that technique alone was not enough if the crews did not know how to exploit its capabilities. Such instruction came at a high cost. Pre-war doctrines had crews trained in dogged flag drills, where instructors told them what to do. But combat reality was different. Rapid changes in the situation required initiative and improvisation. After the devastation of 1940, new schools were established where crews learned to make their own decisions, to fire at different targets from different distances, and to exploit the terrain. Experienced crews then became instructors for novices. Thanks to this, the performance of the T34 gradually improved, and the tanks became more effective than they had seemed in the early battles. 1943 brought a turning point to the front.
The battle at KSK was a defensive success but revealed the shortcomings of the 34 against the new German Panther and Tiger tanks. The Soviet command decided to modernize it. The result was the T34:85 with a new three-part turret and an 85-caliber gun. The commander was no longer overloaded with firing and could concentrate on target acquisition and command. The turret received a large command port with periscopes, and the tank crews thus gained a good view for the first time. The new version also had stronger armor and better insulation. The modernization was not limited to the construction. Under the impression of the enormous losses of the years 1940 to 42, the crews underwent more intensive training. Officers learned to coordinate tanks with infantry and artillery, to exploit the terrain and the necessity of quickly changing positions after firing. Tank brigade commanders were given radio stations to be able to synchronize attacks. Loops began to be used in combat training. Maneuvers in which T34s were scattered, avoiding local clashes, and attacked from the side.
The Soviet army also introduced the tactical rytska when tanks on the march emitted a smoke screen to cover the advance itself. The crews learned to fire on the move and to take advantage of the fast turret rotation, which in the T34 was five times faster than the German Panther. During the winter battles, the advantage of the wide tracks was evident. The tanks could maneuver in deep snow, while the German machines got stuck. In this video you will learn how in 1943 the rearmament of the tank corps began. A brigade equipped with T3485 was often reinforced with SQ85 or SQ100 self-propelled guns that increased firepower against heavier targets. The development was also reflected in the accounting. Soviet industry improved the quality of engines and transmissions. Quality control reduced the number of breakdowns in the workshops, and unit swapping was introduced to enable rapid repair of machines. The price for these improvements was greater weight and slightly lower speed, but the advantages outweighed them. By the end of the war, the T348 accounted for about half of all T34s produced. Combined with better tactics, it became a respectable opponent even for the Panther and Tiger.
The birth of the T3485 was the result of a combined effort of manufacturers and soldiers. The Three-man Turret provided not only more space but also better ergonomics. The Loader had his own station with handles for shells. The gunner could concentrate on aiming and the commander finally gained an overview of the environment. The 85 mm S53 or D5T cannon had an initial velocity of around 790 2 m/s and could penetrate the Tiger's armor at a distance of 800 m. Initially, there were problems with the production of the main and ammunition, but they were quickly solved. The turret also received an electric drive that allowed for smoother rotation. Some variants also had a second machine gun for defense against infantry. The interior of the T34 p:85 became spacious, which reduced crew fatigue. Better seats and rubber lining that protected against debris were installed. Radio stations became standard.
The commander had a communications console in the turret and could coordinate fire. In fact, an entire company. The optics were improved. Panoramic periscopes allowed for 360° observation, which was a big leap compared to the small viewing angle of earlier versions. However, the tank remained simply in production and maintenance. The internal power and fuel distributions remained easily accessible. The training method was also improved. In 1943, a central tank school was established at the NNA GIL and others in Ulyanovsk, which dealt with both theoretical and practical preparation. The crews practiced firing on the move, repairing engines in the field, and coordinating with infantry. A new element was also the team culture, when commanders learned to plan attacks in a group and to exploit maps and radio communication.
