The Battle who save the Europe - Plataia 27 August 479 BC - 110000 Best Paid World Soldiers VS 38700 Greek Ready to DIE Soldiers

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THE BATTLE OF PLATAIA 27 AUGUST 479 BC.
The most important battle in world history

The Battle of Plataea 479 BC it is one of the most important battles in world history, because it equalized the dominance of Europe.
-Until then, the huge Pesrian empire conquered one by one all the states of the then known world and there was no chance for anyone to resist them.
-However, with the Union of the army of the Greek Cities, he created a huge defensive army of 38000 men, and thus the united Greek army was able to fight and crush the huge Persian army. Thus the Greeks became the shield of protection for all of Europe 
The Persian army was invincible until then and consisted of 110,000 selected men, the best army of the vast Persian empire.

The Persian army at Plataea
-------------------------------------------
Persians (the best chosen soldiers): 40,000
Meadows: 20,000
Bactrians, Indians, Sakas: 20,000
Asiatic Greeks and Macedonians who had grazed: 50,000
Total: 110,000 ( Best paid world soldiers )
All these groups provided cavalry, creating a combined force of about 5,000 horsemen.

The Greek army in Plataea
-------------------------------------------
Athenians - Αθηναίοι : 8,000
Corinthians - Κορίνθιοι : 5,000
Lacedaemonians - Λακεδαιμόνιοι : 5,000
Spartans - Σπαρτιάτες : 5,000
Megarites - Μεγαρίτες : 3,000
Sikyonians - Σικυώνιοι : 3,000
Tegeates Τεγεάτες : 1,500
Fleissians - Φλειάσιοι : 1,000
Threezinioi Τροιζήνιοι : 1,000
Anaktorioi / Lefkadis - Ανακτόριοι/Λευκάδιο : 800
Epidaurians - Επιδαύριοι : 800
Orchomenians - Ορχομένιοι : 600
Plataeus - Πλαταιείς : 600
Aeginites - Αιγινίτες : 500
Ambrakiotes - Αμπρακιώτες : 500
Eretrei/Styrei - Ερετριείς/Στυρείς : 600
Chalkideis - Χαλκιδείς : 400
Mycenaeans/Tyrynthians: 400
Ermioneis - Ερμιονείς : 300
Potidaiates - Ποτιδαιάτες : 300
Lepreates Λεπρεάτες : 200
Plateis Πλατείς: 200
Thespians Θεσπιείς: αδιευκρίνιστο : unspecified
Total: 38,700 ( Greek soldiers ready to die )

The Battle of Plataea 479 BC was the last battle on the land front during the second campaign of the Persians in Greece. It was held in August in Plataia of Viotia. The opponents in the battle were the Greek city-states (Sparta, Athens, Corinth and Megara) and Persia of Xerxes I. 479 BC. In the previous year, the Persian campaign in Greece had achieved significant successes at the Battle of Thermopylae and the naval battle at Artemisium, and Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica were captured. But, the victory of the Greeks in the naval battle of Salamis prevented the capture of the Peloponnese by the Persians. Xerxes retreated with much of his army and left his general, Mardonius, to fight the Greeks the following year.

After his defeat in the naval battle of Salamis, Xerxes, leaving Mardonius in Thessaly, left for Persia. Mardonius tried to negotiate with the Athenians, offering them to ally with him with various exchanges. But the Athenians proudly refused, so Mardonius with his 300,000 soldiers encamped in the valley of Asopos, near Plataeus.

Mardonius, before invading the south, tried to detach the Athenians from the Greek alliance by sending as an ambassador the king of Macedonia, Alexander, who promised to compensate for the damages and offer any help if they allied with the Persians. When the Spartans learned about this embassy they were afraid because they knew that Attica had been deserted and the Athenians were facing the specter of starvation and they were also unhappy because the Peloponnesians had not sent an army in time to Boeotia as they had promised to protect their city. Therefore they hastened to send ambassadors to prevent the capitulation, promising that they and the rest of the allies would undertake to feed the families of the Athenians.

The Athenians were also waiting for the ambassadors of Sparta to answer in front of them the envoy of Mardonius and after hearing the words of both of them they replied to Mardonius through Aristides "that as long as the sun does not change its course they are not going to capitulate with Xerxes but remaining loyal to the gods and heroes he burned their temples and statues will persist in fighting for their freedom." The Spartans were told that they thanked them for the proposal but that they would manage on their own and all they asked was to send the fastest army to Boeotia to join the Athenian and fight.


The Spartans, however, once again broke their word by not sending an army to Boeotia but staying in their homeland to celebrate Hyacinthia. The result was that Mardonius passed from Thessaly to Attica unhindered, having with him as allies all the nations of eastern Greece, forcing the Athenians for the second time not being able to face such a numerous army leave their city and go to Salamis.
There Mardonius sent a second embassy to the Athenians to repeat the previous proposals. The new disloyalty of the Spartans had sharpened spirits nevertheless when the proposals were announced to the parliament, all the deputies except one named Lycides, rejected the Persian proposals and stoned the deputy and his family to death. The Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta together with the Megarians and Plataeans to protest against this new breach and to demand the immediate dispatch of an army if not to Boeotia which had been occupied by the enemy in the Thriasian field.


The Spartan prefects after hearing the embassy said they would think about it and reply instead they delayed 10 days postponing the reply continuing to celebrate the Hyacinths and fortify the isthmus. Thus, after the Athenian ambassadors were upset, they told them that if they did not receive an answer the next day, they would ally themselves with Persia. The governors fearing this outcome informed the Athenians that the army had already started and was at this time outside the borders of Sparta, 5000 Spartans each followed by 7 lightly armed helots. The example of the Spartans was followed by other Peloponnesians so that a significant force left the Peloponnese led by Pausanias the commissioner of the minor king Pleistarchus son of the dead king Leonidas. Mardonius, having been notified by the Argives of the movements of the Peloponnesian army, retreated after plundering the region of Tatio which he had respected in the hope of the capitulation of the Athenians to Boeotia, and encamped on the plain in front of the walled city of his Theban allies in order to cover his back and to be able to compete in an open space.



THE ACTIONS OF THE OPPONENTS IN THE WINTER OF 480/479 BC IN MORE DETAIL

After the glorious victory of the Greeks at the Straits of Salamis, the winter of 480/479 BC imposed a suspension of operations and limited the opponents to reconnaissance and diplomatic movements. The news of the victory of the allied Greeks at Salamis traveled quickly throughout the Greek world, spreading excitement. So let's see what happens during this time until the summer of 479 BC.

Persians

After the departure of Xerxes from Greece, the rescued Persian fleet gathered at Kymi in Asia Minor where it spent its winter. Some Persian ships with Medes and Persians (army-marines) passengers, spent the winter in the port of Samos (today's Pythagorion) in order to be able to intervene immediately in case of a revolt of the Ionian cities.

When spring came all the Persian ships, 300 in all, assembled at Samos under the command of the generals Mardontis and Artauntis. Because of the severe trial they had undergone they did not


SAMOS AND CHERSON. MYKALIS
proceeded westward and limited themselves to staying in Samos and guarding Ionia so that it would not defect. Nor did they expect that the Greeks would come to Ionia, believing that they would be content to guard their homeland. This they inferred from the fact that the Greek fleet did not pursue them when they left Salamis.
 
From the sea struggle, they were very disappointed and had high hopes that Mardonius in the land operations would defeat the Greeks. Remaining in Samos on the one hand they intended to cause harm to their enemies and on the other hand they were awaiting the result of Mardonius' actions.
Mardonius spent the winter in Thessaly and when spring came he sent a man, Myn from the city of Europa in Caria, to all the oracles in the area to receive oracles. and that of Amfiaraou in Oropos, Attica. Herodotus gives no details of these oracles, nor what oracles he received.
After Mardonius had studied the oracles, he sent to Athens as an ambassador, the Macedonian king Alexander I Amyntas, who on the one hand was related to the Persians (his sister had married a noble Persian) and on the other had served as consul and benefactor of the Athenians. The consuls received the ambassadors of the states they represented (in this case Macedonia) and introduced them to the municipal church (parliament) and generally looked after the interests of their state.
By this action, Mardonius hoped that he would more easily join the Athenians, of whom he had heard that they were a numerous and brave people, and he also knew that they more than all had caused the Persians to suffer the recent calamities at sea. So if he took them with him, he had hope of easily prevailing at sea as well. On land he thought he was far superior. In this way he calculated to gain supremacy over the Greeks.
However, it is also possible that the recent oracles he received told him what would happen and advised him to ally with the Athenians. So, complying with the oracles, he sent King Alexander to Athens.


Greeks
The coming of spring and the presence of Mardonius in Thessaly brought the Greeks together again. Before the land army was even assembled, the Greek navy consisting of 110 triremes assembled at Aegina. The admiral of the Athenian fleet was the general Xanthippos of Ariphron (father of the well-known Pericles) and of the Spartan, but also of the entire fleet, the king of Sparta Leotychides of Menareus. The Athenians assigned the command of the land army to the general Aristides the Fair.


The winner of Salamis, Themistocles, was probably sidelined and many assume that he did not succeed in the mission assigned to him when he went to Sparta, because he did not get a positive response to the Athenian demands. So it seems that this attitude of the Spartans created some discontent inside Athens and as far as Themistocles himself is concerned, a popular antipathy toward him gradually began to grow, as Plutarch tells us (Plut.Themis.22), but also generally about the policy that the Athenians were to follow henceforth.

XANTHIPPOS

Perhaps the sudden political change that took place in Athens during the new elections for the election of generals for the next Attic year at the beginning of 479 BC is not unrelated to all this. In place of Themistocles, the undisputed leader not only of the Athenian but also of the wider Greek allied fleet, Xanthippos of Ariphronos is elected without any serious reason being mentioned for this change (Herod.H,131 and Diod.IA,27). henceforth we shall not again see Themistocles playing any part in the developments of the war.
The fact becomes even more paradoxical if it is combined with a similar change in Sparta, where one of the two kings, Leotychides, took over as admiral of the Spartan, but also of the entire Greek fleet in place of Eurybiades. Thus the two men who led the Greek triremes to the triumph of Salamis, after being honored for their services, were set aside

ARISTEIDES THE RIGHTEOUS
Moreover, let us remember the auspicious collaboration of Themistocles and Eurybiades. Their removal, about which the ancient sources keep absolute silence, justifiably raises many questions. The growing envy of the Athenians for the glory of Themistocles is sufficient reason to interpret his marginalization. On the other hand, the great influence, evident to many, which Themistocles proved to have had on the decisions of the admiral Eurybiades, was probably the reason for the replacement of the latter by Leotychides. Probably the prefects and senate of Sparta resented this influence of the Athenian general over one of their own as dangerous. 
But there were also changes in the leadership of the Spartan land army.
Cleombrotos, regent and commissioner of king Pleistarchus, his minor son Leonidas, commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesians on the Isthmus, died in Sparta at the end of October 480 BC. In his place was placed Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotos, whom he chose as vice-leader

PAUSANIAS
his cousin Euryanacts, the son of Dorieus, another brother of Leonidas. Here we should note that the general Cleombrotos, brother of Leonidas, withdrew from the Isthmus, in October 480 BC, the army since during a sacrifice for the war against the Persians, the sun darkened and issued this as an ominous sign. It was a partial eclipse of the sun. When the Greek ships gathered at Aegina, Chios arrived as ambassadors of the Ionians to the camp of the Greeks, who had first visited Sparta and begged the Lacedaemonians to liberate Ionia. There were seven of them and they had agreed to exterminate the tyrant of Chios, Stratinus. But when one of them revealed their plans, they escaped from Chios and went to Sparta and then to Aegina and begged the Greeks to sail to Ionia. But the only thing they managed was to bring the Greek fleet to Delos. Beyond Delos, however, the Greeks were afraid to advance because they did not know what was happening and believed that the entire area east of Delos was full of enemy troops. 

LOCATION N.DILOS

Samos seemed to them to be as far away as the Heraklion columns (today's Gibraltar). So the barbarians did not dare to sail west of Samos and the Greeks east of Delos, despite the pleas of Chios. The space between the two opponents was kept by "fear" !!!
The envoy of Mardonius, the king of Macedonia, Alexander I, arrived in Athens and announced to the Athenians the tempting proposals of the Persian general. According to them, the Persians would forgive the Athenians for their old "mistakes", grant them large territories, compensate them for the damages and rebuild the temples they had burned, if they agreed to become allies of the Persian monarch. The Athenians indignantly rejected the proposals. On the same day that Alexander the First presented himself in the Church of the Municipality, Spartan ambassadors also arrived. Thus the Athenians listened successively to the proposals of Alexander and to the arguments of the Spartans, who were anxious lest the Athenians should yield. The Athenians, however, gave two proud answers:


To Alexander they said:
"We know that the Persians have troops many times more than ours, but as we love liberty too much, we will defend it as long as we can. So convey to Mardonius that the Athenians say that as long as the sun follows the straight path, which he follows even now, we will never make an alliance with Xerxes, but trusting in our allied gods and heroes, whose temples and statues he burned without respect, we will campaign against him and repel them".

To the Spartans, who had begged the Athenians not to accept the proposals of Mardonius and that they would take care to feed during the war the women, children and helpless Athenians, they replied:
"There is nowhere on earth so much gold or country so superior in beauty and wealth, that we should accept them and want to enslave Greece. Many and great are the causes, which, even if we wanted, prevent us from doing such an act. First of all, the statues and the burned ones destroyed temples of the gods, for which we seek revenge and not to ally with the cause of this destruction. Besides, the Greeks all have the same blood and the same language, common temples and sacrifices, common customs. Let the Athenians become traitors to all of them it is not right".
They then thanked the Spartans for the proposals to feed the Athenian families and urged them to immediately send an army, because surely after the rejection of the proposals Mardonius will invade Attica. So before this happens the Athenians will march to Boeotia and wait for him there. After receiving the Athenians' answer, the Spartan ambassadors returned to their country.

The Battle of Plataea 479 BC (3D Animated Documentary) Greco-Persian wars

MARDONIUS INVADES ATTICA
As soon as Alexander returned and reported on the Athenians' response, Mardonius hastily began to advance with his entire army towards Attica and forcibly recruited the inhabitants of the regions he passed through. The leaders of Thessaly agreed to this, who did not repent of their anti-Hellenic actions until then, but were inciting Mardonius much more now.
So at the end of the spring of 479 BC. Mardonius proceeded to Boeotia and there completed the preparations for supply and encampment. The Thebans,
wishing to keep the Persians in Boeotia, advised Mardonius to remain there since there was no more suitable ground to encamp, and thus, remaining there, to act so as to occupy all of Greece without a fight. They also advised him to send money to the powerful of the Greek cities, so as to divide the Greeks and thus easily enslave them. Mardonius, however, was not offended and, because of his foolishness, ardently desired, on the one hand, to capture Athens for a second time and, on the other hand, to spread with torches from island to island to Xerxes who was in Sardis, the news of the capture of Athens. Also in this way to force the Peloponnesians to come out of the Isthmus and give battle with him in an open field 

ATHENS 5th CENTURY BC

When he arrived in Athens he found the city deserted again, since the few Athenians who had returned had abandoned it for the second time. Most continued to be in Salamis, Aegina and Troizena. As Herodotus informs us, ten months had already passed since the first occupation of Athens by Xerxes in September 480 BC. So the second occupation by Mardonius must have taken place in the middle of July 479 BC.
He immediately sent to the Athenians Hellespontius Murychidis, who appeared in the Parliament of 500, which as an exile was based in Salamis, the only free part of the Athenian state. The proposals that Murychidis made to the Athenian parliamentarians were the same as those presented by Alexander. For the majority of the Athenian parliamentarians, there was no point in any debate, especially under the weight of the brutal blackmail and psychological pressure that the occupation of their state entailed.
The irritation of the Athenians was justifiably very great and, as they were "in a boiling state of soul", they could not stand even one of the deputies, Lykides, who dared to suggest that it was in their interest to approve the proposals of Mardonius and lead them in a vote in the "Municipal Church", he was executed by stoning. When the women of the Athenians heard about Lycides, urging each other on, they rushed to his house and stoned his wife and children to death. They didn't bother Mourichidis and let him go.

THE ATTITUDE OF SPARTA
The Athenians felt disappointed by the attitude of the Lacedaemonians who had not yet come with their army, according to the condition they had set upon them when they refused the proposals of Mardonius. Instead, the Lacedaemonians, after their allies the Peloponnesians, again crossed the Isthmus and continued the construction of the wall, being at the point where the ramparts were erected. Following Aristides' proposal, the Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta by the generals Cimon, Xanthippos and Myronides from Plataea, who were accompanied by Megareans and Plataeans, on the one hand to express their grievances, because they had let Mardonius invade Attica and not they went to Boeotia with the Athenians to confront him, and on the other hand to remind them of the promises the Persians had made to them, if they had sided with them. 

ANCIENT SPARTA
The ambassadors presented themselves to the prefects of Sparta accusing them of treachery, inconsistency and indolence and also pointed out to them that if they did not help the Athenians, then the Athenians themselves would see to their salvation.

In those days the Spartans celebrated the "Hyacinthia" which was an annual holiday during the months of July and August, in honor of Apollo's friend, Hyacinthos. The magistrates listened to them calmly, and did not appear to be moved by the accusations made, and deferred their answer for ten days, telling them each day that they would answer the next. During this time of ten days they were trying to finish the wall on the Isthmus, working day and night, the erection of which was at an end. This seems to have been the reason for the constant postponements of the answer, since with the completion of the wall, they felt secure and believed, according to Herodotus, that they no longer needed the Athenians.

OFFICERS AND AMBASSADORS

On the day before the Athenian embassy was to be presented to the prefects, Chileus the Tegeate who had the greatest power of all the Lacedaemonians, presented himself to the prefects and emphasized the dangers the Peloponnesians would run into if the Athenians accepted the Persian proposals. The governors thought carefully about his reasons and in the middle of the night, without informing the Athenian embassy, ​​they ordered the general Pausanias, who as he was the son of the deceased Cleombrotus and commissioner of the minor king Pleistarchus (son of Leonidas), to start immediately with 5000 Spartans, to whom the stewards gave seven helots each. Thus, in the dark, a force of 5,000 hoplites and 35,000 helots set out for Attica. Let us recall here that the helots in the campaigns were lightly armed and were used in the battles as "flies".


When dawn broke, the Athenian embassy presented itself to the prefects for the last time and again expressed its complaints. After listening to them, the magistrates informed them under oath that the Spartan army was already north of Sparta near the city of Orestio (today's village of Paparis). The ambassadors were surprised, and full of admiration, hurried away to catch up with them. Together with them, another 5,000 elite hoplites from the localities of Lacedaemon set out.

The mobilization within a few hours of 45,000 men shows us the admirable mechanism of the Spartan state. The movement of the army during the night was probably done for reasons

SPARTANS
of security, in order not to be noticed by the Argives who were eavesdropping and alert the Persians. Nevertheless, the Argives were informed of the movement of the Spartan army and immediately sent their best postman to Athens who informed Mardonius about the events.

Therefore, before the army led by Pausanias reached the Isthmus, the Persian army withdrew from Attica after first burning, collapsing and burying it. that had remained standing in Athens, from the destruction of the previous year, of the walls, the houses and the sanctuaries. Mardonius then sent his cavalry and a body of the army to attack 1,000 Spartans, who had been stationed at Megara as a guard. But when he learned that the whole Spartan army was on the Isthmus, he abandoned the operation against the Megarians. This operation must have been a move to recognize or cover the retreat.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE GREEKS IN THE SQUARES

Herodotus explains the reasons for the retreat of the Persians from Attica. The country was unsuitable for cavalry and in case of defeat their army was in danger of being cut off. On the contrary, Thebes was friendly and had a plain suitable for their cavalry. For his retreat from Attica to Boeotia, Mardonius chose the easternmost of the three roads, the one that passes through Decelia (Tatoi), through a pass of Sfendalis to Parnitha, and through Tanagra. Then he arrived at the Boeotian city of Skolos which was near Thebes. There the Persians began to cut down trees from the surrounding region with which they fortified the camp of Mardonius, in which he intended to take refuge if the battle was not favorable to him. The long frontal sides of the camp were ten furlongs (2 km) long.