Practical exercises included night marches, water crossings and fighting in dense forests. At the tactical level, the Red Army was taught from the first sieves. During attacks in 1944, such as Operation Backgrafi, tank corps were concentrated in offensive groups that had artillery and air support. The T34 p85 penetrated deep, destroyed communication and supply lines. and surrounded enemy units. Commanders stopped attacking locally on controlled lines. Instead, they tried to break up and bypass resistance. With the arrival of Sukeros self-propelled guns and Volon Katiuusa, the T34 acquired supporting forces with which it formed combined tank armies. All this meant that the T34 became part of a complex orchestra. Not a lone sub. Interestingly, the modernization of the tank and tactics took place simultaneously with the improvement of supplies.
The Red Army introduced a system of mobile workshops on truck bases where it was possible to repair a damaged tank directly in the field. Spare parts were stored in railway wagons and distributed to where they were most needed. Each tank brigade had its own maintenance regiment that took care of fuel, ammunition and food. At night, trucks were dragged along forest roads to replenish gasoline and ammunition. Thanks to this, the T34s and their crews remained on the move and allowed for constant pressure on the retreating Wehrmacht. The German command was not prepared for the T34, but quickly adapted. Initially, it deployed heavy FL 18:36 anti-aircraft guns of 88 mm caliber that could penetrate the rear armor. In mid-1940, two partial guns were modified into self-propelled guns Nashorn and Ferdinand. The infantry received Panzer Faust and Panzer Shrek weapons that were deadly at close range. The German medium Panzer tanks received the longer 75 mm L43 and L48 guns that already helped them in part with the T34. The most important response, however, was the development of a new tank, the Panther.
General Gerian, impressed by the performance of the T34, felt a construction with thick armor, wide tracks and an efficient gun. The resulting turret, excellent optics and sights, spacious cabin and better ergonomics. The 75 mm gun of the K from Bigia 42L70 penetrated the armor of the T 34 from a long distance. However, disadvantages also appeared in battle. The Panther was heavy, complicated and prone to damage. The gearbox overheated. The engine consumed twice as much fuel as the T34 and its production required many more hours of work. Also, only around 6,000 pieces were produced. In parallel with the Panther, the Germans sent heavy tanks Tiger A and Shan. These had strong armor and 88 mm caliber guns, but were even more expensive later. In practice, there were few Tigers on the front, and their damage was caused by the fact that there were never enough to overcome the Soviet tank hordes. German tactics focused on defensive combat, long-range fire and terrain exploitation. Experienced crews managed to destroy many. The statistics confirm this. In 1942 and 1943, the Soviets lost many T34 tanks for every German tank destroyed. Despite this, the Wehrmacht never managed to produce sufficient numbers of tanks and its complex machinery exhausted it logistically. German propaganda tried to minimize the moral impact of the T34.
The captured vehicles were exhibited at exhibitions as proof of German superiority, and when it was discovered that Soviet armor was suffering from spawing and cracking, this was used for psychological warfare. In reality, however, many German soldiers continued to fear the encounter with agile and numerous 34s, especially in mud and snow. In this video you will learn how Soviet propaganda also played into this fear. which portrayed its tankmen as ruthless black heroes protecting the homeland. One of the key elements of the German response was to equip the infantry with an effective anti-tank weapon. By 1943, the Panzerζer Faust was introduced. Simple disposable small arms with a cumulative charge that could penetrate the armor of the T34 at close range. The panzerkampfwagen, developed according to the American model of the bazooka, had a more effective shield and a greater range. These weapons changed the battle in the city. Infantrymen could hide in the rubble and hit a tank from the side or directly from above. Combined with the tactics of tank hunters who bypassed the Soviet columns in small groups, the punzerkampfwagen became a terror to the Soviet crews. The different training philosophy also played a key role. German armored soldiers underwent a four-month intensive course that included theoretical preparation, shooting, orientation, maintenance and simulation. The crews learned combat procedures in pairs and trios and each member had a clearly defined role.
In comparison, many Soviet tank crews received only a few days of training, during which they focused on basic driving and shooting. Only during the war did the gap gradually narrow thanks to improved training. Nevertheless, Panther or Tiger crews often had an advantage in coordination and accuracy until their machines broke down. The German response also had an industrial dimension. The Panther and Tiger were technologically advanced, but their production required skilled workers, precise machine tools, and large quantities of raw materials. While a T34 required a few thousand man-hours to produce, a Tiger could be counted in the hundreds of thousands.