SPARTANS

The Lacedaemonians, when they reached the Isthmus, encamped there. The rest of the Peloponnesians who had a feeling of patriotism, when they were informed of the actions of the Lacedaemonians, considered that they should not lag behind and after making sacrifices they joined them at the Isthmus and all together moved towards Eleusis. The army of Pausanias was reinforced on its way from Megaride with 3,000 Megarian hoplites and joined at Eleusis with the Athenian army, which passed through Salamis with 8,000 heavily armed Athenians and 600 Plataeans under the general Aristides. In the sacred land of Demeter and Persephone, thousands of bronze-clad Greek warriors all performed sacrifices together, which again gave encouraging signs.

DIV. OAK HEADS (CASE)

Then, following the mountain passes of Kithairona that led to the fortress of Eleftheri (today's Gyftokastro), they passed through the passage of Dryos Kefalos (today's Kaza) and reached Erythres in Boeotia (near present-day Kriekouki or Erythres). Low in the depth of the plain they saw the Persians to wait for them. It was mid-August of 479 BC.

The Commander-in-Chief Pausanias, seeing the Persians arrayed north of the Asopos river, deployed his army along the foothills of Kithairon, south of the river and to the right of the exit of the Dryos Kephalos pass. The river Asopos crosses the Boeotian plain from west to east, almost parallel to Kithairon, and divides it into two parts, the southern one including the zone as far as Kithairon, which is interrupted by hills and ravines and is not suitable for the cavalry, and a northern part which extends to Thebes and is an extensive plain, suitable for cavalry.

FREEDOM FORTRESS (GYFTOKASTR)

The location of this starting line-up was chosen for several reasons. On the one hand it was necessary to control the passage because new units of the Greek army were constantly arriving and on the other hand the road had to remain open for resupply from Attica and southern Greece. Moreover, the position was favorable to defend the heavy Greek infantry, since the ravines and low hills made the terrain completely unsuitable for the easy deployment of the Persian cavalry.
The objective purpose of Mardoni was to fight on this plain. All the maneuvers and movements of the Greek army, until the moment the battle was fought, must have had the opposite objective, that is to force Mardonius to attack the area south of the Asopus river and especially the mountainous terrain of the lower part of Kithairon, in terrain, that is, completely unsuitable for Persian cavalry.


When the Greeks crossed Kithairon, the Persians had already organized their positions. Mardonius had placed outposts on a line running north of the Erythrae and the Plataea, while the main body of the army was encamped on the north bank of the Asopus, at a distance of eight kilometers from Thebes. In this line-up the Persians occupied the left wing, the "wandering Greeks" the right and the other Asiatic nations the centre. Behind this

The 1st PLACE
faction was the wooden camp of Mardonius in which ramparts and towers had been built as well as a deep ditch that surrounded it (Diod.IA, 30). Mardonius, after occupying these positions, left the Greeks undisturbed for a while, probably in the hope that they would pass Asopus, to attack him on the open plain, where he had the advantage of strong cavalry.


The Spartans were placed on the right wing, the other Greeks, who made up the center of the line, in the Erythres and the Athenians and Megareans, who made up the left wing, in the Hysias. All had camped in fortified and stony places (Plut., Arist. 14), except for the Megarians who camped in lower areas. The Greeks did not have cavalry.

FORCES OF THE OPPONENTS

Greeks
Heavily armed infantry: Lacedaemonians 10,000, Tegeans 1,500, Corinthians 5,000, Potideans 300, Orchomenians Arcadians 3,000, Epidaurians 800, Troizenians 1,000, Lepreates (Triapophylia) 200, Mycenaeans- Tiryns 300, Fleiasians 1000, Hermiones 300, Eretrias- Styrians 600, Chalcidians 500, Lefkadians-Anactorians 800, Pallinians (from Cephalonia) 200, Aeginites 3000. Plataeans 700, Athenians 8000, Thespians 2000. Total of heavily
armed hoplites .600.

Light-armed infantry: In the ranks of the Spartans 35,000 (seven to each hoplite) all trained for war. To the rest of the Lacedaemonians and Greeks 34,500. Total Psilos 69,400.

Total Greeks 110,000

Persians
Persians 20,000, Medes 15,000, Bactrians 30,000, Indians 10,000, Saxons 15,000, Greeks about 50,000 (Macedonians, Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Phocians) among the Greeks, others had volunteered, such as Thessalians and Boeotians and others against their will, like the Macedonians of the

PERSIAN IMMORTALIANS
whose country had been occupied since 492 BC. Only 1000 of the Phocaeans had grazed, and the rest had fled to Parnassos and from there rushed to help the Greeks with small (rather raiding) attacks against the army of Mardonius and his Greek allies. Total 140,000.
But there were others more lightly armed, such as Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paeonians, Ethiopians and Egyptians. It seems that Mardonius disembarked crews from the ships, while the barbarian fleet, which followed him, was still at Faliro. This shows that there were no Egyptians in the army that Xerxes led to Athens.

Total of Mardonius' stactus about 300,000


THE OATH OF THE GREEKS AT PLATAIAS
The orator Lycurgus mentions that the following oath was taken at Plataia shortly before the battle and that it was an imitation of the oath that Athenian citizens took when they became teenagers and were registered at the registry office (Lycur. Kata Leokratous, 80).However, according to Diodorus (IA, 29) it was given by the Greeks who gathered on the Isthmus. Herodotus also refers to an oath taken by the Greeks, but Theopompus considers it illegitimate. In addition, in Acharnes (Menidi) there was a marble inscription with the famous Plataean oath, but it has been argued, rather convincingly, that it is a spurious historical text, one of those forged in the years following the Persian wars. The prevailing view among historians today is that an oath was probably given, probably on the Isthmus, but ultimately its core was altered by later additions.

I'M TALKING ABOUT HER LIFE NOW
FREEDOM. I DON'T MISS THEM
RULER NOR ALIVE NOR
DYING, BUT THEM IN FIGHT
END OF ALLIES EVER
BURIED AND YOU KEEP THEIR WAR
NONE OF THE BARBARIANS AMONG THE CONTESTANTS
OF CITIES, AND THE
OF SAINTS OF THE INSANE AND
I DO NOT BUILD ANY PAYMENTS,
ANOTHER MEMORIAL TO THE INSPIRED
I AND I WILL OVERCOME THE BARBARIANS
ASSEVIAS. (Lykourgos, Kata Leokratou 81.)

"I will not esteem my life higher than liberty, nor will I forsake the chiefs, either living or dead, but such of the allies as have fallen on the field of battle, all without exception I will bury. And, if I vanquish the barbarians, I will not desolate none of the cities that fought. And of the sanctuaries that were set on fire and torn down by the barbarians, I will not rebuild anything at all, but will leave them to posterity as a memorial of the impiety of the barbarians."


THE FIRST FIGHTS
The Greek army was late in reaching Eleusis because the Lacedaemonians had to wait for the other Peloponnesians. Finally, 1,500 Tegeans, 5,000 Corinthians, 300 Potidaeans, Corinthian settlers, 600 Orchomenian Arcadians, 3,000 Sikyonians, 800 Epidaurians, 1,000 Troizenians, 200 Lepraeans, 400 Mycenaeans and Tirynsians, 1,000 Phliasians, 300 Hermes arrived Ionians, 600 Eretrians and Styrians, 400 Chalkidians ,500 Ambrakiites, 800 Lefkadians, 200 Palles from Kefallinia and 500 Aeginites. When the army arrived at Megara, it was joined by 8000 Athenians and 600 Plataeans led by Aristides. If we add to these forces the 5000 Spartans who were followed by 3500 Helots and 1800 Thespians, the Greek army numbered 11000 men. From Eleusis, Pausanias passing through Boeotia saw the Persian army lined up at the Asopus river and not daring to descend to the plain. in order to confront the 300,000 men of the Persian army, he preferred to camp at the foot of the mountain.


Then Mardonius made the mistake of attacking the Greeks with his cavalry which was excellent and numerous and led by one of the best Persian officers, Masistios. The mistake was that the terrain being uneven did not lend itself to such an attack. Thus the Megarians who were attacked due to their position after being terribly pressed at the beginning, helped by 300 Athenians led by Olympiodorus, repelled the enemy

ASOPOS POT. TODAY

THE DEATH OF THE BROKER
Mardonius sent against them all his cavalry under the command of the illustrious Persian Masistius, who was riding a golden-briddled and brilliantly decorated Nessian horse. It remains unknown what Mardonius had in mind with this attack, which certainly, as Herodotus describes it, exceeds in the context of a bombing or reconnaissance operation. Perhaps it was an attempt to ascertain the capabilities of his cavalry on this ground, against the armored phalanx. Perhaps again he intended to draw the Greeks into ground generally more suitable for the Persian army. The Persian cavalry did not adopt the usual tactics, but charged head-on against the Greek horsemen, inflicting heavy casualties on them and hurling heavy abuse at them, mockingly calling them "women," for to the Persians there was no worse abuse than to call someone a coward. and by a woman.

The Megarians were, according to Herodotus, placed in unsuitable ground for defense and suffered the main charge of the cavalry and a barrage of arrows and javelins. So they were forced to ask for reinforcements from Pausanias. The commander-in-chief called volunteers from the others

CAVALRY AGAINST HALLS
Greeks, but only 300 Athenian elite hoplites and archers showed up. In the long-hour battle that followed, the Athenians killed the leader of the Persian cavalry Masistios and captured his horse. The Persians tried to take Masistios' corpse and thus a fight became general and only when he reached the field the main body of the Greeks, the Persian cavalry withdrew. Thus the conflict probably ended with the victory of the Greeks.

In Herodotus' narrative, the Athenians are presented as voluntarily rushing into the fray, while the other Greeks refused. It is natural to assume that the Athenians ran to help the Megarians, because they were closer to them and because they had archers. The battle seems to have been decided more by the superiority of the Greek hoplites in mountainous terrain. Mardonius was thus taught that he could not attack with the cavalry at this point, so he withdrew it and left the initiative of the movement to Pausanias, hoping, perhaps, that the Greeks would advance on the plain beyond Asopus. When the Persian horsemen returned to the camp without the corpse of Masistius, the whole army and Mardonius mourned for him, cutting off their heads and beards, shearing their horses and saddles, and uttering beautiful lamentations, the cry of which was heard throughout Boeotia. plain, because the dead man was considered by the Persians and Xerxes as the most prominent after Mardonius.
MASSISTIUS

The Greeks, after the repulse of the cavalry, took courage and after placing the dead man in a carriage, they took him around to all the divisions of the Greek army. Because the dead man, due to his size and his beauty, caused interest, the soldiers left their divisions and went to see the dead Masistios. The ancient Greeks were distinguished for their beauty, and this energy, the circumambulation of the dead, was also a "psychological operation" to boost the morale of the Greek fighters.

THE ALIGNMENT

OF THE GREEKS


After this first success, Pausanias decided to advance and bring his army's array closer to Plataea. The reasons that dictated this decision to him are certainly not known. He was certainly encouraged by the first success and faced with greater confidence in the possibility of fighting on flat terrain. At the same time, he hoped that he would more easily lure the Persians into a confrontation, now that he was in less mountainous terrain.

Finally, perhaps the lack of water forced him to change his position. Herodotus says that the Greek army marched westward along the foothills of Kythairon, past the Hysias, to the territory of the Plataea, and encamped by nations near the fountain Gargaphia (its location is not known today) and the sanctuary of the hero of Plataion Androkratis, which is six stadia (about 1200 m.) from Plataia, on uneven ground with low hills.


THE 2ND POSITION OF THE GREEKS
While the Greeks were preparing to line up in the new position, an argument broke out between the Athenians and Tegeans about who should be on the left wing. The Tegeans were said to be the most worthy allies of the Spartans and deserved that position. The Athenians replied that "the purpose of the campaign is to fight the barbarians and not to argue. But since you have raised this issue we answer you that since we always do the right thing, it is our paternal tradition to have the primaries". The final solution to the argument was given by the entire Lacedaemonian camp, which shouted that the Athenians were superior to the Arcadians and that the left wing belonged to them.

After that the Greek army lined up as follows:
  • -On the right wing the 10,000 Lacedaemonians together with the 35,000 small Helots. On their left, the 1500 Tegeans lined up in honor.
  • -On the left wing the 8,000 Athenians and the 700 Plataeans.
  • - In the center are all the other Greeks.
The Greeks deployed on a front about five kilometers long.

THE MOVE TO THE 2ND PLACE

The lateral move, probably carried out at night, to occupy the second position, is according to today's strategic understandings, quite unorthodox. In addition, it left a gap in front of the Persian line, as a result of which the crossing of Dryos Kefali, where the supply road of the Greek army passed, was exposed. The new position also had the disadvantage of leaving the Hellenic center exposed.

Pausanias might have been looking to provoke an attack by the strong Persian center at that point, so that the two ends (Lacedaemonians and Athenians) could attempt a circular movement, as in Marathon. The fact that Pausanias was later forced to change his position again proves the impossibility of this movement.

Persians


After the end of mourning in the camp of the barbarians, Mardonius, seeing the Greeks that they had descended lower, rejoiced. The tactic of waiting that he had implemented with the volleys of his cavalry, bore fruit as the opponent had moved to the exact point he wanted so that to be able to deploy the cavalry. So he lost no time and moved his troops westward along the north face of the Asopus River and arrayed them as follows:

  • -On the left wing and opposite the Lacedaemonians, Mardonius arrayed the Persians who, as they were more numerous, their array had a great length and depth and covered the front of the Tegeates as well.
  • -On the right wing and opposite the Athenians, the Plataeans and the Megareans, he lined up the Greeks (about 50,000) who were in the service of the Persian army.
  • -In the center and opposite the rest of the Greeks, he lined up the Medes, the Bactrians, the Indians, the Sakas and the rest of the tribes.
The army of Mardonius was deployed on a front of equal length with the Hellenic one.

WAITING BEFORE THE GREAT BATTLE

Both Mardonius and Pausanias each had their own reasons for not wanting to attack first. Although the Greeks had lined up in a vulnerable position, Mardonius did not seem eager to attack first, preferring instead to wait. the first move by the Greeks that would offer him a comparative advantage. He was smart enough not to underestimate the opponent and considered it too risky to attack him.

THE FIELD OF BATTLE TODAY

The unfortunate outcome of the attacks he had launched with his cavalry and the tragic end of Masistios had convinced him that great caution was required against the Greek phalangites. He had to face not only the best warriors, but also a considerable army, since the ratio of 1:3 (Greeks to Persians) left all possibilities open for the outcome of the battle. So Mardonius was determined to order an attack only when he was quite sure.

But Pausanias also decided that the Persians' defensive position was the most secure and advantageous, rather than crossing the Asopus, exposing the Greek infantry to the advances of the Persian cavalry.

Thus the two armies remained idle in their new positions for eight days, for the oracles, Tisamenus of the Greeks and Hegisstratus the Helios who was in the camp of the Persians, declared to both camps that the omens were good for defense, but not to attack after crossing the river.

On the ninth day, because new fighters were coming to the camp of the Greeks from everywhere, Mardonius, at the instigation of the Theban Timagenis, sent during the night some divisions of cavalry to the passes of Kithairon with a view to placing under his control the strait of the Dryos Kefalon (note Kaza), from where the supply convoys that supplied the Greek army passed. The Persian horsemen managed to block the passage and even capture a supply convoy with 500 ships carrying food from the Peloponnese, mercilessly slaughtering people and animals.

After the loss of the passage, Pausanias began to be pressed for time since he would soon have a problem of feeding his soldiers, but also of general supplies. The Greeks believed that the Persian attack was only a matter of time. But the wily Mardonius had an exasperating patience, and apart from the occasional skirmishes and harassing advances of the Persian cavalry, he did not seem inclined to attack first.

During the next two days neither opponent decided to attack. Mardonius

PERSIAN HORSEMAN
continued to engage in harassing actions. The Persian cavalry constantly provoked the Greeks, prevented them from obtaining water from Asopus, and caused them losses, for the gnawing Thebans, excited for this war, led the horsemen to the point of engagement and then withdrew them, thus making a display of their prowess and their combat capabilities (classic tactical psychological operation).

With these actions, on the one hand, they wanted to lure the Greeks into an attack north of Asopus, and on the other hand, with the suspicion of a Persian attack, they constantly kept the heavily armed Greeks in battle tension, causing irritation and fatigue. The strain of the Greek soldiers from the many days of waiting was certainly very great, if we take into account both the weather conditions (August with an average temperature of 32-34 °C) and the weight of their weapons (31 kg or so).

On the eleventh day, a Persian council of war was held, in which Mardonius and the general Artavazus opposed their arguments. Artavazos proposed the retreat of the Persian army to Thebes, where abundant supplies were gathered and where they could be more easily defended. Prolonging the fight would give the Persians time to succeed in buying off the rulers in some Greek cities.

On the contrary, Mardonius supported the direct attack, because he believed in the great superiority of his army. Finally, Mardonius ignored the advice of Artavazus and the Thebans and ordered them to prepare for battle the next day. In a strong tone, he addressed the commanders of the units, telling them that his own army was incomparably superior to the Hellenic one and that he was the one who made the decision after receiving the command of the army from the king, and not Artavazos. No one objected to Mardonios' decision.

During the night the Macedonian king Alexander I, who was in the camp of Mardonius as an ally of the Persians, crossed the Asopus and presented himself to the Athenian generals (only to Aristides, according to Plutarch), to warn them about the impending enemy attack. The beginning of his words, as handed down by Herodotus, is the following:

"Athenians, I entrust you with these words as a secret, and I forbid you to announce them to anyone except Pausanias, lest you destroy me. Of course you will not I said, if I wasn't very interested in all of Greece. Because I myself am a Greek from an old generation and I would not like to see Greece as a slave and not free".

Alexander then informed them that Mardonius had decided to attack at dawn, despite the unfavorable sacrifices, because he was afraid, in Alexander's own opinion, that the Greeks were gathering larger forces. The king of Macedonia urged them to prepare for battle and advised them, in case Mardonius postponed his attack, to be patient, because the supplies of the enemy army were running out. Finally, he asked to be released after their victory from the Persian yoke in return for this service of his, and revealed his identity:

"I am Alexander of Macedonia," he said, and returned to the Persian camp. This explicit testimony of Herodotus about the Greekness of Alexander and the Macedonians is an important service to history.

After this the Athenian generals went to the right wing and announced to Pausanias the words of Alexander. When Pausanias heard this, out of his fear of the Persians he proposed to the Athenians that they should change sides with the Spartans, so that the Athenians might have the Persians, for the victors of Marathon knew the Persian tactics better than they. The Athenians gladly accepted the proposal: "We would have already proposed it to you, they told the Spartans, if we had not been afraid of offending you."

However, when the Athenians and Spartans began to change positions, the Boeotians realized this and informed Mardonius who immediately ordered a corresponding change in his line-up, to neutralize the movement of the Greeks. As soon as the Athenians found the countermeasure of Mardonius, they reverted to their original arrangement and so did the Persians, so that in the end no change was made.

Mardonius was more impatient than the Greeks for the battle to take place, because he too was pressed by the lack of food and supplies. Another reason, which probably pushed him to battle, was that, while he did not depend on the Persian fleet for his supply, he certainly understood the consequences that a Greek naval victory in Ionia and a revolution of the Asia Minor Greeks would have for his army. So perhaps he was in a hurry to subdue the Greeks, before a victory by the Greek fleet isolated his army in Greece.

Certainly Mardonius waited for twelve days, hoping that Pausanias would make the mistake of attacking the plain north of Asopus, where the Persian cavalry would ensure Persian superiority. It has also been argued that Mardonius postponed the attack because he expected a pro-Persian conspiracy to emerge in the ranks of the Athenian army.