Experts estimate that Germany needed as much labor and material to produce one Tiger as the Soviet Union put into 10 T 34s. In addition, the complex gearboxes and supercharged engines required frequent repairs that were not always possible at the front. As a result, numerous Tigers and Panthers simply became immobile and were abandoned even though no enemy fire had ever touched them. At the tactical level, German commanders tried to neutralize the T34s within complex defensive systems. They built lines of anti-tank ditches and wire mesh, mines and concrete obstacles. The tanks then covered anti-tank guns hidden in camouflaged artillery positions. In offensive operations, German tanks tried to engage in combat at a greater distance to exploit the accuracy of their optics. In the open steppe the Panerta AFO or Panther became a dangerous opponent until the Soviets learned to attack in groups and bypass from the side. It was precisely this dynamic, quality over quantity, that defined the conflicts of 1940 to 45 and shaped the final image of the T34 as a nightmare. In a moment we will move to specific battlefields where these ideas clashed face to face. We will see how in practice masses of T34s clashed with a smaller but technically advanced opponent and how many people on both sides tried to survive in the tool of the great war. Now let's go out to the battlefield where the legend of the T34 was born. In the winter of 1940-42, when the German advance on Moscow was bogged down in mud and frost, the T34, along with the heavy KV, was a key element of the Soviet counterattack. The wide tracks allowed the tanks to move through the snow and bypass frozen German columns. In the battle for Moscow, the crews often used their speed and endurance to make breakthroughs. Although their coordination was limited, the winter conditions favored the diesel engine, which started reliably even in extreme frosts, while the German gasoline engines required preheating. The T34 thus became a symbol of Soviet resistance and was first demonstrated in mass production.
At Stalingrad, the T34s were involved in urban fighting. The Stalingrad tractor factory sent tanks directly to the battlefield. Some left the line unpainted to immediately join the defense. The tanks moved between houses, fired from ground floors, and served as makeshift bunkers. The lack of ammunition and fuel often caused the crews to risk their lives while resupplying. Nevertheless, they managed to slow the German advance and help close the cauldron that decided the defeat of Paulus' army. The largest tank clash in history, the Battle of Krsk, became a test of the T34 P6 against new German vehicles. The Soviets bet on defense. They built a complex system of trenches, minefields, and anti-tank obstacles. Over 2,300 T34s along with thousands of other armored and anti-tank vehicles awaited the German attack.
When the German Army Group South attacked with Panthers and Tigers on July 5, 1943, the Soviets greeted them with cannon fire and mines. Many Panthers were destroyed by tanks and damage before they could strike. Those that penetrated had to face mobile T34 groups attacking from the flanks. The T34s had a faster turret rotation and thanks to their numerical superiority they were able to surround the German tanks. In the chaos of combat, the crews behaved nervously. The memoirs of tank crews describe how they would fake a fire with smoke from cannonballs to confuse the enemy. Sometimes they would take advantage of terrain irregularities for cover and hit a hidden German tank in the garden. In this video you will learn that although many T34s fell in direct fire, their mass and agility broke the German attack. After Kursk, the Red Army took the initiative, the front moved west, and the T34s became a symbol of the liberation of Kiev, Minsk, and Warsaw. Let's incorporate other key events into our narrative. Operation Sky in late 1942 was a daring encirclement maneuver in which T34s penetrated weakly guarded sections of Romanian lines. and surrounded the army at Staling Grand. The tanks moved across the frozen steppe and took advantage of the cover of night snowfall. In freezing temperatures, their diesel engines started more reliably than German gasoline engines, and their wide tracks crushed ice without getting stuck.