After this Mardonius sent a herald to the Spartans, who, after extolling their bravery, criticized them because the Athenians agreed to face the Persians and not them. He also told them that they did this because they were trembling with fear of the Persians. Finally he suggested that they fight only Spartans and Persians and that Mardonius will accept whoever wins and this victory will be considered the victory of the whole army. None of the Greeks answered the herald and he returned and reported to Mardonius what had happened.

Mardonius considered it a victory that the Spartans did not accept his challenge and full of joy and pride sent his cavalry to attempt a general assault on the Greek lines. As early as the ninth day he was pounding them in various places, but this time the attack was general. The attack ended in success for the Persians.

PERSIAN HORSEMEN

The Persian horsemen reached the Gargafia fountain, which was on the right wing of the Greeks, near the Spartan positions, and completely destroyed it, covering it with earth. A large part of the Greeks got water from it, because the Persian cavalry prevented the Greeks from taking water from Asopus. With their blockade from Asopos and Gargafia and with the destruction of the supply convoy at the crossing of Dryos Kefali, the Greeks were in danger of running out of food and water.
The Greeks therefore had to either attack immediately on terrain favorable for the Persian cavalry - so Mardonius would have achieved his goal - or retreat to new, more protected positions, near springs, and at the same time attempt to regain control of the passes of Kithairon . A council of war, which met immediately after the loss of Gargaphia, decided to retreat in the direction of the Plataea during the following night, four hours after sunset, if the Persians did not continue the general attack of their cavalry and advance an attack of the infantry until evening.

The place chosen by the Greeks was called Nisos, because it was included between two tributaries of the Oerois river (daughter of Asopus) that flowed into the Corinthian gulf. The island was 15 stadia (2900m) from Asopus and Gargafia. Today, this location has been identified with a very high probability between today's Erythrae and Plataea. Its identification, however, has the disadvantage that it could hardly include the entire Greek army.

It is not excluded that this is again due to an ambiguity by Herodotus and that the plan provided for an extension of the front outside the Island, which, according to what the historian writes, would serve as a starting point for the operation to restore control of the
Kithairon crossings.


After this decision, throughout the day they endured the attacks of the cavalry and suffered many losses. At the end of the day, however, the cavalry attacks were interrupted. Immediately the Greek divisions began to withdraw from their positions, but they initiated the retreat completely autonomously and moved somewhat individually, without faithfully executing the commander-in-chief's instructions.

Amid considerable confusion, each Greek section occupied a new position, which was not the one specified by the commander's order, either because the section wandered in the night, or because it did not faithfully execute the order, or because it did not coordinate with the movements of the flanks departments. Thus the front lost its cohesion.

AG.TRIADA-RUINS N.IRAS

The troops of the center of the formation (Megareans, Corinthians, Fleiasians, etc.), the most exhausted by the attacks of the Persian cavalry, left their positions at night and wandered to the walls of Plataea, near the temple of Hera, where
they settled. In fact, shortly before dawn Pausanias, not seeing the center divisions lined up at the pre-agreed point, thought that they had deserted and announced to the Athenians that only they and the Lacedaemonians would fight and invited them to come and line up on his left. But this did not happen because at the time of the movement of the Athenians towards the Lacedaemonians, the Persian attack began.

MOVEMENT OF GREEKS

A senior Spartan officer, commander of the Pitanati company (Pitani was one of the municipalities of Sparta), the captain Amompharetos of Poliados, refused to retreat with his division, because he considered it contrary to Spartan honor to retreat in front of the enemy. At that moment, a herald of the Athenians came who were worried about the Spartans' slowness and saw the whole episode.

An argument ensued with Pausanias and Euryanax who failed to persuade him to start. In fact, Amompheratos picked up a stone with both hands and threw it in front of Pausanias' feet, telling him that this is how he votes, that is, not to take a step back and not to retreat in front of the "barbarians" accusing the other Greeks of being cowards. Pausanias after reprimanding him severely, calling him a maniac and

AMOFERATOS
maddened, he told the Athenian herald to inform the Athenians of the state of things, and further requested them to come over to them and act for their departure like the Spartans.

It is said that the Spartans continued to quarrel until the early hours of the morning and finally decided to move on, leaving him behind, in the hope that being left alone he would follow them, which he eventually did. But thus they were delayed many hours.

Most historians consider Amompharetus' disobedience to the orders of his superiors inconceivable. After all, if Amompharetus really believed that Spartan honor forbade retreat, he would not have retreated after all, but would have fought alone like Leonidas. However, it is not excluded that the delay of the Athenians and Spartans was due to another cause. Perhaps, that is, when it was found that parts of the Greek center did not occupy the position provided for in the original plan, a council of Athenian and Spartan leaders was held for new decisions. Perhaps it was even decided that the Athenians would line up on the left of the Spartans, ignoring the center.

THE 3rd PLACE
The retreat of the Spartans was not delayed, but executed slowly, according to plan. This is how it can be explained, why the company of Amompharetus had not completed its collapse in the morning. This delay was therefore aimed at luring the Persians into an attack. And if this was the purpose of Pausanias, then his success was great, because the Persians fell into the trap and began the attack.

Be that as it may, the main Spartan body, after having traveled ten stadia (2 km) stopped at dawn around the river Moloendas (parap. of Asopus) in the foothills of Kithairon near the sanctuary of Demeter (in front of today's Erythres or Kriekouki). , while light divisions
had managed to clear the supply road and thus achieved one of the main objectives of the enterprise.

The Athenians in full order, as Herodotus tells us, followed an opposite route from the Lacedaemonians and moved towards the plain that stretches between the hill of the Tower of Plataea and the Island. The distance they had to travel was long and it seems that in the confusion from the many changes of positions, they were delayed enough, as a result of which they did not have time to approach the Lacedaemonians. These two parts of it

THE FINAL LINE-UP
Greek army they will receive immediately in the morning hours and before they unite the fierce attack of the Persians and their Greek allies.

Thus dawn found the Greeks in the formation of an inverted triangle, with the apex behind where were the overworked sections of the small Greek cities as a reserve, while in front at the base of the triangle to the west the Athenians near the Plataea moving eastward to approach the Lacedaemonians and close the void and to the east the Lacedaemonians in front of today's Erythrae. So there was no formation of a nine phalanx, but three separate divisions that stood apart from each other.


THE MAIN BATTLE
The battle of Plataea took place on the 4th of Boidoromion in 479 BC. that is, on August 27 (otherwise known as September 10), 13 days after the Greeks took second place. At sunrise the Persian horsemen, who recrossed the Asopus, to continue the attacks of the previous day, found that the Greeks had abandoned their positions. Only the laggard company of Amompharetos could be seen retreating slowly across the plain towards the slopes of Kithairon.

Mardonius learned from his horsemen of the Greek retreat. As he was already determined to fight the decisive battle, he wanted to take advantage of the opportunity presented to him. Riding on his horse, he gave his staff the last orders that were to be made and the last words of his life, "they must not escape by anything, we must pursue them until we get them in hand, so that they will be punished as they deserve". His decision seems prudent since the Greek faction was divided into three sections.

The Spartans even retreating would certainly have had some difficulty moving from retreat to defense or attack. However, Mardonius did not suspect the possibility of a trap and it certainly seems that he was lured into a position not so suitable for his cavalry.

Terrible war-cries filled the air from one end to the other of the Asiatic army that eagerly awaited the signal to break out like a bloodthirsty beast. The war banners were raised, first of the Persians and then of all the other nations. Therefore, the Persians and the "snarling" Greeks were the first to advance against these three divisions separately, with Mardonius leading them, who thought that he would not even need to fight, but would easily capture the retreating Greeks (Plut. Aristo. 17, 5).

The Persian "Immortals" and the other cuirassed Medes and Sakas quickly passed Asopus and with them the Bactrians and the Indians in the center and with a shout they all began the pursuit of the Greeks, while on the right they were followed, with no less eagerness and speed, by the Greeks "gnawing", eternal shame of Greece!

Three engagements, one quite far from the other, but with some interdependence, made up the Battle of Plataea. In the first, in the battle that the Spartans concluded with the Persians, the fate of the battle, but also of ancient Greece, was decided. Pausanias asked for help from the Athenians. But the Athenians were unable to reinforce him, because, while they were marching towards her

SAKAS ARCHER
direction of the Spartans, they were attacked by the Thebans.

Pausanias set a trap that was masterfully staged and Amompheratos with his Company with "slow pace" moved towards the main body of the Lacedaemonians which was four stadia (800m) away, calmly watching sometimes the enemies who were weighing and sometimes the Lacedaemonians.
Pursued by the Persian horsemen, without having panicked and with high morale, they joined the Spartan phalanx that had turned around and was waiting for them on the banks of the Moleon river, at the location of Argiopio, where the Sanctuary of Demeter was located. Pausanias performed a sacrifice and ordered his soldiers, while he was sacrificing, to place their shields at their feet and wait, without attempting an attack, before his signal (Plut.Arist.17,7).


But the movement of the Persians forward was done with indescribable disorder. Along with the Persian infantry there were also archers, who had as their only defensive weapon large wooden shields made of wicker mesh, that is to say, they were essentially unarmed in front of the iron fenced hoplites of Sparta. When they approached the Spartans they stopped, fixed their shields on the ground, thus creating a protective wall, and covered the Spartans with a cloud of arrows. For a time the Spartans and Tegeans bravely endured the storm protected by their shields.
When Pausanias after a sacrifice obtained favorable omens and after praying facing the direction of Heraeus of Plataea, he gave the order to set out. It is possible that he foresaw the bad omens and did not immediately order an attack, to give the Persians time to throw all their infantry into battle, so that they would have difficulty retreating and the Spartan victory would be complete. Then first the Tegeans, who had a position on the left of the Spartans, rushed against the Persians and Medes and led the entire Spartan phalanx into the attack.

Mardonius, at the head of the "immortals" of his left wing, charged against the Spartans. He probably also ordered his center to attack as quickly as possible. He had to force the Spartans to give battle, before they occupied in the foothills of Kithairon positions unsuitable for the attack of the Persian infantry.