When the circle came full circle, German crews found that the miracle machines they had feared were now all around them. These events reinforced the Soviet belief that a massive attack could turn the tide of battle. In 1940-43 they became the backbone of Operation Background, the offensive that swept through German Army Group Center in August and liberated Belarus. In the vast swampy plains of Pripyat, tanks exploited their mobility to bypass German forts and penetrate deep into the rear. Many crews had to cross swamps on makeshift bridges made of logs. Drivers wore surgical masks to avoid breathing in exhaust fumes. T34s also participated in the siege and subsequent liberation of Warsaw.
There it became clear that in urban combat the most important thing is cooperation with the infantry. The tanks moved in alleys covered by snipers and had to carefully destroy Panzerfa Faust positions. In the spring of 1945, as part of the Vistlunder operation, the T34s set off from the Vlala River through Pomerania to Berlin. The tank armies advanced rapidly, up to 60 km per day. Their engines roared incessantly and the crews had dark circles under their eyes. On the German roads they collided with retreating, collapsing units. The front began to crumble. In April, heavy street battles were fought in Berlin. The T34 tanks broke through barricades, but their poor visibility and inability to lower the gun at a steep angle made fighting in the narrow streets dangerous. German children and old men armed with Panze Fausts lurked around corners. Some crews decided to remove the side tanks and fixed bricks and sandbags to increase protection. However, after a few days they advanced to the and only burnt hulls and exhausted men emerged from them.
By the end of the war, the T34 had become a legend. In Soviet collective memory, it was celebrated as a clumsy machine that defeated Hitler. The reality was more complicated. Statistics show that the Soviets lost more than 40,000 T34s out of 57,000 produced, or almost 80%. This high mortality was due not only to enemy fire, but also to mechanical damage. For every tactical advantage of the TAI 34, there was a corresponding disadvantage: poor visibility, overloaded crew, mechanical damage or lack of radio stations. Despite this, the tank became the most influential armored vehicle of the Second World War. As authors Hugis and MAN argue, the myth of the T34 arose from many factors. The first was its innovative construction, which in 1940 actually surpassed the usual German machines. The second was its mass production. When dozens to hundreds of T-34s appeared on the horizon, the Germans fell into a feeling of helplessness. The third factor was propaganda, Soviet films, songs and posters depicted the tank as a weapon of national revenge and the crews as heroes. After the war, thousands of T-34s were placed in museums, monuments and served as an export product. They participated in the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Vietnam War, thus confirming their durability and simplicity of maintenance. At the same time, the T-34 became the subject of studies and discussions. Military analyses highlight its ability to combine three main factors. Firepower, mobility and protection in a relatively light and inexpensive package. However, critics point out that in 1940 it was a revolutionary machine, but two years later it was already technically outdated. Its strength was based more on quantity. From today's point of view, its construction philosophy, simplicity, modularity and suitability for mass production are inspiring. Modern tanks use advanced electronics and complex armor. However, the principles embodied by the T34, a combination of adequate protection and mobility remain basic rules of armored technology. In this video you will learn that the legacy of the T34 is not only technical, it is also a social phenomenon. Soviet society during the war rallied around industrial efficiency and self-sacrifice.
Tankers risked their lives in miserable conditions. Workers worked 24 hours a day to produce more armored colossuses and farmers donated their last money to build poles from Tagil. The T34 thus represents a story of how collective effort, ingenuity and determination can overcome technical shortcomings and defeat a better-equipped enemy. Its legacy extends beyond the Soviet Union. After the war, many thousands of tanks were exported to satellite states and allies. Poland and Czechoslovakia began producing the T34, while Yugoslavia and Romania incorporated them into their armies. In the Korean War, the North Korean T34s clashed with American and Persian tanks and initially fared well thanks to surprise and terrain knowledge. In 1950, six Egyptian T34s fought against Israeli and British forces in the Suez Crisis, and in 1960, seven Cubans. The 34s appeared in the Six-Day War. Even in the 1990s, the 34s appeared in conflicts in Africa and the Balkans. This long life confirms the robustness of the construction and the simplicity of maintenance. The myth surrounding the T34 also influenced the PDO culture. In the 1969 film Mir Liberation, viewers watch how many Russian tankmen advance towards Berlin in their T34s. This and other works created an emblematic image that became part of the collective identity. In recent years, modern films have also appeared. For example, the Russian adventure Tu28, which adapted the story of a tank crew escaping from German captivity. In the Czech Republic, the T34 appears on liberation monuments and its silhouette adorns commemorative medals and postal stationery. In Warsaw and Budapest, T34s stood on pedestals until the fall of communism as a symbol of Soviet influence, and after its end they became the subject of discussion about memory and occupation.