Of course, his horsemen had not noticed the Athenians, who were advancing on plain ground, because they were hidden by the ridge of the hill of the Tower of Plataea. That is why no order was given for

PYRGOS PLATAION TODAY

attack on them. It is clear that Mardonius believed that he would win the battle if his best troops defeated the best troops of the Greeks, that is, if the Persians defeated the Spartans. In fact the exact opposite happened, he lost the battle, because his best division was defeated by the best army of the Greeks, the Spartans.

When the leaders of the other enemy divisions saw the Persians pursuing the Greeks, they gave the order to attack. These divisions rushed forward with great noise, thinking that they were going to attack the Greeks.

3rd BATTLE PHASE

The first battle took place on the shield wall. When they broke it up, the conflict continued around the sanctuary of Demeter. The Persians and Medes fought bravely. But, left without shields after the charge of the formidable Spartan phalanx, they were powerless to oppose the Dorian spear. The engagement quickly turned into a massacre, and when the illustrious Spartan Arimnistos killed Mardonius with a stone on the forehead, who was fighting in the midst of 1000 elite horse archers, the Persians and Medes gave up the fight, recrossed, pursued by the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans, Asopus and they fled (at least a part of them) to the entrenched camp.

Only the Persian horsemen, together with the Boeotian cavalry, remained disciplined and tried to
help the retreating infantry, forming protective barriers. The Greek phalangites nevertheless continued to pursue and massacre the Persians who were running in fear to save themselves.


If we observe the whole development and the movement of the opposing sections, we realize that a high strategic mind is hidden behind, none other than Pausanias of course! He had managed to lure the most elite units of Mardonius into a "funnel" and isolate them from the battle-worthy phalanxes of the Thebans and the other scrambling Greeks.


While the left wing of the Persians turned and fled, the center where general Artavazos was stationed with about 40,000 warriors, did not engage in the battle. According to Herodotus, Artavazos, who did not have good relations with Mardonius, seems to be watching the battle between the Persians and the Lacedaemonians as a mere spectator. Pretending that he too would fight, he marched at the head of his army at a slow pace. When he had advanced a little, he learned of the death of Mardonius and the defeat of the Persian army, and he immediately fled with haste to Phocis, with the intention of reaching the Hellespont and proceeding to Asia. This treacherous behavior of Artavazus is related to his hostile relationship with Mardonius.

However, another possibility should not be ruled out. That is, his delay in getting involved in the battle from the beginning was part of the Persian plan, in order to face a possible attack by the Greek center, which entered the battle late. According to one version, his body Artavazos, who was arrayed opposite the Greek center, did not dare to attack because the Greeks had occupied fortified positions in the area of ​​Heraion. Perhaps if Artavazos had rushed to the aid of Mardonius, then he would probably have been attacked by the Greek center. In this sense, he gets a different gravity the misunderstood role of the parts of the Greek center in the battle. It is enough to remember the heroic way the Megarians faced the Persian horse archers during the first days of the arrival of the Greeks in Plataea.

No longer facing the forces of Artavazos, the Greeks in the center (Megareans, Corinthians, Phleiasians) split into two bodies and moved to help the fighting
wings of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. One body, which consisted mainly of Corinthians, moved against length of the sides of Kithairon to help the Lacedaemonians, while the other with the Megarians and Phleiasians, moved towards the plain to help the Athenians. However, disorganized as they were, they were attacked by the Theban cavalry, who were covering the retreat of the Persian infantry. The Thebans led by Asopodorus of Timandros swept the units of the Megareans and Phleiasians, who lost about 600 men and were forced to retreat to the slopes of Kithairon. Thus they failed to help the Athenians.

The Athenians, who until the attack against the Spartans did not face any attack, as they were marching hidden behind the heights of the Tower of Plataea near Asopus, were forced after the request for help from Pausanias to change course and thus revealed their position to the enemy. The "biting" Greeks thus found themselves facing the Athenians.


It is not known how, but the general Aristides tried in vain to convince the Thebans by begging them to give up the battle and not prevent them from helping the Lacedaemonians who were in danger (Plut.Arist.18,6). However, Herodotus says ,all the others showed willful cowardice and did not fight, the Thebans attacked the Athenians and fought bravely.

In the fight that followed in the field north of the Island and between the height of the Tower of Plataea and the sanctuary of Androkratos, the Athenians defeated the Thebans, who had 300 dead in this fight. The Thebans hastily retreated to Thebes, and with them the other gnawing Greeks. According to the Ephorus, the Athenians, Plataeans and Thespians pursued the Thebans to their city, defeated them a second time and forced them to shut themselves up within the walls.

The battle was now decided. The plain of Plataea was littered with thousands of dead and suicides. The slaughter continued unabated near the Persian camp beyond Asopus and near Thebes. There those Persians who managed to fortify themselves, being pursued by the Lacedaemonians and the other Greeks, put up a last brave defense for a long time, but after the arrival of the Athenians from Thebes, who were well versed in wall fighting and who succeeded in opening a breach in the wooden wall , the Greeks, led by the Tegeans, poured into it and what followed is described in a revealing way by Herodotus: "And the barbarians from the moment the wall fell no longer formed a dense phalanx and all of them lost their martial virtue, and was to cry to them, as, panic-stricken and many thousands, they crowded into a narrow space."

Pausanias' order was not to capture anyone alive (Diod.IA, 32), an act unprecedented for the ancient Greek way of fighting, but indicative of how dangerous an opponent the Greeks considered the Persians to be. The slaughter of the Persians was universal and without mercy, though they begged in vain to be captured. And it seems that such was the anger of the Greeks,
carried away by the murderous frenzy of the battle, that with great difficulty they put an end to the havoc of their opponents who had dared to threaten their freedom.

LOSSES OF OPPONENTS

According to Herodotus, during the battle of Plataea, 91 Spartans, 16 Tegeans, and 52 Athenians were killed. He does not mention the losses of the rest of the Greeks from the beginning of the arrival at Plataea, nor the 600 of the Greek center, Megarei (159) and Fleiasi (441), who were killed by the Theban cavalry. He also does not mention the dead gnawing Greeks. He also mentions that only 3,000 Persians were saved from the battle along with 40,000 of Artavazus.

According to Plutarch (Plut.Arist.19,5), the total losses of those who fought for Greece amounted to 1360 men. While according to the Ephorus (Diod.IA 32,33) 100,000 barbarians and 10,000 Greeks were killed.

At the beginning of the road from Plataea to Megara, the Greek cities erected tombs for their heroic dead.. For ten days the Greeks buried their dead in a separate tomb for each city.
The Lacedaemonians opened three graves and in the first they buried the "Irenes" (the Spartans over 20 years old) among whom were the brave, Poseidonios, Amompharetos, Philokion and Kallikrates. In the second tomb the other Spartans-perioikos and in the third the helots. The Tegeans also buried their fallen compatriots in a special grave, as did the Athenians, the Megarians and the Phleiasians.

According to Herodotus and other Greeks who did not fight, in order to avoid the shame of their absence from the great battle, they built cenotaphs.

The Persians and the other slain barbarians, after they had robbed them of their gold, they left them unburied, as food for the vultures. But Mardonius' body was respected by Pausanias and he refused the proposal of Aeginitus Lampos of Pythia, to have it reburied, as revenge for the death of Leonidas in Thermopylae, saying among others that such acts befit barbarians and not Greeks.
According to Herodotus, on the second day after the murder of Mardonius, his body

FIELD OF BATTLE

disappeared and probably the Ephesian Dionysofantis took it and buried it and that for his deed he was later richly rewarded by Mardonius' son, Artantes. the tomb of Mardonius.

Long after the battle, as Herodotus tells us, the inhabitants of Plataea found on the battlefield cases of gold and silver as well as other objects. When the corpses of the barbarians decomposed, the Plataeans gathered the bones in one place and buried them. Among the bones was found a skull without seams consisting of only one bone and also the mandible (jaw) and the upper part of the jaw had monophyte teeth i.e. all the teeth were one bone. Also found was a skeleton five cubits high (about 3 m)! (Herod. Th, 83)


AFTER THE BATTLE
Shortly before the barbarians in the camp were still killed, a Greek woman, who was the concubine of the Persian noble Pharandatus of Theaspus, presented herself to Pausanias, adorned, together with her therapeinides (maids) and told him that she was the daughter of Hegetorides of Antagoros from Kos, which the Persians forcibly seized. Pausanias told her not to be afraid and handed her over to the Ephorus, who at her request sent her to Aegina.

Afterwards, and when I had all finished, the Mantineans arrived on the battlefield and expressed their regret that they had not been there earlier to take part in the battle. But they expressed a desire to pursue the departed Persian Atavazos with his army. The Lacedaemonians

RUINS OF PLATAIA
but they had forbidden the pursuit of the fugitives. When they returned to their homeland they condemned their gnawing generals to exile. The exact same thing happens with the arrived Ilians, who also sent their generals into exile.

It seems that in both of these cases there were political quarrels between the democratic and oligarchic sycophants. The opinion to rush to Plataea to join the common struggle seems to have prevailed at the last moment.

Herodotus also mentions that when Xerxes left Greece, he left Mardonius his luggage, made of gold and silver, as well as various curtains. When Pausanias saw these, he ordered the bakers and cooks to prepare a dinner for him just as they prepared it for the Mardonius. After these were prepared, Pausanias, seeing beds and tables of gold and silver and all that magnificent preparation of the dinner, is surprised at this luxury.

He then ordered his servants to prepare a laconic dinner. When this too was prepared, and because the difference was great, he laughingly invited the Greek generals, to whom, when they had gathered, showing them the two dinners, he said: "Men of Greece, I have invited you to show you the folly of the Medes, who while enjoying so luxurious a life, he came to take away from us this base food."

SPOIL - RETURN OF HONOR
The Tegeans who first entered the Persian camp captured the tent of Mardonius, from which, among other things, they took his horses' manger, which was entirely of bronze and worthy of admiration. They dedicated a part of the spoils to the temple of Alea Athena which was in their homeland of Tegea. They left the rest of the spoils at the place designated for gathering all the spoils.

After this, Pausanias announced an order through a herald, that no one should touch the spoils, but that whatever was useful should be collected by the Eilots at a designated point. So the Eilots, going around the camp, found tents decorated with gold and silver, beds gilded and silver-plated, kraters (cups) of gold and silver and other valuable objects. Also, what valuable did the dead bring besides clothes. The Eilots stole many of them and sold them to the Aeginites and presented only what they could not hide. As Herodotus mentions, the later great wealth of the Aeginites originated from these valuables.
After collecting the loot they gave the "tenth" (1/10) of it to the gods:

To Apollo of Delphi they dedicated a golden tripod placed on top of a copper column, which represents three snakes intertwined. On the tendrils of serpents

GOLDEN TRIPOD
they engraved the names of the cities that fought in Plataea. Most likely, on the base of the column, Pausanias carved the proud couplet:
"Greek general, in the army he wounded Midon, Pausanias Phoebus's memory rested there".
According to Thucydides, this epigram of Pausanias was the first cause of the disfavor he fell into, because the Spartans and the other Greeks did not forgive the victor of Plataea for his arrogance. According to the historian, the Greeks erased the epigram and replaced it with the names of the peoples. Perhaps at the same time they wrote on the base another epigram of Simonides: "The saviors of wide Greece were relieved of the servitude of a rigid pole".
The golden tripod was looted by the Phocians who occupied the Oracle during the Third Holy War (357-356 BC) with the Thebans, while the bronze column was transferred to the Hippodrome of Constantinople by Constantine the Great and part of it is preserved to this day.

The Greeks dedicated colossal bronze statues to Zeus of Olympia and Poseidon of the Isthmus (6.5m height of Zeus and 4m of Poseidon).

GOLD, TRIPLE TODAY
Sparta and Pausanias accepted the awards of bravery. Officers and soldiers divided the rest of the booty: Gold, silver, precious cloths, slaves. Pausanias was given ten of each kind, women, horses, talents, camels and other valuable things.
The Greeks also established on the battlefield an altar of Eleftherios Dios, on which they engraved the epigram of Simonides:
"where the Greeks of Nicaea hold the work of Arius Persa, promoting free Greece in common, Zeus established the altar of Eleftherios".
The city of Plataea, on whose land the freedom of Greece was decided, was decided to be declared "sacred, inviolable and neutral" and to undertake the obligation of offering annual sacrifices at the altar of "Eleftherios Dios" in honor of those who lost their lives in historical battle and the organization of a "celebration every four years called "Salvation".

FREEDOM TODAY
The city of Plataea, after being rebuilt with the help of the Athenians, lived peacefully and quietly until the years of the Peloponnesian war. The Plataeans, for the bravery they showed, were honored with a prize of bravery and received a monetary reward of 80 talents.
The Battle of Plataea was depicted on the western frieze of the Temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis of Athens and is the only instance of a representation of a historical event in a temple.

DISTINGUISHED IN BATTLE

According to Herodotus: Of the barbarians, the Persian infantry and the Saca cavalry excelled. and from the men, say Mardonius.
Of the Greeks, though the Athenians and Tegeans appeared valiant, the Lacedaemonians surpassed all in prowess in that they fought and defeated the strongest divisions of the barbarians.
Aristodemus proved to be the bravest of all, the only survivor from the battle of Thermopylae and for this reason he was despised by everyone in Sparta. To wash away his shame he fought fiercely without regard for death, killed many Persians and was finally killed. But he was not honored because he asked for death.


After him Poseidonius, Philokion and Amompharetos who had created the episode with Pausanias.
Also Kallikrates who was considered the most handsome man, not only of the Spartans, but in the entire Greek camp. Kallikrates wanted to show his martial talent as well, but failed, as an arrow pierced his side as he was in formation. According to Herodotus, the last words of Kallikrates were: "I am not sad because I will die for the country, I am sad because I did not kill any enemy.
Among the Athenians, Sofanis of Eutychidos from the municipality of Decelia stands out for his bravery (note .Tatoi).THE

PUNISHMENT OF THE THEBANES
THEBIAN WARRIOR
On the 11th day after the battle, the Greek army appeared before the walls of Thebes and demanded the surrender of the Theban leaders who had led the city to the Persian alliance. They were thus carrying out the oath they had given on the Isthmus, when they closed the treaty of the Panhellenic alliance.
After a siege of twenty days the city agreed to hand over the chiefs of the Medis. Attaginos
managed to escape. Timagenidas and the others surrendered by the Thebans to Pausanias were taken to the Isthmus and put to death. But the greatest punishment of Thebes was the dissolution of the Boeotian Commonwealth, in which this city had the first place. The dissolution of the Commonwealth particularly benefited Athens, which could now more easily exert its political influence on Boeotia.

THE FLIGHT OF ARTABAZUS

As mentioned above, the General of the Persians Artabazus, as soon as he found out the death of Mardonius, left with his body of 40,000 and headed towards Phocis
with the aim of reaching the Hellespont and crossing into Asia. When he arrived in Thessaly, the Thessalians invited him to host him and asked him about the rest of the Persian army, since they knew nothing of the events at Plataea. Artavazos knew that if he revealed the truth, he and his army would be in danger, because the Thessalians would attack him in order to atone against the other Greeks for their greed.

Reflecting on this, he said nothing to the Phocians, but told the Thessalians that he was in a hurry to reach Thrace to carry out a special mission and that they could host Mardonius and his army, which was following.

After this he hastily departed with his army for Thrace through Macedonia.
Because he was in a hurry, he followed the Mediterranean route and arrived in Byzantium with great losses, since on the way some were killed by the Thracians and others died of hunger and fatigue. From Byzantium he was transported by ship to the Asian coast and returned to his homeland.


THE BATTLE OF MYKALIS

At the foot of the mountain range of Mykali, in the area of ​​the mouth of the Maiandros river, the battle began.
The Allies seem to have lined up in two wings: on the right were the Athenians, Corinthians, Trojans, etc., while on the left were the Spartans with other bodies. The right wing marched straight into the Persian camp, while the left wing attempted to outflank the Persians by passing through various straits. The Spartans had to cross difficult terrain while the Athenians and Corinthians, marching along the coast led by the Athenian Xanthippos were the first to clash with the Persians, while the Spartans and allies were approaching the battlefield.
The Persians, according to their well-known tactics, came out of the enclosure and putting their shields into the ground, they started raining arrows. Herodotus reports that the Persians fought well at first, but the Athenians and the corps, which were with them, wished to defeat the Persians before the arrival of the Spartans, and continued to attack more vigorously.
Although the Persians remained on the battlefield for a while, eventually, after a fierce battle, the Greeks broke the resistance of the Persians, who retreated and entered the fortified camp pursued by the Athenians and Corinthians. Destruction ensued. When the Spartans finally arrived, they overran the camp and fell upon the rearguard of the remaining Persian forces, causing the camp to be sacked and the Persians to surrender.


The defeat of the Persians was completed by the mutiny of the Ionians. Herodotus mentions that the disarmed Samians, seeing that the superiority was on the side of the Allies, joined them, doing what they could. This inspired the rest of the Ionians to fight against the Persians. At what point in the battle this happened is not clear. The Samians did not take part in the main battle (as they were disarmed), so this was when the Persians were retreating from the camp. In the meantime, the Milesians and Aeolians, who were guarding the coasts of Mycale, abandoned their positions and attacked the Persians as well. At first they did not take an active part, but when they saw that the outcome of the battle was certain, they began to kill the Persians.
The Persians were defeated state by state and their army was finally disbanded. The Greeks attacked the Persian naval base and set fire to all their ships, completely destroying the Persian fleet. Any crews that escaped were killed, while troops from the Ionian cities took part in the pursuit of the fugitives. For the first time in the entire long war with the Persians, the Greeks went from defense to attack.
Herodotus does not give specific figures for casualties, but states that both sides suffered heavy losses. The troops from Sicyon lost their general, Perilaus. On the Persian side, their two leaders, Admiral Mardontis and General Tigranes were killed, as well as Admirals Artaunis and Ithamitris. Diodorus says that the Persians lost 40,000 men, while Herodotus reports that the Persian survivors fled the battlefield and headed for Sardis.


THE SIGNIFICANCE
The battle of Plataea and the battle of Mykalis were of great importance in ancient Greek history, as they were the last battles of the second campaign of the Persians in Greece, and because after them, the Greeks gained the upper hand in the Persian wars. The naval battle of Salamis saved the Greeks from immediate destruction, but the battles at Plataea and Mykali brought the war to an end. But, these battles are not as well known as those of Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon. The reason for this difference is not known. Perhaps it is in the conditions in which the Greeks were forced to fight. The battle of Thermopylae, according to historians, showed the heroism of the Greeks, while those of Marathon and Salamis show their intelligence in dire strategic situations. But, regarding Plataea and Mykali, historians believe that the Greeks themselves sought the battle and that they had become stronger, which is why they are not so well known.
Strategically, the importance of the battles at Plataea and Mykali is great (because they took place on land), as they showed the advantage of the Greek hoplite, who was heavily armed, against the light Persian infantry, something that the battle at Marathon also showed.

Results


Salamis, Plataea and Mykali were three disasters, within a short period of time, that even an empire of that time, like Persia, could not "digest" easily. The consequences of the defeat at Salamis, for the internal politics of Persia, could be avoided by the quick intervention of the army of Xerxes. However, the consequences of the battles of Plataea and Mykali were much more serious. With this victory, the Greeks not only put an end to the dreams of Xerxes, but also liberated Chios, Samos, Lesvos and all the other Greek islanders who lived under Persian rule.
The victory of the Greeks at Mykali marked for many Ionians their freedom from the Persian yoke. The Ionians defected from the Persians and expelled the Persian garrisons that each city had. This fact freed the Greeks of Asia from their tyrants and weak Persian occupation regimes and then they gained their freedom. The Ionians had vividly preserved the memory of the Persian reprisals after the failed revolt of 500-494 BC. For the cities of Ionia, mainly, their political situation begins to change.