When we think about the influence of the T34 on subsequent tanks, we see a clear line. The post-war Soviet tanks T4, T54 and T55 continued the idea of a medium tank with a relatively low silhouette, sloped armor and an efficient engine. The principle of combining firepower, mobility and simple construction became the basis for decades. At the same time, the T34 also inspired foreign manufacturers. The closing armor became standard. The three-man turret was also adopted in Western countries. On the contrary, many shortcomings of the T34 served as a warning. Modern tanks have refined ergonomics, better optics and communication systems that prevent crews from being blinded and deafened. Part of the legacy is also the discussion about historical memory and manipulation. In post-Soviet countries, the T34 is symbolized as a victory tank. while in the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe it causes mixed feelings. In Estonia in 2007 a monument to a Soviet T was removed in Tan, which caused protests from the Russian-speaking minority. This story reminds us that technology is not neutral. It carries with it an ideological burden. Whether we admire or criticize the T34. We must not forget the people who fought and died on it. nor those who built it in the factories. The path of the T34 from prototype to legend shows how fundamental the combination of technical organization and the human factor is. In an era when modern armies are betting on advanced sensors, artificial intelligence and precision-guided weapons, the story of the Soviet medium tank has yet to be told. For example, technological superiority alone does not guarantee victory, it is the ability to produce weapons in large numbers, repair them quickly and have crews who trust them that decide. The T34 achieved its effectiveness thanks to the fact that it was good enough for mass production and, despite its shortcomings, became the backbone of tank forces. The human factor is also important. Behind the steel armor sat young men who often had little training and had to improvise. Their generosity and self-sacrifice became the basis of victory. The sober assessment of the Tloipon does not arise from the myth of the reversible superweapon but from the understanding that it was a combination of innovations, collective determination and adaptive strategy.
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As you will read in archival reports, even Soviet commanders were forced to adapt tactics and modify construction based on harsh experiences on the battlefield. This openness to change was decisive for success. We will soon reveal that the history of the T34 also has a cultural transcendence. The tank became an icon of cinema, games and museum exhibitions. To this day, veterans remember it in parades and its silhouette adorns monuments. The T34 thus lives on as a reminder that technology without human will is simply a machine. If you were interested in how this armored vehicle became a nightmare for the Wehrmacht, check out other stories from the Second World War. Thank you for watching. If you liked this lesson, please like and share it so that others can learn how the legend named T34 was born. When we consider the legacy of the T34 in its broader context, the question arises as to what this story tells us about the relationship between technology and society. War is an extreme test of social structure. It requires mobilization of resources, discipline, innovation, and coordination. The Soviet experiment with the T34 shows that sometimes the ability to react and adapt is more important than the achievement of perfection. While the German tanks were technically advanced, their complexity became a weakness. The Soviets, on the other hand, preferred a simple, functional, and mass-produced machine. In modern times, when many countries are trying to create cutting-edge technology, it can be inspiring to think that robustness and repairability are often as important as advanced electronics. The story of the T34 also shows that the morale and determination of people are a necessary complement to technical innovations. A tank alone is capable of nothing. Only the crew that operates it and is willing to risk their lives gives it meaning.
The T34 was developed, built and used by people who lived in the real world of hunger, fear and hope. Their achievements, successes and mistakes are instructive for every generation. Whether we build modern machines or solve social problems, we can take from the history of the T34 that the decisive factor is the human element, the ability to learn, improvise and cooperate.
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