THE FUTURE OF THE IONS
After their victory, in the autumn of 479 or the spring of 478 BC, the Greeks return to Samos to discuss the future of the Ionians of Asia, who had revolted. The Spartans proposed that the Ionians return to their homeland (in Ionia it was difficult to defend against future Persian attacks) and settle in the country of those who allied with the Persians. The Athenians, however, disagreed saying that the Ionian cities were from the beginning Greek colonies. They also demanded the expulsion from Amphictyonia of all cities that did not take part in the fight against the Persians. But even here the Athenians reacted strongly and saved the Delphic Amphictyonia.
The Ionians saw in the Athenian fleet the only force capable of preventing the return of the Persian troops. To make sure of their future, in the face of a possible vengeful fury of the conquerors, they asked to be accepted into the Greek alliance. The Spartans rejected their proposal and Leotychides with the Peloponnesian soldiers left for Greece. Only Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, with Athenian support, were accepted as members at the Delphic Amphictyonia, in the fall of 479.

THE ATHENIAN ALLIANCE
Sparta's withdrawal from naval operations left the Athenians free space in the Aegean and allowed them to handle various situations without hindrance. They decided to retake the peninsula, which controlled the grain transport route from the Black Sea, and besieged Sisto. The Persians who had gathered in the city, after running out of supplies, surrendered. With the fall of Sestos, Herodotus closes the history of the Persian wars. The Athenians also captured Byzantium, Iona and Skyros. In 478/477 BC, under Timosthenes, the Attica-Delos alliance was established, a special treaty within the Delphic Amphictyonia (which was under the supervision of Sparta), with the aim of protecting the Greeks of Ionia and continuing the military operations against the Persians. Individual cities in Ionia and the Hellespont became members of the Delian League (along with Athens) and formed the nucleus of the first Athenian League. The alliance was greatly expanded with the accession of the communities of Caria and Lycia.

THE PEACE OF KALLIAS
After 30 years, in 449 BC, the peace of Callias was signed, ending a war lasting half a century. By the embassy which he sent to the court of the Persian king at Susa, and which was headed by Callias, Pericles introduced a newer change in Athenian foreign policy. The war against the Persians was officially ended, although the danger from the Persian king continued to exist. However, the chances of a future Persian attack were mitigated and the Persians' interest in conquering Greece was reduced. Now, it was no longer troops, as in the time of Xerxes, but Persian money that was efficiently deployed.
With the assassination of Xerxes, in 465 BC. and the assumption of power by Artaxerxes, through intrigues and murders, began the slow collapse of the Achaemenids, which M. Alexander put an end to with the conquest of Persepolis in 330 BC.


CONCLUSION
Salamis first and Plataeus later, were the most decisive moments of the Greeks' struggle for freedom. The Persian wars ended after a generation, with the peace of Callias, in 449 BC. In these struggles, the Greeks did not fight only for their ultimate status. They knew well that if they lost the fight, exile and relocation awaited them. In general, their struggle was for freedom, human dignity and political autonomy. If the Greeks had not united against the Persians, it was certain that Persian despotism with all its consequences would have overshadowed them and the Greeks of Ionia. That is why the Persian danger awakened in the Greeks, for the first time in their history, the feeling of national dignity and unity. The response given by the Athenians to Mardonius, when he invited them to an alliance in 479 BC, is typical, that is, they cannot betray the "Greek" nation, which had a common origin, a common language, common sanctuaries, common morals and customs .
Athens had understood, more than any other city of antiquity, the deeper meaning of the struggle. That is why its inhabitants left their homeland twice and left the fleet to the supreme command of Sparta. They understood that the cause of the nation had to be placed above ambition and privilege. However, despite the victories in Salamis and Plataeus, the pan-Hellenic idea did not yet begin to take shape.
The global significance of the Greek victory against the Persians is obvious. With their victorious struggle for freedom, Europe is born as an idea and as a reality. The goods, for which the Greeks gave their lives, are still today the supreme values ​​for European civilization. Europe received and admires as classical models these achievements, which were created in the period following the victories at Salamis and Plataea. And let us not forget the pioneers of these victories, for whom fate reserved a cruel and inglorious end: Themistocles and Pausanias.
The Persian invasion influenced art and literature and inspired the creation of some of the world's great works. Phrynichus [1] worked out a matter, without fear of another fine. And Aeschylus, who took part in the naval battle of Salamis, made the tragedy of Xerxes a drama, which remains a unique, ambitious work. The Persian War still inspired, a little later, the father of History Herodotus to write his work and immortalize the struggle between Europe and Asia. Even in sculptures the fight of the Greeks against the Persians is immortalized.
With their achievements, the Greeks not only defended their political freedom, but also the spiritual autonomy of man. And if we today can call ourselves free people, people who have the right to think, we owe it to those who created the conditions for it.
Greece, despite its small area, compared to the Persian Empire, fragmented into innumerable states, did not seem capable of such a large and world-historical role. But the example of the struggle of the Greeks against the Persians for freedom, proves that the history of the human spirit does not depend on geographical and political factors, because it is mainly based on the potential of the creative personality, which is necessary for the politician to implement his plans. Persia had not a single remarkable personality to display, whose action had left its stamp in any field of the spirit. And of course this is not accidental. The flattening of the individual rather than the emphasis on personality is characteristic of the Persian state. For centuries, Greece gave new life to Persia, with artists, with doctors, with sages and the Greek spirit became the leaven of an entire world, the West and the East.

THE WEAPON OF THE WARRIORS
What Weapons were used by Warriors in Ancient Greece Ancient Greek History

BIOGRAPHIES

OF PAUSANIAS I (-470 BC)
King of Sparta, who ascended the throne after the death of Leonidas at Thermopylae. He was the initiator of the victory in the Battle of Plataea, which definitively ended the Persian invasions of Greece. After the end of the Persian wars, Pausanias wanted to implement his plan, which provided for the expansion of Spartan hegemony throughout Greece. With 20 ships he campaigned in Cyprus, occupied a large part of it and captured Byzantium from the Persians (478). However, his authoritarianism caused the complaints of the allies, who tried to convince the Athenians to assume the leadership. The Spartans recalled Pausanias to Sparta and replaced him, while the Athenians established the Delian League. Pausanias returned to Byzantium in 477 and stayed there for 7 years, trying to implement his policy. Finally in 470, the Athenians expelled him from Byzantium, since Pausanias had no support from Sparta. He was then accused of treason in favor of the Persians, almost at the same time as Themistocles, and condemned by the Spartans to death. Pausanias took refuge in a begging temple, but his persecutors built the temple and left him to die of hunger and thirst. The Spartans purged themselves of the agony later by dedicating two bronze statues to the temple.

The Definitive Neutralization of the Persian Threat The Battle of Plataea Ancient Greek History 

CONCLUSIONS
At Plataea, the last attempt of the Persians to conquer Greece and then Europe failed. Greek arms secured freedom, and since then no new Persian military operation against Greece has followed. There are many who consider that the victorious naval battle of Salamis saved Hellenism,

ANCIENT SQUARES TODAY
but in reality the freedom of the Greek city-states was secured with the victory at Plataea, which was notable as the highest moment of the Spartan army. The Persian army that was left was made up of the most reliable units led by the Immortals who were a very combative unit, but had the misfortune of running into one of the toughest war machines in history, in its prime.
At the same time, it seems that there was no lack of internal rivalries in the Persian camp, as evidenced by the behavior of Artavazos, which gives the right to insinuate enough.
Also the Persians seem to have learned nothing from Thermopylae. So instead of seeking battle in as open a place as possible, where the use of archers and cavalry would have given them an advantage, they too arrogantly chose to fight with shields and in hand-to-hand combat against an army whose soldiers were trained in this very kind of fighting from children. A natural consequence was the Persian defeat, which, as there was no homogeneity, quickly turned into a disorderly retreat and savage slaughter.
An important factor in the victory proved to be the strategic ability of Pausanias (nephew of Leonidas), who was rightly considered by historians as the main contributor to the Greek victory. "And of all the victories we have seen in our time, the most brilliant is won by Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotos of Anaxandridus" (Herod. Th, 64).
Greece could now in peace realize its cultural achievements that gave it eternity and worldwide recognition.
It would also not be an exaggeration to claim that Plataea was the beginning of the end of the mighty Persian empire. The Persians were reduced to meddling behind the scenes in Greek affairs, bribing the Greek cities with gold, to achieve their gradual weakening. Finally, they succeeded in something, the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) which completely weakened Greece. But since the God of Greece never leaves his country, he took care to make it strong again with the greatest of the Greeks, Alexander the Great, who destroyed the Persian empire by turning it into a Greek one.
FOOTNOTE
Herodotus relates that the tragedy of Phrynichus, "Militus alosis," performed in 492 BC, two years after the disaster, moved the audience to tears. The Athenians forbade the repetition of the work and punished the poet with a fine, because it reminded them of "familiar evils". But another tragedy of Phrynichus, "the Phoenicians", gave him the victory in 476 BC.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Herodotus books "i" "heavens" and "T" Calliope
Diodorus Sikeliotis "historical library, book 1"
History of the Greek nation volume II Athens publishing house
History of the Greek nation volume X Mr. Paparrigopoulos
Persian wars of Dim. Garoufalis
Median wars of Pantelis karyka
Tragedy of Aeschylus "Persia"
Plutarch "Themistocles"
Plutarch "Aristides"
Ctesias "Persia"
Lycurgus "against Leocrates"
Blog "Greek Ascension"

LINKS
http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/
http://www.elzoni.gr/html/ent/275/ent.13275.asp
http://pyrron.blogspot.gr/2009/09/blog-post_1159 .html
https://ellinonistoria.blogspot.com/2011/04/blog-post_19.html
https://ellinondiktyo.blogspot.com/2014/09/blog-post.html
https://perseasorion.blogspot.com/2013/05/6.html
https://history-pages.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_10.html
https://greekworldhistory.blogspot.com/2015/09/479.html
https://sofixanthi.blogspot.com/2015/11/19.html
https://www.offlinepost.gr/2022/06/14/i-maxi-ton-plataion/

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